Showing posts with label Va-Yiqra. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Va-Yiqra. Show all posts

Parshath Va-Yiqra’ (Leviticus I,1-V,24) 3/23/12

A.

As our parasha opens, Moshe is called to the newly erected Mishkan, where Ha-Shem instructs him in the order of sacrifice to be offered there. There are two Hebrew words which are generally rendered “sacrifice” in English, zevah and qorban. The latter is the most common and, as many different commentators have noted, is derived from the same root as qarov, “near, close,” signifying the purpose of the qorbanoth, to bring man and nation near to G-d, to establish a closeness between them.

Our parasha is concerned with the qorbanoth from the point of view of the individual on whose behalf the qorban is offered, and discusses four broad categories: The qorban ‘ola, or “elevation sacrifice,” an animal offering which is burnt up entirely on the altar; the qorban minha, or “gift offering”, which comes in several sub-categories, but generally consists of fine flour, oil, and lëvona (“frankincense”), shared between the kohanim and the altar; the zevah shëlamim, or “peace offering” (an animal sacrifice shared between the altar, the kohanim, and those offering it); and the hattath, or “sin offering”, brought for overt (if not necessarily intentional) actions in violation of one of the mitzvoth, shared between the kohanim and the altar.

Since the discussion of the qorban minha begins with the words נפש כי תקריב מנחה (“For a soul will offer a minha”; II,1), as opposed to the term adam, “human being,” used in connection with the other qorbanoth, Hazal understand its purpose to be some sort of corrective for the soul, though they do not specify what particular condition or affliction it is intended to correct (עיי' בענין זה ויקרא רבה פ"ג סי' א'-ד'). The Nëtziv, in his Ha‘améq Davar seeks further clarification, and suggests on the basis of I Samuel XXVI,19, in which David says to King Sha’ul, who has been persecuting him. אם ד' הסיתך בי ירח מנחה (“If Ha-Shem has incited you against me, let Him smell a minha”)שבא להשיג כפרה ורצוי על השחתת הנפש במדות (“that it comes to obtain atonement and conci-liation for the ruin of the soul through [bad] qualities [middoth]”), which seems to imply that the minha is also a sort of hattath.

This, then, suggests a problem with the logical sequencing of the four categories of qorbanoth in our parasha, since it would appear that the minha and hattath should be grouped together; why does the zevah shëlamim intervene between them?

B.

As should be obvious to anyone possessed of a חוש חי לשפה העברית (“living sense of the Hebrew language”), the word shëlamim is derived from the same root as shalom, “peace,” whence its translation “peace offering”. Hazal tell us, גדול שלום שכל הברכות טובות ונחמות שהקב"ה מביא על ישראל חותמין בשלום – בק"ש "פורס סוכת שלום", בתפלה "עושה שלום", ובברכת כהנים "וישם לך שלום" ואין לי אלא בברכות בקרבנות מנין? "זאת התורה לעלה למנחה ולחטאת ולאשם ולמילואים ולזבח השלמים" וגו' (“Great is peace, for all the blessings, good things, and consolations which the Holy One, Blessed is He, brings upon Israel are sealed with peace: In reading the Shëma‘ [in the evening, it is followed by] ‘Who spreads the shelter of peace’; in the tëfilla, [it ends with] ‘Who makes peace’; and in the birkath kohanim [Numbers VI], ‘and He will grant you peace’; and I have only [these examples] on blessings – whence [do I see this] with qorbanoth? ‘This is the Torah concerning the ‘ola, minha, hattath, ashan, the installations [of Aharon and his sons as kohanim] and the zevah ha-shëlamim’....”; ויקרא רבה פ"ט סי' ט'). In next week’s parasha, the phrase ‘this is the Torah’ introduces each of the categories there discussed, and shëlamim come at the very end.

In his commentary on the Haggada shel Pesah, the Maharal mi-Prag observes that, from the same root as shëlamim and shalom is derived the word shalém (“whole, complete, perfect”) with its abstract noun shëlémuth, and remarks that in the above examples the bërachoth are “sealed” with shalom כי השלום הוא סוף של דבר כדכתיב "כי אחרית לאיש שלום" כי על ידי השלום הדבר הוא בשלמות והשלמות הוא בסוף כי בהתחלה אין הדבר בשלמות וכאשר הדבר הוא בשלום הוא בשלמות כי לכך נקרא שלום וגו' (“for shalom is the end of a matter, as it is written, ‘for the culmination of a man is shalom’ [Psalms XXXVII, 37], for through shalom the matter comes to be in shëlémuth, and shëlémuth is at the end [of a process], for at the beginning the matter is not in shëlémuth, and when the matter is at peace [bë-shalom] it is in shëlémuth, for it is for this reason, it is called shalom....”; מתוך דרוש נאה לשבת הגדול).

In short, the reason that the qorban shëlamim occurs at the end of the series is because it is reflective of the perfection which comes at the end of a process. This is a fine explanation concerning the order in next week’s parasha, but why, in ours, does it fall between the minha and hattath?

C.

The essence of the qorban ‘ola is expressed by its name. As the Maharal remarks elsewhere (נתבות עולם ח"ב נתיב הענוה פ"ב), a human being is elevated by the very hithma‘atuth, (“diminution or reduction of self”) implied by the total dedication of this part of his capital to Ha-Shem, from which he derives no physical benefit, since it is burnt completely on the altar. This measure of dedication is the very tachlith, the purpose, of human existence, and so stands at the very beginning of the process.

