Parshath Pëqudei (Exodus XXXVIII,21-XL,38) 3/4/11

A.

אלה פקודי המשכן משכן העדת אשר פקד על פי משה עבדת הלוים על יד איתמר בן אהרן בכהן: (“These are the accounts of the Mishkan, the Mishkan of testimony; it was drawn up according to Moshe, the work of the Lëviyyim under the supervision of Ithamar ben Aharon ha-Kohén”). So begins our parasha.

Yet another iteration of the work done on the Mishkan and its accoutrements, this one detailing the precise amounts of materials collected, allocated, and disbursed. As the lack of a vav ha-hibbur clearly tells us, it is not a continuation of last week’s parasha, and indeed the midrash asserts that Moshe had these accounts drawn up in order to dispel any notion that he had in any way profited from the rich and generous donations which resulted in the Mishkan (מדרש תנחומא ישן, פקודי סי' ד').

That said, our attention is drawn to the odd repetition in the introductory sentence of ha-Mishkan, Mishkan; surely there was only one Mishkan, such that it should not have been necessary to specify that it was the “Mishkan of testimony.” What was Moshe trying to tell us with the arresting repetition of the word?

B.

The Talmud records the following insight: הכי א"ר יוחנן אמר הקב"ה לא אבוא בירושלים של מעלה עד שאבוא לירושלים של מטה ומי איכא ירושלים למעלה? אין דכתיב "ירושלים הבנוי' כעיר שחוברה לה יחדיו" (“Thus said Rabbi Yohanan, 'Said the Holy One, Blessed is He, "I will not come into the supernal Jerusalem until I have come into the Jerusalem below."'' And is there indeed a supernal Jerusalem? Yes, for it is written, ‘Jerusalem, built like a city which has been connected together’ [Psalms CXXII, 3]”; תענית ה.), and Rashi explicates: ירושלים שלמטה תהא בנוי' כעיר שחוברה לה שהיא כיוצא בה חבירתה ודוגמתה מכלל דאיכא ירושלים אחריתי והיכן אם לא מעלה (“Jerusalem here below will be built like a city which has been connected, so that one is the same as the other, its twin and its model, since there is another Jerusalem, and where would it be if not Above?”). In other words, every aspect of the Holy City (indeed, of our physical world) is rooted in the infinite, metaphysical realm which surrounds and contains the physical cosmos. Hence, the Mishkan, which G-d described to Moshe as a מקדש ושכנתי בתוכם (“a sanctuary – miqdash – such that I shall dwell [vë-shachanti] amongst [Israel]”; XXV,8) is that “dwelling place.” The Divine Presence, resident amongst Israel in this world, is thus termed the Shëchina.

It follows logically that the word Mishkan is commonly considered to be derived from the root shin-kaf-nun. The root itself is a prefixed derivative of the primal root kaf-vav-nun, which has the general meaning of “established, firm, certain, ready to hand.” The radical prefix shin imparts a sort of causative, inchoative, or inceptive flavor to the primal meaning, as is evident from its use in creating principally quadriconsonantal roots as secondary derivatives of triconsonantal ones, for instance: shichna‘, “persuade, convince”, from kaf-nun-‘ayin meaning “give in, give up”; shihrér, “liberate,” from the root of the word héruth, “freedom”; shihzér, “restore, reconstruct,” from hazar, “return, come back”; and so on. We may thus infer that the metaphysical “dwelling” of the Shëchina in the Mishkan here below is intended to solidify, establish more firmly, and ensure the continual existence and replenishment of our ephemeral, entropy-ridden cosmos.

Interestingly, Rabbénu Bëchayé approaches this same idea in a comment on our verse from a different angle, taking advantage of what I have previously called the “creative ambiguity” inherent in the Holy Language: למה שני פעמים משכן, אלא ללמד שהיכל של מטה מגוון כנגד היכל של מעלה שנאמר "מכון לשבתך פעלת ד' וגו'" אל תקרי "מכון" אלא "מכוון" כו' בית המקדש של מטה מושך כח ממקדש של מעלה וגו' (“Why [does the verse read] Mishkan twice? To teach that the Temple here Below is directed toward the Supernal Temple, as it is said, ‘An establishment [mëchon] for Your seat have You effected, Ha-Shem’ [Exodus XV, 17]; read not mëchon but ‘directed’ [mëchuvvan]... The lower Béyth ha-Miqdash draws down [moshéch] power from the supernal Miqdash....”). Rabbénu Bëchayé thus appears to relate the word mishkan to the root mem-shin-kaf, which connotes “draw out or down,” emphasizing its role in stabilizing the universe and replenishing its “stuff” used up in the processes of entropy.

All well and good, so long as there is a Mishkan or Béyth ha-Miqdash in the world; but neither is standing today. Does this not suggest that the Divine dispensation has been changed, that perhaps Israel is no longer the ממלכת כהנים וגוי קדוש, the “kingdom of kohanim and holy nation” (Exodus XIX, 6) which they once were, that the mantle has been inherited by some successor?

C.

Halila vë-has! The midrash records another insight into the doublet in our verse: מהו משכן שני פעמים? אמר ר' שמואל בר מרתה שנתמשכן שני פעמים על ידיהם וזהו שאנשי כנה"ג אומרים "חבול חבלנו לך ולא שמרנו את המצות ואת החקים ואת המשפטים". מהו "חבול חבלנו לך" הוי שנתמשכן ב' פעמים ואין חבול אלא משכן שנא' "לא יחבול ריחים ורכב" וגו' (“Why [does it state] Mishkan twice? Said Rabbi Shëmu’él bar Marta, 'Because it was mortgaged [nithmashkén] by them,' and this is what the Anshei Këneseth ha-Gëdola say, ‘Taking collateral, we took collateral for You [havol havalnu lach], and we did not keep the mitzvoth, the laws and the judgments’ [Nehemiah I, 7], such that it was mortgaged twice; and havol refers to a mortgage, for it is said, 'One should not take as collateral the mill or upper stone.... [Deuteronomy XXIV, 6]....”; שמות רבה פנ"א סי' ג' וע"ע מדרש תנחומא פקודי סוף סי' ה' אותו המאמר בלשון קצת שונה וגם פירוש עץ יוסף שם על אתר).

Rabbi Shëmu’él bar Marta thus sees in the repetition an allusion to the Mishkan’s successor, the Béyth ha-Miqdash which King Shëlomo would one day build in Jerusalem, which would eventually be destroyed, the built again by the shavei Tziyyon under Zërubbavél ben Shë’alti’él, in the days of ‘Ezra and Nëhemya.

The Mattënath Këhunna explains what Rabbi Shëmu’él bar Marta means by “mortgage” or “collateral”: חרב שני פעמים ע"י עון ישראל כו' (“It was destroyed twice because of the iniquity of Israel...”). The word havol has destructive connotations (the modern Hebrew word for “sabotage” is derived from the root), as well as conveying the sense of a mortgage, collateral, a surety bond. The Béyth ha-Miqdash, with all its sublime purpose in serving as the portal and conduit for the flow of abundance into this world from the next, also served, as it were, as a fuse-box: When there was (as the Talmud tells us was the case in both instances; יומא ט:) a “surge” of iniquity, the fuse blew, to protect the integrity of the circuit as a whole.

Rabbénu Bëhayé, continuing his comment, takes note of the midrash, and goes on: ואם תשכיל במלת "המשכן משכן העדת"תמצא בהם רמז למספר השנים שעמד בית ראשון ובית שני וכן מיציאת מצרים עד שבנה שלמה את ה בית וגו' (“And if you penetrate the secret of the words ha-Mishkan, Mishkan ha-‘éduth, you will find in them allusion to the number of years the First Temple, and the Second Temple stood, and also from the Exodus until Shëlomo built the Temple....”).

The allusion is as follows: the gimatriya or numerical value of Mishkan is 410; the first Béyth ha-Miqdash would stand for 410 years until it was destroyed by the Babylonians under Nëvuchadnetzar. The word ha-Mishkan, comes to 415; with the addition of an extra five for the total number of letters in the word, it is 420. The second Béyth ha-Miqdash would survive 420 years, until razed by the Romans. Finally, the word ha-‘éduth, “the testimony,” is spelt anomalously without the usual vav; its gimatriya is 479; a total of 479 years would elapse from the first erection of the Mishkan until Shëlomo would dedicate the Béyth ha-Miqdash in Jerusalem, 480 years after the Exodus (cf. I Kings VI, 1; ע"ע בעל הטורים שגם הוא כתב כעין זה).
וכל אלו החשבומות ראה אותם משה ברוח הקדש וגו' (“And all of these calculations were observed by Moshe through the power of ruah ha-qodesh...”, a level of prophecy. Our verse is thus ‘éduth indeed that all of Israel’s history was laid out before them from the beginning, both the triumphal erection of the Béyth ha-Miqdash and its sad downfall. Whilst the proximate cause in each case of the destruction was the accumulated sinfulness of the respective generations, when G-d took out his rage on its stones and mortar. The very fact that it was so laid out in the beginning tells us that the prophets and rabbinical authorities of the respective times were well aware of heir limitations, the temporary nature of the first two structures.

D.

What is not specifically captured in the words of our verse is the length of the Babylonian exile, the hiatus between the two Battei Miqdash (seventy years), nor, indeed, the length of our present exile, before we shall see the permanent erection of the Bayith Shëlishi. For the precise length of such interludes is up to us.

The Torah predicts that it will be (as it has been) a long exile, filled with many twists and turns, a people decimated, a land abandoned and desolate: והארץ תעזב מהם ותרץ את שבתתי' בהשמה מהם והם ירצו את עונם יען וביען במשפטי מאסו ואת חקתי געלה נפשם: ואף גם זאת בהיותם בארץ איביהם לא מאסתים ולא געלתים לכלתם להפר בריתי אתם כי אני ד' אלקיכם: וזכרתי להם ברית ראשנים אשר הצאתי אתם מארץ מצרים לעיני הגוים להיות להם לאלקים אני ד': (“And the land will be abandoned by them, and will fulfill its Sabbaths in desolation of them, and they will repay their iniquity, because they despised My judgments, and their soul was revolted by My laws. And yet even so, whilst they are in the land of their enemies, I shall neither despise them nor abhor them to wipe them out, to overturn My covenant with them, for I am Ha-Shem their G-d. And I shall remember to them the covenant of the ancients, when I brought them out of the land of Egypt before the eyes of the nations to become their G-d; I am Ha-Shem”; Leviticus XXVI, 43-45).