As Rashi points out in comments on I, 3, and II, 1, both the qorban ‘ola and the minha are in the class of qorbënoth nëdava, “voluntary sacrifices” (as opposed to the hattath, which is a hova, an “obligation” or “debt” owed by the hoté’, the sinner seeking atonement. Rashi thus explains the use of the word nefesh, the “animal soul” of the offeror, אמר הקב"ה מעלה אני עליו כאלו הקריב נפשו (‘said the Holy One, Blessed is He, I consider it for him as though he has brought his soul as a sacrifice”).

Since the minha is not necessarily a hova, this implies that the “atonement” or kappara of which the Nëtziv writes is not necessarily occasioned by some specific failing caused by bad middoth, the hashhathath ha-nefesh to which he refers in the case of Sha’ul, but rather more generally a reference to tiqqun ha-middoth, the effort required to adjust the measures (the true translation of middoth) of the various character traits inherent in the nefesh to bring them into line with the Divine expectations outlined in the Torah, “bringing close” one’s soul to G-d, after its alienation through insertion into the body.

Only in this way can shëlémuth, in any meaningful sense of the word, be accomplished by mortal human beings. That it can be accomplished is evidenced by the Oral Torah’s insistence both that אין מיתה בלא חטא (“there is no death without sin”; שבת נ"ה.) and also, e.g., that Mt Nëvo was so called שנקברו בו ג' מתים הללו שמתו לא בידי עבירה זה משה אהרן ומרים (“since three people were buried there who had died not through any violation: Moshe, Aharon, and Miriam”; ספרי האזינו פיסקא ל"ג). Nëvo is derived from the word nëvu’a, “prophecy” (עמק הנצי"ב הגהות וביאורים שם).

Our parasha considers the sacrifices from the point of view of each individual on whose behalf they are carried out. It is for this reason, I believe, that the sacrifices are ordered ‘ola, minha and shëlamim, and only then hattath; because of those rare individuals capable of achieving shëlé-muth through a process of pure dedication and applied Torah, in the form of tiqqun ha-middoth.

But there are not many of them, and so when, in next week’s parasha, we go on to consider the qorbanoth from the point of view of the kohanim who officiate in the Mishkan/Miqdash and bring the qorbanoth on behalf of everybody, the hattath and asham precede the shëlamim. For the vast majority of us, the path to ehëlémuth lies through tëshuva, through repentance and return to Ha-Shem.

D.

We are now in the run-up to Passover. In this light, it is worthwhile remembering that the qorban Pesah is a special case of shëlamim.

Hazal compare the yétzer ha-ra‘ to the së’or sheba-‘isa, the “yeast in the dough” (ברכות י"ז.), because just as the leaven puffs up the dough with gases, increasing its volume without adding any substance to it all (indeed, it consumes a certain amount of the dough), so does the yetzer ha-ra‘ affect the human nefesh through such middoth ra‘oth as ga’ava (“pride”). Hence, whilst cleaning hamétz, leavened material, out of our homes, the sëfarim ha-qëdoshim advise that we should be striving to remove the spiritual hamétz from our souls. Hence, the entire preparation for Pesah is a process of tëshuva.

Done correctly, the resultant national shëlémuth will lead to the restoration of the Béyth ha-Miqdash and the renewal of the qorban Pesah, the shëlamim, and shalom, at the end of the journey.

Parshath Va-Yiqra’ (Leviticus I,1-V,26) 3/11/11

A.


This first parasha of the third book of the written Torah opens with Ha-Shem calling Moshe back to the newly erected Mishkan to instruct him in the sacrificial service which would be conducted there. He begins Moshe’s instruction with אדם כי יקריב מכם קרבן לד' מן הבהמה מן הבקר ומן הצאן תקריבו את קרבנכם (“A person [adam], that he should offer a sacrifice [qorban] from you to Ha-Shem; from the beast[s], from the cattle and ovicaprid[s] shall you offer your qorban”; I, 2).
The translation is deliberately awkward, in order to emphasize the rather odd word order of the first clause, adam ki yaqriv mikkem qorban.... Ordinarily, we would expect the particle ki, usually translated “that,” “for,” “because,” and so forth, to introduce the clause, yet here it is the subject of the verb yaqriv which starts it. This odd, idiomatic usage, whilst not exactly rare, is nonetheless distinctive, and serves especially to emphasize the subject of the sentence for one or another reason, and indeed a variety of suggestions may be found in the sëfarim ha-qëdoshim for its use here (עיי' ביחוד רש"י על אתר וגם ירושלמי שקלים פ"א ה"ד).

After running through the various possibilities for voluntary animal sacrifices (as opposed to those mandated for the atonement of sin), we arrive at ונפש כי תקריב קרבן מנחה לד' סלת יהי' קרבנו ויצק עלי' שמן ונתן עלי' לבנה: (“And a soul [nefesh], that it will offer a qorban minha to Ha-Shem; fine flour will be his qorban, and he will pour oil on it, and place frankincense upon it”; II, 1). Here we have a considerably more modest qorban than one composed of any of the preceding animals (even with the “luxurious” flourish of the frankincense).

It would seem just as likely that a nefesh, a “soul” will bring a qorban as an adam, so the alternation of terms comes presumably to teach us something; what might it be?

B.
In our first passage, Rashi comments on the word bëhéma (“beast”) יכול אף חי' בכלל ת"ל "בקר וצאן" (“A wild animal [hayya] could also fit the rule; the teaching is to say, ‘cattle and ovicaprids’”). There are wild animals which are perfectly kosher (such as the deer or gazelle), and if they can be trapped and properly slaughtered, they are completely permissible as food. Yet, no sacrifice is mandated from any of these creatures, only from cattle, sheep and goats.