However dark things may appear, we must remember that the integrity of the circuit was indeed preserved; in the absence of the Béyth ha-Miqdash, the morning service of Qorbanoth stands in place of the sacrifices (cf. תענית כ"ז:, and especially also Hoshéa‘ XIV, 3, wherein the prophet plainly alludes to prayer in place of sacrifice, when necessary), and so faithful Israel must and will persevere. There is a light at the end of the tunnel, for Moshe and the Sages of Israel knew what was coming, recording it and preserving its secret so that every succeeding generation, even ours, can take heart....

Parshath Pinchas (Numbers XXV,10-XXX,1) 7/6/07

A.

At the end of last week’s parasha we learnt that the bnei Yisra’él camped at a place called Shittim, where the brazen Mo’avi and Midyani women offered themselves as the ultimate weapon in Balaq’s arsenal to destroy Israel’s standards of decency and bring them down from their exalted status as the ממלכת כהנים וגוי קדוש, the “kingdom of kohanim and holy nation” (Exodus XIX, 6). ותקראן לעם לזבחי אלהיהן ויאכל העם וישתחוו לאלהיהן (“And [the women] called the people to the sacrifices of their gods, and the people ate and bowed down to their gods;” Numbers XXV, 2).

Things went from bad to worse: והנה איש מבני ישראל בא ויקרב אל אחיו את המדינית וגו' (“And behold, a man of the bnei Yisra’él came and brought close to his brothers the Midyani women....” ibid., 6), cavorting openly with the woman before Moshe and the rest as his fellow tribesmen jeered and egged him on; whereupon Pinchas, son of El’azar and grandson of Aharon, seized a spear and ran them both through in flagrante, an act which ended a plague which had broken out due to Divine wrath, and which (the last verse in the parasha tells us) had taken the lives of 24,000.

For which he is rewarded at the beginning of our parasha. It is curious, though, that the ish mi-bnei Yisra’él and the Midyanith are not named in the account of the incident, but only in our parasha, after Pinchas’ reward is established: ושם איש ישראל המכה אשר הכה את המדינית זמרי בן סלוא נשיא בית אב לשמעני: ושם האשה המכה המדינית כזבי בת צור ראש אמות בית אב במדין הוא (“And the name of the stricken man of Israel who was struck with the Midyanith woman [was] Zimri ben Salu, nasi (“president”) of the tribe of Shim’on. And the name of the stricken Midyanith woman [was] Kozbi bath Tzur, head of the nations, of the royal house of Midyan;” XXV, 14-15).

Why does the Torah not mention their names at the time of the incident, but takes the trouble now to expend two complete verses in order to tell us who they were?

B.

The holy Zohar tells us concerning the 24,000 dead from the plague: חס ושלום דאפילו חד מישראל מית אלא שבטא דשמעון כד אתו אינון ערב רב אתערבו בנשים דשבטא דשמעון בתר דאתגיירו ואולידו בנין מינהון מיתו בעגל כו' ואחרנין מיתו הכא אינון דאשתארו כו' וכל אינון זרעא קדישא אתמנון כולהו בגין דלא חסר אפילו חד מינהון (“Heaven forfend that even one of Israel died! Rather, when the êrev rav came, they became mixed with the women of the tribe of Shim’on after they converted and sired sons, of whom some died due to the [Golden] Calf... and others died here, those who remained... and all of the holy lineage were counted, since not one of them was missing;” ח"ג קל"ז.).

The êrev rav, of course, was the mixed multitude of foreign slaves who took advantage of the chaos accompanying the Exodus to leave Egypt with Israel (cf. Exodus XII, 38, Rashi ad loc.).

The Zohar is telling us that the âm, the anonymous “people” who found the blandishments of the Mo’avi women irresistible, and the members of Shim’on who egged on Zimri ben Salu with Kozbi bath Tzur, were in fact their immediate descendants. The fact that some of these members of the êrev rav had died in the incident of the Golden Calf (cf. ibid. XXXII, 8, in which the wording of the verse - ויאמרו אלה אלהיך ישראל אשר העלוך מארץ מצרים - “And they said, These are your gods, Israel, who brought you forth from the land of Egypt,” implies that somebody outside of Israel, the êrev rav, pronounced the words), demonstrates that when they had declared נעשה ונשמע, “We shall do it and we shall hear” with Israel, they had no idea what they were agreeing to; hence, their blind reversion to idolatry when panicked by Moshe’s apparent delay in coming down from Mt. Sinai; ibid., v. 1, Rashi ad loc.). Evidently, amongst those who had not perished on that occasion, there were some who were still susceptible to such blandishments at this late date.

But the Zohar asserts that none of “the holy lineage” had perished at the time of the second census (later in our parasha; cf. XXVI, 4-51). What, then, of Zimri ben Salu, chief of the tribe of Shim’on? He could hardly have been one of these “naturalized” members of the êrev rav. How do we account for him?

C.

In Genesis XXI, 23, Avimelech demands an oath from Avraham: ועתה השבעה לי באלקים הנה אם תשקר לי ולניני ולנכדי כחסד אשר עשיתי עמך תעשה עמדי ועם הארץ אשר גרת בה (“And now, swear to me here by G-d that you will not be false to me or to my grandson or to my great-grandson; according to the knidness which I have done with you shall you do with me and with the country in which you dwelt”). Rashi comments on the word ul’nechdi: עד כאן רחמי האב על הבן (“Thus far [extend] the mercies of a father on a son”).

The term neched (grandchild) is not very precise. For example, in foretelling the downfall of the mighty Babylonian empire, G-d proclaims through the prophet Yisha’ya: והכרתי לבבל שם ושאר ונין ונכד (“And I shall cut off for Babylon name and remnant, great-grandchild and grandchild;” Isaiah XIV, 22). The Talmud (מגילה י:) explains that the term neched here refers to Vashti, the queen of the Persian Empire whom Achashverosh ordered executed in a fit of pique at the beginning of the Book of Esther.

The Sdei Chemed clarifies: שהרי ושתי היתה בתו של בלשצר בנו של אויל מרודך, ואויל מרודך הי' בנו של נבוכדנצר כו' הרי אתה רואה שהגמרא [שם] קאמרה ושתי היא בכלל נכד והיא היתה בת בן בנו של נבוכדנצר, הר שגם בן בן הבן הוא בכלל נכד (“that Vashti was the daughter of Belshatzar son of Evil Merodach, and Evil Merodach was Nevuchadnetzar’s son... So you see that the gmara [op. cit.] says [that] Vashti is in the class of a neched and the daughter of Nevuchadnetzar’s son’s son, so even the son of a son of a son is in the class of neched;” ערך בני בנים, כללים סי' י"ח דה"מ ועל מה, וע"ע ירמי' כ"ז ז', רש"י ורד"ק שם).

So why is this relevant? Well, the midrash (תנחומא, פר' ויצא י"ג) asserts: ובלעם זה לבן (“And Bil’am is Lavan,” Ya’aqov’s father-in-law). Elsewhere, the Talmud informs us that Zimri ben Salu was in fact Sha’ul ben ha-Kna’anith (סנהדרין פ"ב:). This Sha’ul ben ha-Kna’anith is listed amongst the sons of Shim’on in Genesis XLVI, 10, and Rashi ad loc. follows the midrash in telling us that he was בן דינה שנבעלה לכנעני וכשהרגו את שכם לא היתה דינה רוצה לצאת עד שנשבע שמעון שישאנה (“the son of Dina who had been raped by a Canaanite, and when [Shim’on and Levi] killed [the inhabitants of] Shchem, Dina did not wish to come out [from shame] until Shim’on swore that he would marry her”’ עיי' מזרחי וגור ארי' שם בענין היאך אפשר ששמעון ישא את אחותו לאשה).

So now let us think a bit. Bil’am was utterly determined to curse Israel, to destroy the Torah nation before it could begin its mission to spread sanctity in the world, even though most of Israel were in fact his progeny, through his daughters Le’a and Rachel. The natural mercies of a father extend to his nechadim, Rashi informs us, and the Sdei Chemed shows us that this means they encompass three generations. But even Moshe and Aharon were already five generations distant from Bil’am (bnei Amram ben Qehath ben Levi ben Ya’aqov), hence outside of Lavan/Bil’am’s tender mercies, and able to eb cursed.

G-d was unwilling to countenance Bil’am’s inordinate, burning desire to curse Israel, as He told him: לא תאר את העם הזה כי ברוך הוא (“You will not curse this people, for it is blessed;” XXII, 12). Thus, the intended curses became blessings.

Reread the wording of the passage from the Zohar cited supra and note: חס ושלום דאפילו חד מישראל מית it reads: “Heaven forfend that even one of Israel died.” Not “of the bnei Yisraél,” the ethnic stock derived from the patriarchs, but “of Israel,” the new nation forged at Sinai of all who wholeheartedly accepted the Torah, whose members, born in the desert afterward would settle the Holy Land and implement the Torah. This newly forged Torah nation is the זרעא קדישא, the “holy lineage.” לא חסר אפילו חד מינהון; “not even one of them was missing.”

But Sha’ul/Zimri, the ish mi-bnei Yisra’él, was much older; the son of Shim’on and Dina, he was a great-grandson of Lavan/Bil’am, still subject to his tender mercies. Hence, he was exempt from Bil’am’s intended curse, and consequently also from the blessing resulting from its reversal. Instead, the “mercies” of his evil great-grandfather had set up a qitrug, an arraignment in the Béyth Din shel Ma’âla, which was activated when Sha’ul/Zimri succumbed to the temptations of Kozbi bath Tzur.

This, I believe, is a possible explanation of the double usage איש מישראל המכה אשר הכה, the “stricken man of Israel who was struck.” Zimri was first “struck” by the רחמי אב, the “fatherly mercy” of Bil’am/Lavan ha-rasha, prophet of the nations (as we see in Proverbs XIV, 34, וחסד לאומים חטאת, “and the kindness of the nations is sin;” עיי' פי' הגר"א שם ואין כאן מקום להאריך), which enabled, as it were, the strike by Pinchas’ spear.

D.

So why are Zimri and Kozbi not mentioned by name at the time of the incident?