Rashi does not identify his source in this case, but it is not hard to find a ma’amar Hazal which could inform Rashi’s comment. For instance, there is the following midrash: אמר הקדוש ברוך הוא עשר בהמות טהורות מסרתי לך שלש ברשותך שבע שאין ברשותך כו' שמא הטרחתי עליך שתהא מחזר בהרים ובגבעות שתביא לפני קרבן מאלו שאינן ברשותך? לא אמרתי לך אלא ממה שיש ברשותך מן הגדלים על אבוסיך וגו' (“Said the Holy One, Blessed is He, 'Ten kosher species did I give to you, three under your control and seven which are not under your control.... Did I burden you, that you should roam the mountains and hills in order to bring before Me a qorban of those which are not under your control? I told you only [to bring] from what is under your control, from those being raised at your mangers....”; מדרש תנחומא פר' פנחס סי' י"ב וע"ע תורת כהנים פרשתנו דאמרינן שם כעין זה כדוגמת ענותנותו של הקב"ה).
The principle being enunciated here is stated very explicitly later in the written Torah: כי המצוה הזאת אשר אנכי מצוך היום לא נפלאת היא ממך ולא רחקה היא: לא בשמים היא לאמר מי יעלה לנו השמימה ויקחה וישמיענו אתה ונעשנה: ולא מעבר לים היא לאמר מי יעבר לנו אל עבר הים ותקחה לנו וישמיענו אתה ונעשנה: כי קרוב אליך הדבר מאד בפיך ובלבבך לעשתו: (“For this mitzva which I am commanding you today is not too wonderful for you, and not too far away. It is not in the heavens, to say, 'Who will go up for us to the heavens and take it and make it heard to us and we shall do it.' And it is not across the sea, to say, 'Who will cross for us to the other side of the sea and take it for us and make it heard to us and we shall do it.' For the thing is very close to you, in your mouth and in your heart, to do”; Deuteronomy XXX, 11-14).

The Holy One, Blessed is He, does not demand from us what we cannot give, or even what is exceptionally difficult to give, whether we are talking about qorbanoth or about observing any other mitzvoth in the Torah; indeed the very concept expressed in our passage above, that observing mitzvoth is qarov, “close” to us, is inherent in the word qorban, derived from the same root. The purpose of a qorban is to bring us closer to G-d, and the very word which ere now has been translated “offer,” hiqriv, is a verb in the causative conjugation built on that root, with the sense of “causing closeness,” “bringing one close.” With this sense, then, that the mitzvoth are “close” to us, i.e. within our grasp to perform, and that we should yearn to be closer to the Mëtzavve, the Divine “Commander” of the mitzvoth, we turn to our second passage, that of the qorban minha.

As has already been intimated, the minha, composed primarily of flour and oil, is a much more modest affair than any of the animal qorbanoth discussed earlier. Obviously, only someone quite well off could afford to bring an ox as a voluntary ‘ola, whilst for someone in the middle rankings, a sheep or a goat is not beyond his means. The birds mentioned later are within the means of those with even more slender resources.

But the minha, says the gëmara: אמר הקדוש ברוך הוא מי דרכו להביא מנחה עני מעלה אני עליו כאילו הקריב נפשו לפני (“Said the Holy One, Blessed is He: 'Whose way is to bring a minha? A poor man; I consider it for him as though he has sacrificed himself [nafsho] before Me”: מנחות ק"ד:).' For those whose means can support animal qorbanoth, the humble minha is beneath them; for the poor man, who may have nothing more than a bit of flour and oil, donating a minha represents a real sacrifice, a genuine achievement.
But this implies that a qorban should, in fact, be something of a sacrifice, in the sense that we should be prepared to stretch our resources, what have ready at hand, to achieve it. The poor man does not see himself exempt, unable to offer any sort of qorban; he brings what is within his means to bring, albeit barely.
The question shows up very starkly if we juxtapose another ma’amar Hazal to the midrash cited above, this one again based on a verse incorporating our emphatic little idiom: מניין אשין דברי תורה מתקיימין אלא במי שממית עצמו עלי' שנאמר "זאת התורה אדם כי ימות באהל" (“Whence [do we learn] that words of Torah do not endure save in one who kills himself over it? As it is said: ‘This is the Torah: an adam, that he should die in a tent’ [Numbers XIX, 14; “tent’ here has the connotation of a yëshiva, a place of Torah study; cf. Genesis XXV, 27, Rashi ad loc.]; ברכות מ"ג:).
So what happened to “the matter is very close to you”?
C.
A bit later in our parasha we read: וכל קרבן מנחתך במלח תמלח ולא תשבית מלח ברית אלקיך מעל מנחתך על כל קרבנך תקריב מלח: (“And each qorban minha of yours shall you season with salt; and you will not abate the salt of your G-d’s covenant from upon your minha; upon every qorban of yours shall you offer salt”; II, 13).

Rashi, follows the midrash to write in explanation of this “covenant of your G-d”: שהברית כרותה למלח מששת ימי בראשית שהובטחו המים התחתונים ליקרב במזבח במלח ובניסוך המין בחג (“that the covenant was cut for salt since the six days of Creation, for the lower waters were promised to be offered on the altar through salt and the libation of water on Sukkoth”).
When G-d made the distinction between the “lower” waters of the ocean and the “upper” atmospheric water (Genesis I, 7), the midrash tells us, the lower waters (more properly, the sar or angelic being responsible for them) complained that they would thus be permanently alienated from G-d, more so than the upper waters. The covenant of salt mentioned in our verse was meant to be a consolation to them.

Rabbi Ya‘aqov Kaminetsky זצ"ל notes that several commentators (עיי' למשל שפתי חכמים וגור ארי') ask why this Divine pact was made with salt? Would the consolation not have been clearer if a libation of water with each and every qorban had been decreed?