The Or ha-Chayyim offers several suggestions: First, הנה האדון ב"ה אינו חפץ לזלזל אפילו ברשעים לפרסם מי בעלי דברים מתועבים (“The L-rd, blessed is He, does not wish to dengrate even evil-doers by publicising who is responsible for reprehensible things”). Hence, the Torah contents itself with ish mi-bnei Yisra’él and ha-Midyanith whilst describing what they did, mentioning their names only later, in connection with Pinchas’ reward, for באמצעות זה שעשה הקנאה בנשיא נתקדש שמו קידוש גדול (“by means of this that [Pinchas] acted zealously concerning a nasi, [G-d’s] name was very greatly sanctified”). The rank of Zimri and Kozbi emphasizes the courage with which Pinchas acted.

Then, too, עוד נראה טעם שלא הזכיר ד' שמו למעלה לפי שעדיין לא עשה מעשה אלא חשב לעשות וכל עוד שלא עשה לא תבזהו התורה להזכיר שמו ואחר שכבר עשה מעשה פרסם התורה שמו (“It also seems that a reason why Ha-Shem did not mention [Zimri’s] name supra is because he had not yet done anything, but only contemplated acting, and so long as he had not acted, the Torah did not wish to demean him by mentioning his name; but after he acted, the Torah publicized his name”). G-d, in short, does not engage in lashon ha-ra.

Finally, we note that the first reference to Zimri is as an ish mi-bnei Yisra’él (XXV, 6) and the second as an ish mi-Yisra’él (ibid., 14), the first signifying ethnic ancestry, the second membership in the Torah nation. The Or ha-Chayyim, I believe, has something to say about this as well, when he assures us שלא ידח נדח מניצוצי הקדושה וכולן לבסוף יזכו למקום שממנו באו והגם שיריע איש מישראל כי סוף כל סוף יחזור לשורשו והוא אומר "ושם איש ישראל" הרי שאפי' אחר מעשה בשם ישראל יכונה (“that none of the sparks of sanctity will be banished permanently, and all of them will merit the place whence they came, and even if an ish mi-Yisra’él does wrong, for in the end he will return to his root, as it says ‘and the name of the ish mi-Yisra’él’, for even after [such a] deed he is called by the name Israel”).

Parshath Mattoth-Mass’êi (Numbers XXX,1-XXXVI,12) 7/13/07

A.

Divinely commanded to settle the score with their Midyani adversaries, Israel defeats them in battle: ואת מלכי מדין הרגו על חלליהם וכו' ואת בלעם בן בעור הרגו בחרב (“And the kings of Midyan they slew along with [the rest of] their fallen...and Bil’am ben Be’or they slew with the sword”; XXXI, 8). However, Bil’am did not meet his end during the fighting; rather, the Sifrei informs us, ר' נתן אומר בב"ד הרגוהו שנאמ' "ואת בלעם בן בעור הקוסם הרגו בני ישראל בחרב וגו'" (“Rabbi Nathan says, 'By order of a court they executed him, as it is said, "And Bil’am ben Be’or, the wizard, the bnei Yisra’él killed with the sword...." [Joshua XIII, 22]'” פרשת מטות פיסקא ה'). In short, Bil’am was tried by Moshe’s Sanhedrin, convicted, and executed.

The Êmeq ha-Netziv, commenting on the above from the Sifrei, notes ומדכתיב "הקוסם" למדנו שדנוהו כמחשף ודעת ר"נ שב"נ הוזהרו על הכישוף כו' ואינן נהרגין אלא בסייף ומכש"כ מכשף דריה"ג סובר דדינו אפילו בישראל בסייף וגו' (“And from what is written, “the wizard,” we learn that they tried him as a m’chashéf [‘sorcerer’], and [that] in Rabbi Nathan’s opinion bnei Noach are admonished concerning kishuf [‘sorcery’]... and they are only executed by the sword; and especially a m’chashéf, since Rabbi Yossi ha-Galili holds that he is sentenced to [die by the sword] even in Israel....” עיי' סנהדרין דף נ"ו: ותוספתא דע"ז פ"ט לדעת רבי נתן, וסנהדרין ס"ז. לדעת רבי יוסי הגלילי ).

So the Netziv concludes that Bil’am’s sentence was justified. But was it?

B.

Elsewhere in the Talmud, we discover that Bil’am’s relationship with his athon (“female donkey”) was rather more intimate than it should have been. When the athon miraculously spoke on reaching Balaq’s camp, it blurted out, amongst other things, שאני עושה לך רכיבות ביום ואישות בליליה (“that [she] gave rides to [him] by day and carnal relations by night;” עבודה זרה ד:).

Now, the mishna tells us of Arba Mithoth Béyth Din, sqila (“stoning”), sréfa (“burning”), hereg (“death by the sword”), and cheneq (“strangulation”), in order from most severe to least severe, four death sentences which the Torah mandates can be administered by the Sanhedrin (סנהדרין מ"ט:).

Noting this, we move on a bit in the same massechta and find: אלו הן הנסקלין, הבא על האם ועל אשת האב, ועל הכלה, ועל הזכור, ועל הבהמה וגו' (“These are the ones who are stoned: One who has relations with his mother, or with his father’s wife, or with his daughter-in-law, or with a male, or with a beast....” שם נ"ג.).

Finally, we take note of one more eventuality: מי שנתחייב שתי מיתות נידון בחמורה כו' ר, יוסי אומר נידון בזיקה הראשונה שבאה עליו (“One who has incurred two death sentences, the more severe one is executed.... Rabbi Yossi says, 'The first instance which he incurred is executed;'” שם פ"א.).

Now let us think a bit: Regardless of whether we hold like the tanna qama (“first authority”) or like Rabbi Yossi in the last mishna, the result should be the same: Sqila is considered more severe than hereg, and presumably Bil’am’s relationship with the athon predated the kishuf in which he engaged concerning Israel; Bil’am, it seems, should have been liable for sqila rather than hereg.

At this point, the learned reader will ask to call a halt to the proceedings: Bil’am, after all, was a ben Noach, not a member of Israel, ואינן נהרגין אלא בסייף, as the Netziv himself writes: Bnei Noach are only subject to a sentence of hereg, the other three mithoth Béyth Din can only apply to someone who is subject to Torah. So why should we engage in any speculation concerning Bil’am’s sentence?

When I first read the Netziv’s comment, I was bothered by one thing: Why did he continue, after telling us that Bnei Noach are only subject to hereg, to tell us that Rabbi Yossi ha-Galili holds that “even in Israel” a m’chashéf is executed by hereg. What relevance does it have, if Bil’am was a ben Noach and not a member of Israel?

C.

The answer, it seems to me, lies in the unique juncture in history which the events surrounding Mattan Torah represent.

Noach, on leaving the teiva, was given seven mitzvoth: He and all of his descendants were forbidden to engage in idolatry, forbidden to curse G-d (into which category Rabbi Nathan and others place kishuf), to engage in bloodshed, in sexual impropriety, to expropriate another’s property, or to eat part of a living animal, and enjoined to establish courts of justice to adjudicate these matters and such disputes as might arise amongst them (רמב"ם הל' מלכים פ"ט ה"א).

This was Noach’s covenant with G-d. Over the next three centuries, fidelity to this original covenant rapidly faded amongst most of Noach’s descendants.

Into this world, the Patriarchs, beginning with Avraham, were born. Already fervent observers of the Noachide covenant due, if nothing else, to their education in the yeshiva which had been established by Shem and Ever, they were unlike the others in their respective generations, and yearned for greater spiritual heights. Their intense longing for dveiquth, for oneness with Ha-Shem, gained them early access to the Torah, even before the moment which had been Divinely foreordained for it to come into the world, and be formally commanded.

One by one, the Patriarchs and the shvatim, Ya’aqov’s sons, assumed wholly voluntarily and enthusiastically the spiritual discipline and consequent obligations of the Torah, making them gérei tzedeq of a sort, righteous converts (עיי' גור ארי' לבראשית מ"ו י'). The spiritual tools of Torah observance enabled the patriarchs (and the matriarchs) to scale dizzying heights of spiritual accomplishment. As a reading of Genesis demonstrates time and again, they were nevi’im, prophets, in close, frequent contact with the Divine.

Torah sources tell us that, just before Mattan Torah, G-d offered the Torah to all the nations of the world, before finally bestowing it on Israel (עבודה זרה ב:, זוה"ק ח"ג קצ"ב.). In preparation, therefore, should the nations have accepted it as Israel did, נביא הי' להם לאוה"ע כמשה, זה בלעם בן בעור (“The nations of the world had a prophet like Moshe; this was Bil’am ben Be’or;”במדבר רבה פי"ד סי' ל"ד, ע"ע מדרש תנחומא פר' צו א').

But, as already stated, nevu’a, prophecy, is a major spiritual accomplishment, one which requires and presupposes careful adherence to Torah practices, with all of the proper intentions and mental attitudes. As the Torah tells us, the patriarchs engaged in such practices. And, the midrash tells us, Bil’am, too, asserted that he observed the Torah (עיי' ספר פנינים יקרים בשמ המדרש ).

If Bil’am’s assertion to the authorities in Mo’av that he was Torah-observant had ever been true, this might serve to explain the source of his prophetical greatness as well. It would also mean, as with the patriarchs and shvatim, that at some stage of his life he was a gér tzedeq like them, and therefore, voluntarily, subject to Torah law. Had this “conversion” been at all sincere, it would also mean that his subsequent transgressions were also subject to Torah, and the Arba mithoth béyth din.

Herein, I believe, lies the significance of the Netziv’s aside, that “even in Israel”, a m’chashéf is liable for hereg.

So, if Bil’am had indeed subjected himself to the Torah, as we have suggested, and not merely to the seven Noachide commandments, why was he not sentenced to sqila because of the athon?
Because it was that unique athon.

Elsewhere in the Talmud, we find a discussion of possible birth defects, and the status of a fetus afflicted with one or another of them, where we learn: הכל מודים גופו תייש ופניו אדם, אדם (“Everyone agrees that [if] its body is a goat and its face human, [it is] human;” נדה כ"ג:). The reasoning is that the status agrees with the shape of the face; the superiority of a human being over an animal lies in the human ability to use language, and language requires the structures of the human face (רש"י שם דה"מ גופו תייש ובבראשית פ"ב ז'). Near the beginning of the discussion, Tosafoth clarify that the major question at issue in the status of each case is אם הרובע חייב סקילה כדין הבא על הבהמה (”If one who has relations [with it] is subject to sqila, like the sentence of one who has relations with a beast;” שם כ"ג. דה"מ ולאתסורי).

The unique, miraculous athon of Bil’am had been created with the power of speech; it was hence arguably similar to the case in the above gmara, the body of a beast with a human face, in which case, it seems, Moshe’s béyth din apparently ruled it human, for this purpose, and so Bil’am was acquitted on this count, and not sentenced to sqila, leaving him open to the sentence of hereg for kishuf.

D.

It remains for us to reflect a bit on how it was that Bil’am, who, the midrash asserts, had been a navi “like Moshe,” had sunk so low, whilst concerning Moshe the Torah testifies: ולא קם נביא עוד בישראל כמשה אשר ידעו ד' פנים אל פנים (“And there did not arise in Israel another prophet like Moshe, whom Ha-Shem knew face to face;” Deuteronomy XXXIII, 10). How had Moshe reached such a pinnacle of human perfection, and his counterpart Bil’am sunk so low?

The answer, I believe, lies at least in part in the following analogy: Imagine a young rabbi, a true talmid chacham, earnest and fervently observant himself, who accepts the leadership of a congregation of âm-horatzim, ignorant, lax in observance, and preoccupied with materialistic goals. Unless that young rabbi is a most outstanding and charismatic leader, and succeeds in relatively short order in transforming at least part of his congregation, he will be brought down by the congregation, and may even, over time, come to accept their norms and standards as his. On the other hand, his colleague who accepts a position in a thriving, vibrant Jewish community of learned, studious individuals, thirsty for Torah, will flourish, and will be elevated to even greater heights of achievement by the challenges posed by such a zealous congregation who take what he says seriously and are themselves earnestly ever striving upwards.

The first “rabbi” was Bil’am; the second, Moshe. Each came to embody the spirit and aspirations of his respective “congregation,” the nations of the world for Bil’am, and Israel for Moshe.

Parshath Dvarim (Deuteronomy I,1-III,21) 7/20/07

A.

The Book of Deuteronomy consists primarily of Moshe’s final address to Israel, as they stood on the plains of Mo’av opposite the city of Jericho, poised for the invasion of the Holy Land. Much of our parasha is taken up with Moshe’s recapitulation of the path they had taken over the last forty years, both literally and figuratively, to arrive at this point.

ויהי כאשר תמו כל אנשי המלחמה למות מקרב העם: וידבר ד' אלי וגו' (“And it was that when all the men of war had finished dying from amongst the people. And Ha-Shem spoke to me....” II, 16-17). The “men of war,” the Talmud informs us, were the generation of the yotz’ei Mitzrayim, condemned to end their days in the desert and never enter the Promised Land, in the wake of their panic-stricken reaction to the negative report which had been brought back by the spies sent out by Moshe thirty-eight years before.

That report had been delivered on 9 Av 2449. Over all these years, the generation of adults who had witnessed G-d’s miraculous pounding into submission of the Egyptian super-power, the drowning of her army at Yam Suf, and the revelation at Sinai and attendant miracles in the desert had been dying off. Each Tish’â b’Av (the date in Hebrew), the date would be announced, and the bnei Yisra’él would dig their graves and lie down in them, lest they die in the course of the night. When morning came, those whose time had not yet come would arise from the graves and go on about their business.

In the year 2488, on Tish’â b’Av, the people had followed the same custom. Only, this year, nobody had died. They were surprised; had they erred in the date? So the next night, they did the same. Again, no-one has perished. And the next night, and the next night.... Finally, on 15 Av, as they beheld the full moon, they realised that the gzéra, the Divine decree, had been fulfilled, and no one else was destined to die in the desert. Wild with joy, they established 15 Av as a holiday, which the Talmud compares in greatness to Yom Kippur (תענית ל:, עיי' רש"י, רבנו חננאל, ותוספות שם בשם איכה רבתי ).

The gmara goes on to list other historical events associated with 15 Av, each a cause for rejoicing in its own right: On this day, young women whose fathers had died without sons and as a consequence had inherited their fathers’ estates, were allowed to marry young men from other tribes of Israel than their own (on completion of the conquest and distribution of the land; cf. Numbers XXVII, 1-11; the prohibition had been in effect for one generation., in order to keep all the land allotted to each tribe together). On this same date, later on, the ban which had been imposed by the rest of Israel on the tribe of Binyamin was lifted, and they were once again permitted to marry members of other tribes (cf. Judges XXI). And also on this day, King Hoshea ben Ela of the northern kingdom of Israel abolished the guards who had been stationed on the roads to prevent any of its subjects from making pilgrimage to Jerusalem since the separatist kingdom’s founding by Yerov’am ben Nevat (cf. I Kings XII, 25-33), once again permitting them.

B.

The holiday was overtaken by events, overshadowed by that other day in the month of Av which looms so large in Jewish, indeed, in world history, the Ninth.

Aside from the disastrous report of the m’ragglim with its resultant panic-stricken revolt and concomitant Divine decree, the Holy Temple in Jerusalem was destroyed both times on this day (the first time by the Babylonians, the second by the Roman); the city of Beitar, last strongpoint of Shim’on bar Kochva in the final revolt against the Romans, was taken and its inhabitants slaughtered; simultaneously, the sacred ground of Jerusalem was ploughed and sown with salt by the Romans.

For these reasons, the mishna rules, משנכנס אב ממעטין בשמחה (“When the month of Av enters we minimise our rejoicing;” שם). The day’s inauspicious nature has continued down through the ages, and many other evil events have been associated with it (for instance, the First World War began on Tish’â b’Av).

The Yerushalmi, in discussing our passage, poses the question: מה יעשו גדולי הדור ואין הצבור נדון אלא אחר רובו, שכן מצינו שכל ל"ח שנים שהיו ישראל כמנודים לא הי' מדבר עם משה (“What do the great men of the generation do, since the public is judged according to its majority; for we find that the entire 38 years that Israel were, as it were, ostracized, [G-d] did not speak to Moshe....” ירושלמי תענית פ"ג ה"ד).

As the Qorban ha-Êida, ad loc., explains, the gmara does not wish to imply that G-d’s silence was absolute; rather, לא הי' מדבר עם משה ביחוד וחיבה, בלשון וידבר שהוא מורה על חוזק הדבור וחיבה יתירה (“He was not speaking with Moshe in private, affectionately, as suggested by the word ya-yedabbér which indicates animated speech and exceptional affection”).

This was, in short, Israel’s first experience with the phenomenon known as hestér panim.

C.

Hestér panim, literally “hiding of [G-d's] face,” is the term used by the Torah to describe the alienation from our Heavenly Father which results from failure to observe His commandments. The Torah gives us fair warning: Should we ignore the mitzvoth, G-d will be angry with us, ואנכי הסתר אסתיר פני ביום ההוא (“And I shall hide My face on that day....” Deuteronomy XXXI, 18).

G-d still runs His world, to be sure, but His beneficence in doing so is far less apparent. Rather than the warmth and affection evident in a close “I-Thou” relationship, we find ourselves relegated instead to the colder, more distant third person (compare, for instance, the pronouns used in Deuteronomy XI, 13-16 with the following verse, 17).

As a result of Moshe’s choice to send out the m’ragglim (cf. Numbers XIII, 2, Rashi ad loc.) and the bad reaction engendered by their report, Moshe and Israel were not cut off utterly; Divine guidance continued to be given, and mitzvoth were elucidated and clarified. What was missing was the intimacy and warmth; communication had become curt, cold, and impersonal.

Until that magical 9 Av 2488, when nobody died. On the subsequent 15 Av, when Israel were certain that the gzéra had been lifted, it was confirmed: וידבר ד' אלי, “And Ha-Shem spoke to me!” אלי הי' הדבור, exulted Moshe; the speech was to me!” The warmth and intimacy had returned to the Divine voice....

D.

The hey to dealing with the present state of hestér panim, I believe, can be discerned from what we have learnt of the interplay between 9 Av and 15 Av. Review the occasions which the Talmud associates with 15 Av, and you will note they were all acts of reconciliation, the ending of alienation of part of Israel from another.

Our present long and bitter exile began with the destruction of the Second Temple by the Romans. That destruction, the Talmud tells us, was the result of sin’ath chinnam, of “groundless hatred” between Jews (יומא ט:). It is time and long past time for the alienation to end, for the wearers of kippoth srugoth to grasp the hands of those of us who wear bekeshes, shtreimelach, and black hats; nor should those hands, when outstretched, be refused.

The name of the month of Av is derived from an Aramaic root which means something like “to bear fruit,” especially young, tender shoots (cf., e.g., Daniel IV, 9, as well as numerous places in the Talmud, especially the Yerushalmi; see also Job VIII, 12 and Song of Songs VI, 11 for rare instances of its use in Hebrew). The év, the young, tender fruit of Av, is the immediately following month of Elul.

Elul, the Séfer ha-Toda’â reminds us, is formed of the initials of אני לדודי ודודי לי, “I am my beloved’s and my beloved is mine” (Song of Songs V, 6). In the wake of the alienation in Av, G-d makes Himself especially available to reconciliation with Israel during Elul, if we will only take the invitation and make the requisite effort.

May Tish’â b’Av this year pass uneventfully, without adding to the chain of sorrows, and may the healing begin immediately thereafter.

Parshath Va-Ethchannan (Deuteronomy III,21-VI,11) 7/27/07

A.

This week’s parasha contains Moshe’s repetition of the Âsereth ha-Dibroth, the “Ten Utterances” with which Mattan Torah began, often misnamed the “Ten Commandments” (V, 6-18).

The Mishna describes how the kohanim used to pray in the Temple: אמר להם הממונה ברכו ברכה אחת והם ברכו וקראו עשרת הדברות ושמע והי' אם שמוע וגו' (“The one appointed [to lead the service] said to [the kohanim] to recite one blessing, and they recited [it] and read the Âsereth ha-Dibroth, Shma [Deuteronomy VI, 4-9], [and] V’haya im shamoa [ibid., XI, 13-21]....” תמיד פ"ה מ"א:).