In answer, he refers to a comment of Rashi on the Talmud (כתובות ע"ט: דה"מ המלח כו') in which he describes the commercial production of salt by evaporating sea water, and then goes on: והיינו שחלקי המים הקלים מתעלין על ידי החמה והנשארים נעשים מלח ובזה הוכיח הש"י דבאמת בוחר הוא בתחתונים שאפילו במים התחתונים עצמם בוחר בחלק התחתון שבהם ודו"ק כי כאן נמצא עיקר גדול בהשקפת ישראל על הרוחניות שאינה דוקא בעלמים העליונים וגו' (“that is, that the the lighter parts of the water [the liquid of the solution liable to evaporation] are elevated by the sun, and what remains becomes salt, and through this Ha-Shem proved that He truly chooses the lower realms, for even in the lower waters themselves he chooses the lowest part of them; study and receive this, for here is found a great principle of Israel’s view of spiritu-ality, that it is not solely in the supernal realms..”; אמת ליעקב עה"פ).

D.
Israel’s purpose in the material realm is to elevate the cosmos in sanctity and spirituality by using it to perform mitzvoth. Torah study, therefore, is vital and is a mitzva in itself, not merely the preparation for a mitzva by learning what to do. As a mitzva, it serves to elevate the nefesh, the vital principle which animates the body in this world.

But the capacity to learn varies with every individual. Some are great geniuses, capable of absorbing immense amounts of material and synthesizing it to find fresh insights, whilst others are simple people for whom each verse in the Torah is a hurdle and major accomplishment.
When the Torah asserts that it is קרוב אליך מאד בפיך ובלבבך, “very close to you in your mouth and in your heart,” the closeness must take into account this difference in capacity. One must dig very deeply and, stretch one’s resources, “killing oneself” over the books (to use the Talmud’s metaphor) to be all that one can be.

G-d does not demand of us what we do not have ready to hand, but He does demand of us what we do have; it is in that way that one can truly be maqriv eth nafsho.

Parshath Va-Yiqra’ (Leviticus I,1-V,24) 3/19/10

A.


As our parasha opens, Moshe is called to the newly erected Mishkan, where Ha-Shem instructs him in the order of sacrifice to be offered there. There are two Hebrew words which are generally rendered “sacrifice” in English, zevah and qorban. The latter is the most common and, as many different commentators have noted, is derived from the same root as qarov, “near, close,” signifying the purpose of the qorbanoth, to bring man and nation near to G-d, to establish a closeness between them.


Our parasha is concerned with the qorbanoth from the point of view of the individual on whose behalf the qorban is offered, and discusses four broad categories: The qorban ‘ola, or “elevation sacrifice,” an animal offering which is burnt up entirely on the altar; the qorban minha, or “gift offering,” which comes in several sub-categories, but generally consists of fine flour, oil, and lëvona (frankincense), shared between the kohanim and the altar; the zevah shëlamim, or “peace offering” (an animal sacrifice shared between the altar, the kohanim, and those offering it); and the hattath, or “sin offering,” brought for overt (if not necessarily intentional) actions in violation of one of the mitzvoth, shared between the kohanim and the altar.


Since the discussion of the qorban minha begins with the words נפש כי תקריב מנחה (“For a soul will offer a minha”; II, 1), as opposed to the term adam, “human being,” used in connecttion with the other qorbanoth, Hazal understand its purpose to be some sort of corrective for the soul, though they do not specify what particular condition or affliction it is intended to correct (עיי' בענין זה ויקרא רבה פ"ג סי' א'-ד'). The Nëtziv, in his Ha‘améq Davar seeks further clarification, and suggests on the basis of I Samuel XXVI, 19, in which David says to King Sha’ul, who has been persecuting him. אם ד' הסיתך בי ירח מנחה (“If Ha-Shem has incited you against me, let Him smell a minha”) שבא להשיג כפרה ורצוי על השחתת הנפש במדות (“that it comes to obtain atonement and conciliation for the ruin of the soul through [bad] qualities [middoth]”), which seems to imply that the minha is also a sort of hattath.


This, then, suggests a problem with the logical sequencing of the four categories of qorbanoth in our parasha, since it would appear that the minha and hattath should be grouped together; why does the zevah shëlamim intervene between them?


B.

As should be obvious to anyone possessed of a חוש חי לשפה העברית (“living sense of the Hebrew language”), the word shëlamim is derived from the same root as shalom, “peace,” whence its translation “peace offering.” Hazal tell us, גדול שלום שכל הברכות טובות ונחמות שהקב"ה מביא על ישראל חותמין בשלום – בק"ש "פורס סוכת שלום", בתפלה "עושה שלום", ובברכת כהנים "וישם לך שלום" ואין לי אלא בברכות בקרבנות מנין? "זאת התורה לעלה למנחה ולחטאת ולאשם ולמילואים ולזבח השלמים" וגו' (“Great is peace, for all the blessings, good things, and consolations which the Holy One, Blessed is He, brings upon Israel are sealed with peace: In reading the Shëma‘ [in the evening, it is followed by] ‘Who spreads the shelter of peace’; in the tëfilla, [it ends with] ‘Who makes peace’; and in the birkath kohanim [Numbers VI, ], ‘and He will grant you peace’; and I have only [these examples] on blessings – whence [do I see this] with qorbanoth? ‘This is the Torah concerning the ‘ola, minha, hattath, ashan, the installations [of Aharon and his sons as kohanim] and the zevah ha-shëlamim’....”; ויקרא רבה פ"ט סי' ט'). In next week’s parasha, the phrase ‘this is the Torah’ introduces each of the categories there discussed, and shëlamim come at the very end.