Elsewhere (ברכות י"ב.) we learn: אמר ר"י אמר שמואל אף בגבולין בקשו לקרות כן אלא שכבר בטלום מפני תרעומת המינים (“Said Rabbi Yehuda, said Shmu’el, 'Even in the countryside people sought to read thus, but [the rabbis] had already abolished them because of the insinuations of the heretics [minim]'”), who used the practice to advance the claim to the less well-educated, as Rashi explains ad loc., that אין שאר התורה אמת ותדעו שאין קורין אלא מה שאמר הק"בה ושמעו מפיו בסיני (“the rest of the Torah is not true, and [that] you should know that [we] do not read anything save what the Holy One Blessed is He said and they heard from His mouth at Sinai”). In other words, the minim wanted to promotee the idea that there were “ten commandments,” rather than 613, which had to be obeyed (ע"ע ירושלמי ברכות פ"א ה"ה דאמרינן התם "מפני טענת המינים שלא יאמרו אלו לבדן ניתנו למשה בסיני").

Basing himself on the above passages, an anonymous chacham asked Rambam whether the custom of standing during the reading of the Âsereth ha-Dibroth should also be discouraged, on the grounds that it is מדרכי המינים המאמינים שלעשרת הדברות מעלה על שאר התורה (“of the ways of the minim who believe that the Âssereth ha-Dibroth are more important than the rest of the Torah”). He offers two explanations which he had heard for the custom, that it commemorates the fact that Israel stood during the original utterances at the foot of Sinai, and that it is an age-old custom of the ancient communities of Babylon. He refutes both of these, saying that the reason Israel stood was out of respect, since they were being addressed directly by G-d, and, similarly, that people in the Babylonian communities rose out of respect for the august personages, roshei yeshiva or reishei galutha, whom it was customary to honour with the reading; other, more humble communities not addressed directly by G-d or graced by such august personages need not follow the Babylonian example.

Rambam responds by ruling in favour of the questioner: בכל מקום שמנהגם לעמוד צריך למנעם בגלל מה שמגיע בזה מן ההפסד באמונה ומה שמדמים שיש בתורה מדריגות וכו' וזה רע מאוד וגו' (“in every place in which their custom is to stand they should be prevented because of what comes of it in loss of faith and that they imagine that there are levels [of truth] in the Torah... and this is very bad....” שו"ת רבינו הרמב"ם מכ"י אוקספורד, סי' מ"ו).

If so, why do we still stand?

B.

Rabbi Chayyim Yosef David Azulai (Chida) was asked the same question independently. He responded that the ban on reading the Âssereth ha-Dibroth together with the Shma mentioned in the gmara supra and standing whilst hearing the Dibroth during a regular Torah reading, are two very different things: הכא שקורין בס"ת כל התורה מידי שבת בשבתו וגם ביום זה שהם קורין עשרת הדברות קורין איזה חלק מהתורה בס"ת לית לן בה דמוכח דהכל אמת אלא שהם עומדים בהם להיות שהם יסוד התורה ונכתבו בלוחות (“And here where we read the entire Torah from the séfer Torah, sabbath after sabbath, and also on this day when they read the Âsereth ha-Dibroth they read a certain portion of the Torah from the séfer Torah we have no part in [this heresy] for it is demonstrated that it is all truth, but they stand during [the Âssereth ha-Dibroth] because they are the foundation of the Torah and were written on the Tablets....” שו"ת טוב עין סי' י"א).

More recently, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein זצ"ל (אגרות משה או"ח ח"ד סי' כ"ב) ruled similarly to Chida, but on the basis of a different rationale:

First, he notes that Rambam wrote in his comments on the mishna supra that the Dibroth are עיקר הדת וראשיתו שלכן חזינן שלא בטלו מלומר במקדש (“the root and starting point of the [Jewish] religion, for which reason we see that they were not abolished from being said in the Temple”).

He then cites the opinion of the Tif’ereth Yisra’él on the same mishna: דכך היתה התקנה אף בגבולין לקרות בכל יום עשרת הדברות קודם ק"ש. אולי מקורו הוא מלשון שכבר בטלום דלא שייך לשון ביטול על מה שלא הי' כלל כו' שהי' זה אחר זמן גדול משבטלום שרצו עוד הפעם להנהיג כו' ואמר ר"י אמר שמואל שכיון שכבר בטלום מחמת שבגבולין יש מקומות שלא נמצאו ת"ח והטעו המינים את ע"ה אין להנהיג בהא כו' (“that thus had been the ruling, that even in the countryside [it had been the norm] to read every day the Âsereth ha-Dibroth before reading Shma; perhaps [the Tif’ereth Yisra’él’s] source is the phrase ‘they already abolished them’ since the term ‘abolished’ does not apply to something which had never been at all... For this was some time after they had abolished them that people wanted to institute the custom once again... and Rabbi Yehuda said that Shmu’el said that since [their predecessors] had already abolished [the custom], since there were places in the countryside where there were no Torah scholars [unlike in the Temple, where the Sanhedrin was immediately available to answer questions], and the minim could mislead the peasantry, one should not reinstitute it....”).

Rabbi Feinstein concludes that standing in the synagogue is unrelated to this, but shows the importance of every individual member of Israel, who merited to hear these words directly from G-d’s mouth, דזהו ענין אחר אינו בכלל מה שבטלו דלפי זה אין לדמות מילתא למילתא (‘for this is a different matter entirely, amd is not sat all what they abolished, and accordingly one should not compare the one to the other”). The custom of standing during the Âsereth ha-Dibroth, he rules, is valid.

Rabbi Ovadya Yosef שליט"א, for his part, was asked a variant of this question: If one finds oneself in a synagogue in which the custom is to stand for the Dibroth, what should one do?

Rabbi Yosef begins by reviewing Rambam’s ruling, and declares אין לזוז מפסק דינו של הרמב"ם הנ"ל (“one may not budge from the above ruling of the Rambam”). He then proceeds to note Chida’s opinion, concluding that Chida was unaware of Rambam’s opinion, and would have changed his mind had he known of it. In support of this thesis, he adduces two other unrelated cases in which Chida ruled differently from Rambam and later reversed himself on learning Rambam’s view.

Turning to the immediate question, he notes that Chazal say: לא יהי' אדם יושב בין העומדים ועומד בין היושבין (“A person should not be sitting amongst the standing or standing amongst the sitting”; מסכת דרך ארץ רבה פ"ז וזוטא פ"ה), explaining that this only applies in the absence of a compelling halachic reason to behave differently than the rest. Nonetheless, to sit whilst the others were standing in this case would appear to show disrespect. Therefore, he suggests that if one knows in advance the custom of the synagogue, one should stand for the entire reading, or at least for the entire âliya in which the Âsereth ha-Dibroth occur, so as not to violate Rambam’s ruling not to stand specifically for the Dibroth whilst still maintaining peace and decorum (יחוה דעת ח"ו סי' ח').

Rabbi Yosef does nor mention Rabbi Feinstein’s opinion. Can they be reconciled?

C.

If we turn to the Shulchan Âruch, we find that, whilst he did not rule on this specific issue, he does say concerning Torah readings in general: א"צ לעמוד מעומד בעת שקורין בתורה (“One need not stand erect whilst the Torah is being read;” או"ח קמ"ו סע' ד'). His source in this is the practice of Rav Sar Shalom, one of the Ba’âlei Tosafoth, cited in the Tur (שם). Rema adds the gloss: ויש מחמירין ועומדין וכן עשה מהר"ם (“And there are those who are stringent and stand; thus did the Maharam mé-Rothenburg”).

On this, the Mishna Brura cites a comment of the Bach (או"ח קמ"א) דגם המהר"ם מודה דמדינא שרי אלא דס"ל דראוי להדר ולעמוד מפני שצריך האדם להעלות בדעתו כששומע הקריאה מפי הקורא כאילו קבלה אותה שעה מהר סיני ובהר סיני היו כל ישראל עומדין כו' (“that even the Maharam admits that it is permitted [to sit], but he holds that it is proper to stand because a person ought to consider as he hears the reading from the reader that it is as if he received [the Torah] that moment from Mt. Sinai, and at Mt. Sinai all Israel were standing....”).

Now, I once heard in the name of Rabbi Yosef Dov Soloceitchik זצ"ל an explanation that the difference between Rav Sar Shalom and the Maharam goes back to the question of what Ezra’s intention was in issuing the original ruling that one should read the Torah on Monday, Thursday, and Shabbath (בבא קמא פ"ב.): Did he intend it simply as a measure to encourage Torah learning, or did he have the deeper intent of emulating Mattan Torah three times a week, in keeping with the verse רק השמר לך ושמור נפשך מאד פן תשכח את הדברים אשר ראו עיניך כו' יום אשר עמדת לפני ד' אלקיך וגו' (“ Just guard yourself and guard your life lest your forget the things which your eyes have seen...[on] the day you stood before Ha-Shem your G-d;” Deuteronomy IV, 9-10, ועיי' יומא ה:).

If his intent was the former, the Talmud tells us that, from the death of Rabban Gamliel ha-Zaqen, due to advancing human weakness the old practice of studying Torah whilst standing was abolished (סוטה מ"ט. רש"י שם ע"פ מגילה כ"א.); this presumably underlies Rav Sar Shalom’s practice. On the other hand, if his intent was the latter, this explains the Maharam, who nonetheless agreed (the Bach goes on) ומי שהוא איש חלש וקשה לו לעמוד ועי"ז אין דעתו מיושבת עליו לכוין לקול הקורא יש לו לישב (“and whoever is weak and finds it hard to stand and for this reason cannot concentrate on the voice of the reader should sit”).

D.

Even if we agree with Rav Sar Shalom (as, apparently, both Rambam and the M’chabbér did) that the primary purpose of reading the Torah in the synagogue is study, it seems to me that there is nonetheless room to say that the two parashoth containing the Dibroth constitute a recapitulation of Mattan Torah, and therefore one should stand for them (as Chida and Rabbi Feinstein ruled). This is espoecially true in our day, when there are normally Torah scholars present in our congrgations (if only in the person of the congregational rabbi) who could deal with any minim and their issues.

But perhaps the best course is to follow Rabbi Yosef’s advice (who does not suggest making an issue of the custom, even though he disagrees with it), and stand for the entire reading, or at least the relevant âliya rather than only for the Dibroth, in deference to Rambam’s opinion, so as to comply with all the rulings, and avoid disputes.

For אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים (“These and these are the living words of G-d;” עירובין י"ג:).

Parshath Mishpatim (Exodus XXI,1-XXIV,18) 2/14/07

A.

At G-d’s behest, Moshe, Aharon, his sons Nadav and Avihu, and the first Sanhedrin, the seventy elders selected by Moshe, approach the summit of the mountain, and behold a vision: ויראו את אלקי ישראל ותחת רגליו כמעשה לבנת הספיר וכעצם השמים לטהר (“And they saw the G-d of Israel, and under His feet was like a piece of sapphire brickwork, and like the very heavens in purity;” XXIV, 10).

Rashi explains the intended significance of the brickwork: היא היתה לפניו בשעת השעבוד לזכור צרתן של ישראל שהיו משועבדים במעשה לבנים (“[The brick] was before Him during [the Egyptian] enslavement, to recall the sufferings of Israel, who had been enslaved through brickwork”). G-d wanted to demonstrate to the leadership of Israel that throughout the entire trial of their suffering in Egypt, He had been נושא בעול, sharing in what they had gone through. They had never been alone the whole time.

Elsewhere, in the Talmud (ירושלמי סוכה פ"ד ה"ג), we find a number of drashoth involving this verse, and amongst them this one: אמר ר' מיישה, בבבל כתיב "כמראה אבן ספיר" ובמצרים כתיב "כמעשה לבנת הספיר" ללמדך כשם שהאבן קשה מן הלבינה כך שעבודה של בבל היתה קשה משעבודה של מצרים (“Said Rabbi Miyyasha, 'Concerning Babylon it is written "like the appearance of sapphire stone" [Ezekiel I, 26] and concerning Egypt it is written "like a piece of sapphire brickwork," to teach you that just as a stone is harder than a brick, so was the Babylonian enslavement harder than the Egyptian enslavement'”).

The Babylonian exile lasted only 70 years as ooposed to the 210 years of Egyptian exile. Even if we deal only with the worst period in Egypt, the actual time under the lash, that lasted some 80 years. How, then, was the Babylonian enslavement harder?

The Pnei Moshe’s comment on the above passage, וכפי תוקף הגלות היתה המראה (“and according to the effectivity of the exile was the vision”) does not, at first blush, seem to help us much. What was the difference in the “effectivity” of each respective exile?

B.

The whole point of the drasha hangs on the comparison between brick and stone. What other passages can enlighten us about such a difference?

In the first mishna in Bava Bathra, we find the following: השותפין שרצו לעשות מחיצה בחצר, בונין את הכותל באמצע וכו' בונין... גויל, זה נותן ג' טפחים וזה נותן ג' טפחים וכו' בלבינים, זה נותן טפח ומחצה וזה נותן טפח ומחצה וגו' (“The partners [in a piece of property] who desire to build a partition in the courtyard, build the wall in the middle.... [If] they build... [with] undressed stone, each one gives up three tfachim on his side... [If they build] with bricks, each one gives up a tefach and half;” a tefach is a linear unit equivalent to 9.6cm or 3.8 inches [בשיעור החזון אי"ש]).

Rashi explains the implication, שעובי כותל גויל ו' טפחים... ושל לבינים ג' (“that the thickness of a wall of [a single course of] undressed stone is six tfachim... and of bricks, three”). In other words, a standard-sized undressed stone in the Talmud is 2 tfachim longer than a standard-sized brick along any of the three axes. This being so, 2 x 2 x 2 tells us that a standard-sized undressed stone was eight times larger than a standard brick.

So?

C.

In Genesis XLVI, 27, we read, in part: כל הנפש לבית יעקב הבאה מצרימה שבעים (“All the souls of the house of Ya’aqov who were coming to Egypt [were] seventy”). The same number is repeated in Exodus I, 5. But this is not the end of the story.

The midrash (מדרש תנחומא פרשת שמות ג') picks up on the phrase איש וביתו באו (“[each] man came with his household”) in Exodus I, 1 to tell us: מלמד שלא ירד למצרים עד שמנה לפרץ ולחצרון, זה בן שנה וזה בן שתי שנים, וזיווג להם נשים )”It teaches that [Ya’aqov] did not descend to Egypt until he had taken account of [his grandchildren] Peretz and Chatzron, the first one year old and the second two, and matched them with wives;” אבל עיי' עץ יוסף כאן). Based on the well-known Talmudic principle that ביתו זו אשתו (“one’s household is one’s wife;” cf., e.g., גיטין נ"ב.), then, each male member of Ya’aqov’s household had a female counterpart; 70 x 2 = 140.

But this is also not definitive in terms of the number of exiles. There were female members of this household: Dina bath Ya’aqov, Serach bath Asher, and Yocheved; there was also Ya’aqov himself and his three surviving wives, Le’a, Bilha and Zilpa (already taken into account). Thus, a total of 63 wives can be added to the 70 original members, and so we arrive at a total of 133 people who entered the Egyptian exile.

But R’ Miyyasha is comparing the שעבוד, the enslavement, of one exile to the other. How many of the original exiles actually lived long enough to feel the Egyptian enslavement?

We know that Ya’aqov died before it began (Genesis XLIX, 33). Presumably (in the absence of any statement to the contrary) his wives also predeceased their children in the normal order of events. Then (Exodus I, 6): וימת יוסף וכל אחיו וכל הדור ההוא (“And Yosef and all his brothers, and all that generation, died”). So we have the twelve brothers, their wives, their sister Dina, and Ya’aqov and his wives, 29 in all, whom we must subtract from the total number who had entered exile, to get the number of original exiles who actually saw the enslavement: 104.

If we now turn to Jeremiah LII, 23, we read that: בשנת שמונה עשרה לנבוכדראצר מירושלם נפש שמונה מאות שלשים ושנים (“In the eighteenth year of Nevuchadretzar [there were exiled] from Jerusalem 832 souls”). This, as Rashi and the M’tzudath David tell us, constituted the last surviors of the siege of Jerusalem, driven straight into slavery with their king, Tzidqiyahu. Do the math; the final group of Babylonian exiles was exactly eight times as large as the group of original Egyptian exiles who had been enslaved by the Egyptians. According to its תוקף, its effectivity, the Babylonian exile was harder; it took effect immediately as they were exiled, and eight times as many people went from freedom into slavery.

D.

From this we can see that even in their metaphors, Chazal were careful to utilise exact language. They did not simply wax poetic; even their metaphors and similes have a precise quality to them, waiting for us to discover.

Parshath Êqev (Deuteronomy VII,12-XI,25) 8/3/07

A.

פסילי אלהיהם תשרפו באש לא תחמד כסף וזהב עליהם ולקחת לך פן תוקש בו כי תועבת ד' אלקיך הוא (“The idols of their gods you shall burn with fire; you shall not covet and take for yourself what silver and gold is upon them, lest you be ensnared by it, for it is an abomination of Ha-Shem your G-d;” VII, 25).

The Talmud goes on to detail what is permitted and what forbidden: הנכרים העובדים את ההרים ואת הגבעות, הן מותרין ומה שעליהן אסורין כו' ר' יוסי הגלילי אומר אלהיהם על ההרים ולא ההרים אלהיהם, אלהיהם על הגבעות ולא הגבעות אלהיהם. ומפני מה אשירה אסורה? מפני שיש בה תפיסת ידי אדם וכל שיש בה תפיסת ידי אדם אסור (“The foreigners who worship the mountains and the hills, [the mountains and hills] are permitted and what is upon them is forbidden.... Rabbi Yossi ha-Galili says, Their gods are on the mountains, the mountains are not their gods; their gods are on the hills, the hills are not their gods. And why is an asheira forbidden? Because it has tfisath yad [i.e., it has been handled by human beings], and whatever has tfisath yad is forbidden;” עבודה זרה מ"ה., ע"ע רמב"ם הל' עבודה זרה פ"ח ה"א-ג ושו"ע יו"ד סי' קמ"ה סע' א').

An asheira, it will be remembered, is a tree dedicated to idolatrous purposes in the Canaanite cult. Trees can be handled by human beings; the seeds must be planted, the young trees tended, and so on. As a rule, this is not the case with mountains or hills, and so they cannot have been created for such purposes, and hence ought not be prohibited.

But is that really so?

Elsewhere, the Talmud discusses the war between Israel and Og, king of the Bashan. Og, it will be remembered, was a prodigious giant; during the struggle, the Talmud tells us, אמר מחנה ישראל כמה הוי, תלתא פרסי? איזיל ואיעקר טורא בר תלתא פרסי ואשדי עלייהו ואקטלינהו. אזל עקר טורא בר תלתא פרסי ואייתי על רישי' וגו' (“Og said, The camp of Israel is how large? Three [square] parsei; I shall go and uproot a mountain of three [square] parsei and throw it upon them and kill them. He went and uprooted a mountain of three [square] parsei and raised it over his head....” ברכות נ"ד:).

A parsa is a unit of linear measure equivalent to about 3.8 km (we said that Og was a formidable giant). The Talmud’s insistence that Og in fact lifted this uprooted mountain over his head demonstrates that his intent was neither idle boast nor wishful thinking; at the same time, it also demonstrates that for him, at least, the mountains of the Bashan had tfisath yad, and were capable of human manipulation. If so, and if the principle is indeed enshrined in halacha that whatever has tfisath yad can be rendered forbidden by being used for idolatrous purposes, why, indeed, were the mountains not forbidden?

B.

If we go a bit further in our Talmudic research, we discover that the Canaanites ought not have had the ability to render anything in the Holy Land unusable through their base rites, מכדי ירושה היא להם מאבותיהם, ואין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו (“since it is an inheritance to [Israel] from their forefathers, and no one can render forbidden an article which is not his;” עבודה זרה נ"ג:). As Rashi clarifies the matter: הארץ וכל המחובר לה ירושה לישראל היא מאבותיהם שהרי לאברהם נאמר "כי לך אתננה" וגויים שבאו אחרי כן לא יכלו לאסרן בהשתחואה (“the land and everything connected to it is an inheritance to Israel from their forefathers, for it was said to Avraham, ‘to you I shall give it’, and the nations who came afterward were unable to prohibit [even the trees in it] by bowing to them”).

If this is the case, it would appear that the Canaanites’ handling of asheiroth and dedicating them to cultic purposes should not have denied their use to Israel, since the asheiroth, or anything else growing out of the sacred soil, were never really their property.

So what went wrong? אלא מדפלחו ישראל לעגל גלו אדעתייהו דניחא להו בעבודת כוכבים וכי אתו עובדי כוכבים שליחותא דידהו עבדו (“But since Israel had worshipped the [golden] calf, they revealed that in their opinion they were comfortable with idolatry, and so when the [non-Jewish] idolators arrived, they were acting on [Israel’s] behalf”), the gmara concludes. In other words (continues Rashi), הלכך הויא עבודת כוכבים של ישראל ואינה בטילה עולמית (“Therefore, the idols were Israel’s, and could never be nullified”) save by destruction, as the Torah commands.