In his commentary on the Haggada shel Pesah, the Maharal mi-Prag observes that, from the same root as shëlamim and shalom is derived the word shalém (“whole, complete, perfect”) with its abstract noun shëlémuth, and remarks that in the above examples the bërachoth are “sealed” with shalom כי השלום הוא סוף של דבר כדכתיב "כי אחרית לאיש שלום" כי על ידי השלום הדבר הוא בשלמות והשלמות הוא בסוף כי בהתחלה אין הדבר בשלמות וכאשר הדבר הוא בשלום הוא בשלמות כי לכך נקרא שלום וגו' (“for shalom is the end of a matter, as it is written, ‘for the culmination of a man is shalom’ [Psalms XXXVII, 37], for through shalom the matter comes to be in shëlémuth, and shëlémuth is at the end [of a process], for at the beginning the matter is not in shëlémuth, and when the matter is at peace [bë-shalom] it is in shëlémuth, for it is for this reason, it is called shalom....”; מתוך דרוש נאה לשבת הגדול).


In short, the reason that the qorban shëlamim occurs at the end of the series is because it is reflective of the perfection which comes at the end of a process. This is a fine explanation concerning the order in next week’s parasha, but why, in ours, does it fall between the minha and hattath?

C.

The essence of the qorban ‘ola is expressed by its name. As the Maharal remarks elsewhere (נתבות עולם ח"ב נתיב הענוה פ"ב), a human being is elevated by the very hithma‘atuth, (“diminution or reduction of self”) implied the total dedication of this part of his capital to Ha-Shem, from which he derives no physical benefit, since it is burnt completely on the altar. This measure of dedication is the very tachlith, the purpose, of human existence, and so stands at the beginning of the beginning of the process.


As Rashi points out in comments on I, 3 and II, 1, both the qorban ‘ola and the minha are in the class of qorbënoth nëdava, “voluntary sacrifices” (as opposed to the hattath, which is a hova, an “obligation: or “debt” owed by the hoté’, the sinner seeking atonement. Rashi thus explains the use of the word nefesh, the “animal soul” of the offeror, אמר הקב"ה מעלה אני עליו כאלו הקריב נפשו (‘said the Holy One, Blessed is He, I consider it for him as though he has brought his soul as a sacrifice”).


Since the minha is not necessarily a hova, this implies that the “atonement” or kappara of which the Nëtziv writes is not necessarily occasioned by some specific failing caused by bad middoth, the hashhathath ha-nefesh to which he refers in the case of Sha’ul, but rather more generally a reference to tiqqun ha-middoth, the effort required to adjust the measures (the true translation of middoth) of the various character traits inherent in the nefesh to bring them into line with the Divine expectations outlined in the Torah, “bringing close” one’s soul to G-d, after its alienation through insertion into the body.


Only in this way can shëlémuth, in any meaningful sense of the word, be accomplished by mortal human beings. That it can be accomplished is evidenced by the Oral Torah’s insistence both that אין מיתה בלא חטא (“there is no death without sin”; שבת נ"ה.) and also, e.g., that Mt. Nëvo was so called שנקברו בו ג' מתים הללו שמתו לא בידי עבירה זה משה אהרן ומרים (“since three people were buried there who had died not through any violation: Moshe, Aharon, and Miriam”; ספרי האזינו פיסקא ל"ג). Nëvo is derived from the word nëvu’a, prophecy (עמק הנצי"ב הגמות וביאורים שם).


Our parasha considers the sacrifices from the point of view of each individual on whose behalf they are carried out. It is for this reason, I believe, that the sacrifices are ordered ‘ola, minha and shëlamim, and only then hattath; because of those rare individuals capable of achieving shëlémuth through a process of pure dedication and applied Torah, in the form of tiqqun ha-middoth.


But there are not many of them, and so when, in next week’s parasha, we go on to consider the qorbanoth from the point of view of the kohanim who officiate in the Mishkan/Miqdash and bring the qorbanoth on behalf of everybody, the hattath and asham precede the shëlamim. For the vast majority of us, the path to ehëlémuth lies through tëshuva, through repentance and return to Ha-Shem.


D.

We are now in the run-up to Passover. In this light, it is worthwhile remembering that the qorban Pesah is a special case of shëlamim.


Hazal compare the yétzer ha-ra‘ to the së’or sheba-‘isa, the “yeast in the dough” (ברכות י"ז.), because just as the leaven puffs up the dough with gases, increasing its volume without adding any substance to it all (indeed, it consumes a certain amount of the dough), so does the yetzer ha-ra‘ affect the human nefesh through such middoth ra‘oth as ga’ava (pride). Hence, whilst cleaning hamétz, leavened material, out of our homes, the sëfarim ha-qëdoshim advise that we should be striving to remove the spiritual hamétz from our souls. Hence, the entire preparation for Pesah is a process of tëshuva.


Done correctly, the resultant national shëlémuth will lead to the restoration of the Béyth ha-Miqdash and the renewal of the qorban Pesah, the shëlamim, and shalom, at the end of the journey.

Parshath Va-Yiqra’ (Leviticus I,1-V,26) 3/27/09

A.

Our parasha details the categories of qorbanoth which would be brought in the newly-erected Mishkan, and subsequently in the Béyth ha-Miqdash. Loosely translated “sacrifices,” from the Latin word sacrificere, “to make holy,” qorban hints at its true meaning when one realizes that its root also yields such words as qarov, “close, near.” The purpose of a qorban, then, is to bring one closer to Ha-Shem, and maintain that closeness, once it has been established.

One of these categories is the qorban mincha, an offering primarily of flour mixed with oil. The passage dealing with this qorban opens: ונפש כי תקריב קרבן מנחה וגו' (“And a nefesh, for it will bring a qorban mincha....”; II, 1). Nefesh refers to the life-force which animates the body, conveying its needs and wants. The usage is unusual; one expects instead adam or ish (cf. e.g. I,2, שפתי חכמים שם וע"ע תורה תמימה לפ"ב א', זי' ג'). This prompts the Ha‘améq Davar to offer in explanation: לשון נפש מלמדנו דמנחה בא לרצות על הנפש כו' אכן לא נתבאר על איזה דבר הוא בא ונראה מסוגי' דקראי שבא להשיג כפרה וריצוי על השחתת הנפש במדות. ומש"ה אמר דוד לשאול "אם ד' הסיתך בי ירח מנחה", פי' הסותך בי ע"י מחלה של עצבון וכעס ירח מנחה להסיר מחלה זו ממך וגו' (“The term nefesh teaches us that a mincha comes to appease on behalf of a nefesh.... So what it comes for is not specified, and it seems from examination of Scripture that it comes to achieve atonement or appeasement for destruction of a nefesh through [bad] character traits. For this reason, David told Sha’ul, ‘If Ha-Shem has incited you against me, may He smell a mincha’ [I Samuel XXVI, 19], i.e., incited you against me through a sickness of melancholy and anger, may He smell a mincha to remove the sickness from you....”; ע"ע ויקרא רבה פ"ג סי' ה').

A bit later, our parasha admonishes: כל קרבן מנחתך במלח תמלח ולא תשבית מלח ברית אלקיך מעל מנחתך על כל קרבנך תקריב מלח (“Each qorban mincha of yours shall you salt with salt; and you will not withhold the salt of the covenant of your G-d [melach brith Eloqecha] from on your mincha; on every qorban of yours shall you sacrifice [taqriv] salt”; ibid., v. 13).

The Torah also refers to a “covenant of salt” in Numbers XVIII, 19, when G-d tells Aharon: כל תרומת הקדשים אשר ירימו בני ישראל לד' נתתי לך ולבניך ולבנותך אתך לחק עולם ברית מלח עולם הוא לפני ד' וגו' (“All the donations of sacrifices [qodashim, which is much closer to the actual meaning of the Latin word] which the bnei Yisra’él raise up to Ha-Shem I have given you, and your sons and daughters with you, for an eternal law; an eternal covenant of salt [brith melach ‘olam] before Ha-Shem....”). As Rashi ad loc. points out, salt is a preservative, and hence this appears to be a metaphor for the permanence and enduring quality of the brith.

Other commentators make the same point in connection with our verse (cf. e.g. the comments of Rabbi J.H. Hertz ז"ל, late chief rabbi of the British Empire, in his translation of the Torah), but Rashi chooses instead to comment as follows: שהברית כרותה למלח מששת ימי בראשית שהובטחו המים התחתונים ליקרב על המזבח במלח וניסוך המים בחג (“For the covenant was made with salt from the six days of Creation, for the lower waters were promised that they would be brought close [liqqarév] upon the altar through salt and the libation of water on Sukkoth”).

What did Rashi see in our verse that caused him to understand this brith melach differently from the brith melach of the kohanim?

B.

Accept, for the moment, that G-d made this promise to the “lower waters”: One may fairly ask, why the nissuch ha-mayim, the annual watery libation which provides the occasion for the simchath béyth ha-sho’éva during Sukkoth when there is a Béyth ha-Miqdash, does not suffice in itself to fulfill it. Why should we need salt?

The Maharal mi-Prag asks this question in his Gur Aryeh, and notes that every qorban in fact consists of two parts, a component of solid food (the meat of the animal, the flour) accompanied by a libation of wine. So, he suggests, the salt is intended to serve as the solid food component, and the libation of water serves as the liquid.

Why salt, in particular? Look at the volume of water which covers the earth; it is apparent that the volume of salty water dwarfs the volume of fresh water. If the “lower waters” are those covering the earth’s surface, their makeup is best represented by a solution of water and mineral salts which, separated, provide us with a solid and a liquid. Hence, the above correspondence.

Fair enough; but there is also a much deeper matter here, and in order to understand, we now need to examine the matter of the “lower waters” and the Divine promise made them.

C.

The mayim ha-tachtonim or “lower waters” were formed on the second day of Creation, when G-d separated them from the mayim ha-‘elyonim, the “upper waters”; that the mayim ha-‘elyonim constituted the main body of water and the tachtonim were a secondary development is implied by the name by which G-d designated the partition: Shamayim, i.e., “there” [sham] is the water [mayim]”, also translated “sky” (cf. Genesis I, 6-8).

The Maharal notes that this division and degradation, as it were, of the “lower waters” was unique in Creation: וזהו הפך סדר הבריאה והמציאות שהולך הכל להתעלות תמיד (“And this is the reverse of the order of Creation and the physical realm [metzi’uth] which constantly aspires to be elevated”), and goes on to explain: ולפיכך לא היו נבדלים מהם עד שהבטיח הש"י אותם להיות קרבים על המזבח שיקנו ההתעלות (“and therefore [the lower waters] would not be separated from [the upper] until Ha-Shem the Blessed promised that they would be maintained in a state of closeness [qrévim] upon the altar, in order to secure elevation”).