So it would seem that our question returns: If the asheiroth belong to Israel because of the tell-tale revelation at the incident of the calf, and because tfisath yad applies to them, why are the mountains of the Bashan not prohibited, since Og had tfisath yad in them, and they were likewise used for idolatrous purposes?

C.

We turn to yet another Talmudic source, where we learn: מתים שהחי' יחזקאל עלו לארץ ישראל ונשאו נשים והולידו בנים ובנות כו' ומאן נינהו מתים שהחי' יחזקאל? אמר רב אלו בני אפרים שמנו לקץ וטעו כו' והרגום אנשי גת (“The dead men whom Yechezqel revived [cf. Ezekiel XXXVII, 1-12] came to Eretz Yisra’él and married women and sired sons and daughters... And who were the dead men whom Yechezqel revived? Said Rav, 'They were bnei Efrayim who calculated the end [of the Egyptian exile] and erred... and were killed by the men of Gath;” סנהדרין צ"ב:, רש"י שם).

The bnei Efrayim, smarting and impatient under the Egyptian yoke, endeavoured to figure out how much longer their suffering would last. Based upon the calculation, some of them made a break for it, and succeeded in escaping from Egypt. But they were tragically, grievously wrong in their estimate, and were slaughtered by the warlike Plishtim of Gath. Indeed, their bones still littered the eastern approach of the coastal route to the Holy Land at the time the Exodus actually took place (cf. Exodus XIII, 17, Emeth l’Ya’âqov, ad loc.).

A little thought reveals the tremendous implications of this historical fact. A significant group of bnei Yisra’él who had died before the Exodus, and therefore were not in any way implicated in the incident of the calf, were subsequently resuscitated by Yechezqel ha-navi, and rejoined Israel. These men, at least, had not lost their original status as staunch monotheists and opponents of idolatry in all its forms.

Concerning the Bashan, the Torah tells us: וכל הבשן ממלכת עוג נתתי לחצי שבט המנשה (“And all of the Bashan, the kingdom of Og, I gave to the half-tribe of M’nashe;” Deuteronomy III, 13). If we then turn to Joshua XVI, 1-4, we read: ויצא הגורל לבני יוסף כו' וינחלו בני יוסף מנשה ואפרים וגו' (“And the lot of the sons of Yosef came out... And the sons of Yosef, M’nashe and Efrayim, inherited.....”).

Even though M’nashe and Efrayim were classed as tribes in their own right, they retained an organic link as sons of Yosef, and their territorial holdings in the Holy Land were assigned jointly, to both together.

In other words, a significant number of bnei Yoséf had had nothing at all to do with the calf, and so their title to the land was unsullied by it. It is for that reason, it seems to me, that the mountains of the Bashan were not forbidden them, despite the tfisath yad exhibited by Og.

D.

A little more thought reveals that our story appears to take place within a rather large time-frame. The bnei Efrayim attempted their abortive get-away at some point before the Exodus. From the Exodus (and the golden calf) to the invasion of Eretz Yisra’él was a span of 40 years. The period of the Judges (including the conquest of the land) lasted some four centuries. The combined reigns of Kings Sha’ul and David total some 43 years, after which Shlomo ascended the throne and built the First Temple, which stood for 410 years. It is not clear precisely when Yechezqel revived the dry bones, but he himself tells us that his prophetic career began in the thirtieth year of the Babylonian Exile.

Add it up, and it approaches a millennium from the golden calf to the likely time the bnei Efrayim rejoined Israel; yet, for all that time, the mountains of the Bashan were permitted to their inhabitants on account of the bnei Efrayim. This comes to tell us something of the true nature of our environment.

The ôlam, our universe, is a closed, self-contained continuum dimensioned along four axes: Height, Length, Width, and Time, a box of contoured space-time, if you will. Its self-containedness means that we are constrained to physical perceptions along those four axes. But our universal “box” is itself contained, located within a metaphysical realm of non-space/non-time. Chazal explain one of the most puzzling appellations of the Divine, ha-Maqom (literally, “the Place”): שהוא מקומו של עולם ואין עולמו מקומו (“For He is the place of the ôlam, and His ôlam is not His place;” ב"ר פס"ח סי' ט'). G-d is not subject to the physical and temporal constraints to which we are subject. He created them for us to hide reality from us (the root meaning of ôlam is “hide”) so that we can exercise our free choice.

The Torah itself tells us this at the beginning: B’réshith bara Eloqim begins the Torah, a phrase which Rashi finds untranslatable, שאין לך ראשית במקרא שאינו דבוק לתיבה שלאחריו (“for the term réshith does not occur in Scripture unless it is bound to the term after it”), which usually requires the grammatical realtionship in Hebrew called smichuth, in which two nouns are in apposition; yet, réshith is followed by the verb bara.

The Ramban explains that the phrase can only mean that הקב"ה ברא כל הנבראים מאפיסה מוחלטת, ואין לנו בלשון הקדש בהוצאת היש מאין אלא ל' ברא (“the Holy One, Blessed is He, created all created things from absolute nihility. We have no way in the Holy Language to express bringing forth something from nothing save the term bara”). Réshith, then, is a word which has no referent whatever before it; to have meaning, it must be דבוק לתיבה שלאחריו, bound to what follows, in this case, the physical ôlam.

Even though we are within the ôlam, bound to physical means of perception, we are in fact not of it; our essences, our neshamoth, belong to Meqomo shel ôlam, and our actions here are never simply what they seem. Idolatry, worship of the “forces of nature,” does not seem at all unreasonable within the parameters of the temporal ôlam; viewed from the perspective of the atemporal Meqomo shel ôlam, it is seen as the outrage it is. Nevu’a, “prophecy,” is the Divinely granted faculty to perceive metaphysical reality. The atemporality demonstrated by the fact that the mountains of Bashan remained unsullied by idolatry. Despite Og’s tfisath yad, in the merit the bnei Efrayim who had left the world so much earlier and re-entered it so much later, is primâ facie an indication of the fundamental, ultimate unreality of the ôlam and the true nature of our total environment.

Parshath Re’eh (Deuteronomy XI,26-XVI,17) 8/10/07

A.

בנים אתם לד' אלקיכם לא תתגדדו ולא תשימו קרחה בין עיניכם למת: כי עם קדוש אתה לד' אלקיך וגו' (“You are sons of Ha-Shem your G-d; you shall not gash yourselves or put a bald strip between your eyes for the dead. For you are a holy people of Ha-Shem your G-d...." XIV, 1-2).

Rashi explains our verse: לא תתנו גדידה ושרט בבשרכם על מת כדרך שהאמוריים עושין לפי שאתם בנים של מקום ואתם ראויין להיות נאים ולא גדודים ומקורחים (“Do not make a gash or scratch in your flesh vecause of the dead in the way that the Emoriyyim do, because you are sons of G-d and you are fit to be comely, and not gashed or made bald”).

This, it would seem, is the plain meaning of our verse, and the Talmud connects it to what the Torah prescribes for the kohanim in Leviticus XXI, 5-6: לא יקרחה קרחה בראשם ופאת זקנם לא יגלחו ובבשרם לא ישרטו שרטת: קדשים יהיו לאלקיהם וגו' (“They shall not make a bald spot on their heads and the corners of their beards they shall not shave, and in their flesh they shall not scratch a scratch. Holy shall they be to their G-d....” קדושין ל"ו., מכות כ'.), which, the Sifrei points out, was in fact the practise of the priests of Ba’al (cf. I Kings XVIII, 28).

Ramban notes Rashi’s comment and questions it sharply: ואיננו נכון, שאם כן תהי' המצוה גם לא על המת (“It is not correct, for if so, the mitzva would apply even not because of the dead”). In other words, if the real reason for the mitzva is, as Rashi states, that we are “sons of G-d” and therefore fit to look nice, then why does the verse prohibit self-mutilation specifically over someone who has died? Indeed, if the custom is prohibited to all of Israel “because [we] are sons of G-d,” why does it have to be separately prohibited to the kohanim?

B.

After asking his question, Ramban goes on to quote the Even Êzra: שתדעו שאתם בנים לשם והוא אוהב אתכם יותר מהאב לכן אל תתגודדו על כל מה שיעשה כי כל אשר יעשה לטוב הוא ואם לא תבינוהו כאשר לא יבינו הבנים הקטנים מעשה אביהם רק יסמכו עליו כן תעשו גם אתם כי עם קדוש אתה ואינך כשאר כל הגויים על כן לא תעשה כמעשיהם (“For you should know that you are sons of Ha-Shem and He loves you more than a father; therefore, do not gash yourselves over anything which He does, for everything which He does is for good, and if you do not understand Him, just as small children do not understand what their father is doing, yet still rely on him, so, too, should you do, for you are a holy people and not like all the rest of the nations; therefore, don’t do as they do”).

Adds Ramban: ולפי דעתי "עם קדוש" הבטחה בקיום הנשמות לפניו ית' ואמר אחרי שאתם עם קדוש וסגולת ד' ולא ישא אליהם נפש וחשב מחשבות לבלתי ידח ממנו נדח אין ראוי להם להתגודד ולהקרח ואפי' ימות בנוער כו' ומכאן סמך לרבותינו באסרם להתאבל יותר מדאי (“And in my opinion, ‘holy people’ constitutes a promise concerning the preservation of souls before Him, may He be blessed, and He said, 'Since you are a holy people and a treasure of Ha-Shem’s, such that He would not grant them a nefesh amidst thoughts of casting it away from Him, it is not proper for them to gash themselves or be rendered bald, even if [the deceased] dies young....' And from here [we have] support for the Rabbis’ prohibition of excessive mourning”).

The death of a loved one is naturally the occasion for the wildest emotions; mourners often irrationally blame themselves, try to hurt themselves, to hurl themselves into the grave so as not to be permanently parted from the deceased parent, spouse, sibling, or (G-d forbid) child. It is this, apparently, which underlies the Emori custom of gashing or scratching oneself over the dead (as is indeed still the mourning custom amongst some primitive peoples in our day). For Israel, such displays are neither justified nor seemly, for in our case the parting is not permanent. A measure of sadness is in order, to be sure, just as it would be were the loved one to be emigrating to a far-off land; but since we are בנים לד', Ha-Shem’s sons, we are assured of an eventual “family reunion."