The physical universe, the metzi’uth, is the result of a sort of process of congealing or materialization, in which a metaphysical input passes through a very high number of progressive stages of “thickening,” as it were, to manifest the world which we find around us (the more literal definition of metzi’uth). The material world, though, can only exist because of the spiritual energy at its core. The situation is precisely analogous to, and replicated in, the union of physical and spiritual which is a human being, comprising the body and nefesh living and functioning through the presence of the neshama, the “soul.” This underlies the many places in which Chazal compare the world to a human being (עיי' נפש החיים שער ג' פ"ב ולשם שבו ואחלמה ח"א ש"ג פ"א ). That spiritual energy at the heart of every bit of the material cosmos never ceases to yearn for elevation, for a return to its more exalted source; hence, the mayim ha-tachtonim would only consent to be further debased and physically alienated if they were guaranteed a spiritual ascendancy, to be niqrav, “brought close” once again to their Source. This is what Rashi and the Maharal mean.

Through this promise was established a pattern replicated in the other qorbanoth, writes the Maharal, שלא בחר למזבח רק ממינים השפלים שאמרו למה בחר בתורים ובני היונים שאין בעופות יותר נרדפים מן מינים אלו, ואין בבהמות וחיות יותר נרדפים רק שור וכבס ועז ובחר הש"י בהם (“For [G-d] chose for the altar only from those species which are humble, as [Chazal] said, Why did He choose turtledoves and pigeons? Because there are none amongst the fowl more hunted than these species, and there are none amongst the beasts and wild animals more hunted than cattle, sheep, and goats, and Ha-Shem the Blessed chose them”; עיי' בבא קמא צ"ג. ).

The reason for this, he continues, is כי העולם הזה הוא עולם הגשמי ואשר יותר מושל בו ומצליח בו הוא מצד שהוא מתיחס אל עולם הזה ואשר הוא נרדף אין הגשמיות בו ולפיכך הוא נבחר להיות נקרב למעלה הנבדלת (“For this world is the material world, and those who are more dominant and successful in it are more attached to this world, and who is persecuted is not materialistic, and therefore is chosen [nivchar] to be brought close [niqrav] to a rarified height....”).

Hence, predatory creatures are kosher neither for sacrifice nor for consumption. To the extent, then, that the mayim ha-tachtonim were separated and alienated in this world from the ‘elyonim, they merited they merited being sanctified and brought close to Ha-Shem on the altar.
And the presence of solid mineral salts dissolved in the lower waters is proof of their humility.

D.

With this in mind, we turn to Rashi on II, 1: מי דרכו להתקרב מנחה? עני. אמר הקב"ה מעלה אני עליו כאלו הקריב נפשו (“Whose way is to bring a mincha? A poor man. Said the Holy One, Blessed is He, 'I consider it for him as though he has sacrificed his nefesh'”; ועיי' מנחות ק"ד:). A poor man cannot bring an animal sacrifice, with its direct symbolism of the nefesh; he is too humble.

We see from the foregoing why it is that Chazal so persistently emphasize the cultivation of ‘anivuth, “humility,” as the cure and preventative for such spiritual diseases as David perceived in Sha’ul. This quality applies to nations as well as to individuals, and the Maharal’s essay supra serves to explain much of the history of Klal Yisra’él, the ‘am ha-nivchar or “chosen people.”
Seemingly paradoxically, the holy Zohar proclaims: מאן עני? דא דוד מלכא (“Who is a poor man? This is King David”; ח"א קנ"ז. ); since a just and righteous king recognizes that he owns nothing in his own right; rather, all of “his” wealth is the property of the state, and ultimately of the people he rules.

It is instructive that, in this holiest of seasons rushing upon us, the Passover séder opens with the demonstration that we are about to eat lachma ‘anya, the “poor bread” which our enslaved ancestors ate in Egypt. Yet, at the same séder, we recline like bnei mlachim, princes.

Demonstrably the most harried and persecuted of people, Klal Yisra’él are capable of sanctification, and rising, to a rarified level indeed.

Parshath Va-Yiqra (Leviticus I,1-V,26) 3/14/08

A.

דבר אל בני ישראל ואמרת אליהם אדם כי יקריב מכם קרבן וגו' (“Speak to the bnei Yisra’él and you shall say to them, 'A person, for he will bring from you a sacrifice....'” I, 2).

The wording of this first commandment in the book of Leviticus is a bit unusual; the word ki more usually begins a clause, followed by the verb and nominal subject. The presence here of the subject of the sentence, adam, outside of the clause means that it is especially emphasized by its odd position.

Rashi ad loc. follows the midrash (ויקרא רבה פ"ב סי' ג') to explain why the passage should so anomalously begin with adam: מה אדם הראשון לא הקריב מן הגזל שהכל הי' שלו אף אתם לא תקריבו מן הגזל (“Just as adam ha-rishon [the first man] did not bring sacrifice from stolen goods, since everything was his, you, too, should not bring sacrifice from stolen goods”).

In the Talmud (סוכה ל.), we find Rabbi Yochanan saying in the name of Rabbi Shim’on bar Yochai that a stolen sacrifice is invalid, לא שנא לפני יאוש לא שנא לאחר יאוש. בשלמא לפני יאוש "אדם כי יקריב מכם" אמר רחמנא ולאו דידי' הוא (“it makes no difference before [the original owner has despaired of his loss – yi’ush] or after yi’ush. Before yi’ush is all right, ‘a person for he will bring from you a sacrifice’ said the Merciful One, and it is not his”).

It appears that Rabbi Shim’on bar Yochai wishes to derive the invalidity of a stolen sacrifice from the word mikkem (“from/of you”), which he reads as though it is mi-shella-chem (“of yours”). Why does he appear to ignore the unusually emphasized word adam which apparently struck Rav Berechya, the author of the midrash cited by Rashi supra?

B.

If we turn elsewhere in the Talmud (חולין ס.), we find a discussion of the first ox which was offered by adam ha-rishon in sacrifice, and a number of remarkable qualities which it had. Not the least remarkable, of course, is that this ox, offered so soon after the Creation, could not have been born in the normal fashion of oxen ever since; it must have been one of the animals created at the very beginning.

This has ramifications in halacha, as we discover in yet another Talmudic source (בכורות נ"ז.), where we find a dispute whether or not an animal not born in the normal fashion can be a kosher sacrifice: The debate centres on Leviticus XXII, 27: שור או כשב או עז כי יולד וכו' ירצה לקרבן אשה לה' (“An ox or sheep or goat which is born... will be desired as a burnt sacrifice to Ha-Shem”), where we find that the Rabbanan would forbid, e.g. a yotzé dofen (an animal born by Cæsarian section) for sacrificial purposes, whilst Rabbi El’azar ben Yehuda would consider such an animal acceptable.

The halacha follows the Rabbanan (עיי' רמב"ם הל' אסורי מזבח פ"ג ה"ד), who insist that the phrase ki yivvaléd (“that it be born”) means that the animal be born normally. So it seems plain that, according to the majority opinion, the ox offered by adam ha-rishon would not have been a proper sacrifice. (If so, why did he bring such a sacrifice? As has already been implied, he did the best he could, since there were no other animals; the alternative would have been not to offer any sacrifice at all until a proper calf had been born and lived at least eight days. However, the flawed sacrifice which he did offer could not be an object for emulation.)

C.

Now we can see why the Talmud prefers to derive the prohibition of a stolen sacrifice from mikkem, rather than from adam. Turning to yet another place in the Talmud (נדה מ.) we find, in so many words: אמר רבי יוחנן דרבי שמעון סבר דבקדשים יוצא דופן פסול (“Said Rabbi Yochanan that Rabbi Shim’on held that concerning sacrificial animals a yotzé dofen is invalid”). As Rashi informs us, when the Talmud mentions Rabbi Shim’on without the patrronymic, the intent is always Rabbi Shim’on bar Yochai (שבועות ב: דה"מ משמו).

In other words, Rabbi Shim’on bar Yochai concurred with the majority opinion, and not with Rabbi El’azar ben Yehuda on this issue. For that reason, he rejected the example of adam ha-rishon, and looked elsewhere for the source of the prohibition.

But then what led Rashi to reject the Talmud’s conclusion here in favour of the midrash?

D.


The Sifthei Chachamim tells us that Rashi expected to find the word ish (“man”) here instead of the word adam, in light of the Talmudic pronouncement that adam generally refers to a ben Yisra’él (יבמות ס"א:) and, as is well known, non-Jews are also able to bring sacrifices (cf. I Kings VII, 41-3, מנחות ע"ג:). Hence, explains the Sifthei Chachamim, Rashi felt compelled to cite the midrash, enabling him to understand adam as referring to adam ha-rishon, common ancestor of all mankind, so that the prohibition of a stolen sacrifice applies to Jew and non-Jew alike.


The Talmudic source of this interpretation, cited supra, tells us: תניא וכן הי' ר"ש בן יוחאי אומר קברי עובדי כוכבים אינן מטמאין באהל כו' רבינא אמר נהי דמעטינהו קרא מאטמויי באהל דכתיב "אדם כי ימות באהל" (“It is taught, 'And so Rabbi Shim’on ben Yochai used to say, "The graves of idolators do not render [anyone] tamé when within an enclosed space...."' Ravina said, 'It appears that a verse excludes [non-Jews] from causing tum’a in an enclosed space, for it is written, "An adam for he may die within an enclosed space"' [Numbers XIX, 14]”). Thus, Rabbi Shim’on bar Yochai specifically held that adam refers to bnei Yisra’él.

But if this is so, then הדרא קושיא אדוכתה, our question returns: It appears from the first Talmudic passage supra (from Sukka) that Rabbi Shim’on bar Yochai wants to derive the prohibition of a stolen sacrifice from the word mikkem. If he really held that adam ordinarily refers to bnei Yisra’él, why was he not open to the drasha based on adam ha-rishon’s practice which Rav Berechya in the midrash and later Rashi favored?

It is true enough that other Tanna’im diasagreed with Rabbi Shim’on bar Yochai on the interpretation of adam, e.g. Rabban Shim’on ben Gamli’el and Rabbi Yossi (עיי' אהלות פי"ח מ"ט וכלאים פ"ח מ"ה, ר"ש שם). But it is Rabbi Shim’on bar Yochai whose view appears to be cited, not theirs.

The only possible answer, it seems to me, is that the gmara in Sukka never intended to learn the reason for the prohibition of a stolen sacrifice from Rabbi Shim’on bar Yochai. Rather, his opinion is cited in explanation of the mishna’s earlier assertion that לולב הגזול פסול, one may not fulfill one’s obligations on Sukkoth with a stolen lulav, just as one may not fulfill one’s duty to bring a sacrifice with a stolen animal. The mishna itself is anonymous and, as is well known, סתם משנה רבי מאיר, an anonymous mishnaic statement is attributed to Rabbi Me’ir (עירובין צ"ו:). As it happens, the gmara makes quite clear elsewhere that Rabbi Me’ir held that adam can also refer to a non-Jew (סנהדרין נ"ט.).

Hence, as Rabbi Me’ir did not accept Rabbi Shim’on bar Yochai’s opinion, he therefore would not have accepted Rav Berechya’s and Rashi’s reasoning concerning the word adam, and consequently needed a different hook on which to hang the universal prohibition of a stolen sacrifice.

Which he found in the word mikkem, QED.