But there are deeper implications worthy of some exploration.

C.

The holy Zohar juxtaposes our verse to Genesis IX, 6: בצלם אלקים עשה את האדם (“in the image of G-d [tzelem Eloqim] did He make the adam”), and draws the conclusion: ואילין אינון בצלם אלקים ואילין ירתין ירותא עלאה כגוונא דילי' ועל דא אזהר באורייתא "לא תתגודדו" וכו' דהא לא אתאביד והא שכיח בעולמין טבין עלאין ויקירין להוון חדן כד אסתלק צדיקא מהאי עלמא (“and these [Israel] are in the image of G-d, and they inherit a supernal legacy which is of Him, and therefore He warned in the Torah ‘do not gash yourselves,’ etc., for [an individual Jew who dies] is not lost, and finds himself in good, supernal, precious worlds, such that one ought to rejoice when a tzaddiq leaves this world;” ח"ג קנ"ט:).

This is a central theme in Torah thought; the Talmud, for its part, informs us: אתם קרויים אדם ואין העובדי כוכבים קרויים אדם (“You [Israel] are called adam and the idolators are not called adam;” יבמות ס"א.), and the Maharal mi-Prag returns to it over and over again in his writings; for instance:
ישראל הם מציאות אמיתי שהרי הם עלולים מן השם יתברך ונקראים בשביל כך בנים למקום שהם נמצאים מאתו בעצם ובראשונה (“Israel are a true actuality, for they were brought about from Ha-Shem, and are called on that account “sons of G-d,” for they are in existence from Him in essence and from the beginning;” גור ארי' על פסוקנו). And: ישראל נקראים בנים בשביל שהם עלולים מאמיתתו יתברך, ודבר זה גורם החבור והדביקות לגמרי (“Israel are called ‘sons’ because they came about from His truthfulness, may He be blessed, and this is what causes [their] connectedness [chibbur] and total adherence [dveiquth]”; נצח ישראל פי"ב). And: ישראל המה נבראו מן השם יתברך בעצם, לא כמו שאר נמצאים שאין נבראים מן השם יתברך בעצם רק שהם נבראים לשמש אחרים, לכן לא נקראים בשם בנים כו' רק ישראל שבריאתם לא לשמש זולתם (“Israel were created from Ha-Shem in essence, not like the rest of existing things which were not created from Ha-Shem in essence; rather, they were created to serve others, and therefore are not called by the term ‘sons...,’ only Israel, whose creation was not to serve any others;” באר הגולה, באר שלישי), multa inter alia.

All this is very heady stuff. Israel would seem to be a race of Übermenschen, of Jewish supermen. Yet, the Torah is very careful to delineate Israel’s genetic heritage, descended from Shem, son of Noach. Others, too, are descendants of Shem, and, of course, all mankind are ultimately descended from Noach, meaning that they share the same genetic heritage as Israel. What is more, if Israel have this essential, qualitative difference over everyone else, how is giyyur, “conversion,” from one of the nations to Israel possible?

D.

We can begin to clarify this with a mishna (אבות פ"ג מי"ד). The mishna opens by juxtaposing Genesis IX, 6 and our verse in a fashion similar to the Zohar cited supra, then continues: חביבין ישראל שנתן להם כלי חמדה. חבה יתירה נודעת להם שנתן להם כלי חמדה שבו נברא העולם, שנאמר "כי לקח טוב נתתי לכם תורתי אל תעזבו" (“Favored are Israel because [G-d] gave them a precious instrument. Special affection is known to them because He gave them the precious instrument with which the world was created, as it is said: ‘For I have given you a good portion, My Torah; do not abandon [it]’ [Proverbs IV, 2]”). Indeed, the Zohar, a bit before the passage cited supra, itself asserts: בכל מאן דאיהו דחיל חטאת איקרי אדם אמיתי. א"ר אלעזר דאית בי' יראה, ענוה, חסידות כללא כולא (“Everyone who fears sin is called a true adam; said Rabbi El’azar, For he has in him fear and humility; piety summarizes it all;” ח"ג קמ:ה:).

The above can be reconciled with all the foregoing by first remembering the Talmud’s assessment that the human body contains 248 “limbs” (évarim) and 365 “sinews” (gidim; מכות כ"ג:). Presumably, so does the body of an ape. What differentiates an adam, the tzelem Eloqim, from an ape is the addition of the neshama, the metaphysical, spiritual component whose structure is exactly parallelled by the body, such that each éver and each gid has its metaphysical counterpart. This is the tzelem Eloqim (עיי' בית חכמה לשל"ה הקדוש).

As any physical therapist will tell you, lack of exercise leads to physical atrophy; when I was hospitalized, I was told that it begins to set in within the first 48 hours that one is bedridden. The same is true of the neshama, however the atrophy begins to set in immediately.

Chazal, in the Talmud, op. cit., do the arithmetic, and note that the number of évarim and gidim, not coincidentally, equals the number of mitzvoth in the Torah, 613. "Favored are Israel," for G-d has given them the “exercise manual” by which they can maintain and strengthen the chibbur and dveiquth to Ha-Shem which confers on them the right to be called an adam and G-d’s “sons.” It is the Torah which frees them from the “service of others,” as the baraitha tells us, שאין לך בן חורין אלא מי שעוסק בתלמוד תורה (“For no-one is free save one who is occupied in Torah-study;” אבות פ"ו ה"ב).

Through the Torah, the Maharal notes, we are engaged in the service of the uniquely, utterly unitary G-d, a union such that din (“judgment”) and rachamim (“mercy”) are indivisible and indistinguishable from one another. The nations, on the other hand, turn Divinity into “divinities;” they serve “others.” They see din as isolated from rachamim, and there seems no plainer expression of din than death. Hence the Torah’s emphasis on invalidating “gashing,” and so on in connection with the dead, and with Divine service (גור ארי' שם, וע"ע נפש החיים ש"א פ"ד, פירוש ובחרת בחיים שם ובמלואים בענין חבור הנשמות לעולמות העליונים, שהוא נעשה אך ורק דרך לשון הקדש, ושחבור זה נפסק מן הגויים ע"י בלבול הלשונות במגדל בבל).

Any member of the nations wishing to be free of the service of “others” and wishing to (re-)establish the chibbur and dveiquth which will create an adam amithi, a true adam rather than the mere physical shadow of one, has the path of giyyur open to him.

For G-d is One, and din and rachamim are not, in the end, separable.

Parshath Shoftim (Deuteronomy XVI,18-XXI,9) 8/17/07

A.

כי אתה בא אל הארץ אשר ד' אלקיך נתן לך לא תלמד לעשות כתועבת הגוים ההם: לא ימצא בך מעביר בנו ובתו באש כו' כי תועבת ד' כל עשה אלה וגו' (“For you are coming to the land which Ha-Shem your G-d is giving to you; you will not learn to act according to the abomination of those nations. There will not be found amongst you one who passes his son and his daughter through the fire.... For an abomination of Ha-Shem is anyone who does these things....” XVIII, 9-11).

Last week, we touched upon an insight based on a thought of the Maharal mi-Prag, that âvoda zara, “idolatry," is based upon an over-reliance on human perceptions. Human beings, being unable to grasp completely the perfectly unique unity of Ha-Shem, tend to divide His functions up. The phrase I used was that they turn Divinty into “divinities." In particular, we do not see that din (“judgment”) and rachamim (“mercy”) emanate from the same place. Coupled with a very well-placed fear of the former, then, people who feel left on their own in this regard tend to try to propitiate or deflect what they see as the malevolent forces of din, which rites are the primary forms of âvoda zara (עיי' למשל גור ארי' לדברים ט"ז א').

The Canaanite cult of Molech, to which our passage refers (cf. also Leviticus XX,1-5) is the most extreme expression of this fallacy, so starkly different from the usual idolatrous rites that it had an immensely strong grip on the imaginations of its devoteés, such that it merits its own, separate prohibition.

Which leads us to an interesting difference of opinion between the Rambam and the Ramban, concerning the nature of and reason for sacrifice in the Torah.

B.

Concerning the rationale behind the qorbanoth, the Rambam writes: בעבור שהמצרים והכשדים אשר היו ישראל גרים ותושבים בארצם, מעולם היו עובדים לצאן ולבקר, כי המצרים עובדין מזל טלה והכשדים עובדים לשדים אשר יראו להם בדמות שעירים, ואנשי הודו עד היום לא ישחטו בקר לעולם, בעבור כן צוה לשחוט אלו השלשה מינין לשם הנכבד כדי שידע כי הדבר שהיו חושבים כי הם בתכלית העבודה הוא אשר יקריבו לבורא ובו יתכפרו העונות כי כן יתרפאו האמונות הרעות שהם מדויי הנפש כי כל מדוי וכל חולי לא יתרפאו כי אם בהפכן (“Since the Egyptians and the Chaldaeans in whose lands Israel had been sojourners and residents worshipped ovicaprids and cattle, for the Egyptians worshipped the constellation Aries [the Ram] and the Chaldaeans worshipped demons who would appear to them in the form of goats, and the people of India to this day do not slaughter cattle at all; for this reason, [G-d] commanded that these three species be slaughtered for [His] revered Name, in order that one should know that the thing which they were thinking was the object of worship was what they should sacrifice to the Creator, and through it sins would be atoned and in this way bad beliefs which are an illness of the soul would be cured, for illnesses and diseases are only cured by their being reversed;" מורה נבוכים ח"ג פמ"ו).
In other words, the Rambam sees the entire system of sacrifice instituted by the Torah as a sort of concession to human frailty: Because people are inclined to debase themselves by prostrating themselves to animals, so G-d decreed that these very animals be sacrificed to Him, to serve as a pointed reminder that He had created them, and that therefore He was to be venerated, not they.

The Ramban protests most strenuously that the Rambam’s words are דברי הבאי, ירפאו שבר גדול וקושיא רבה על נקלה יעשה שולחן ד' מגואל, שאיננו רק להוציא מלבן של רשעים וטפשי עולם, והכתוב אמר שהוא "לחם אשה לריח ניחוח"?! (“vain words: can a huge gulf and great difficulty be healed so easily? Should Ha-Shem’s table be made contaminated, since it exists only to contradict the evil and stupid of the world, when Scripture says that it is [G-d’s] ‘bread, a burnt offering for a savoury aroma’?!”).
The Ramban goes on at some length to recount the numerous Biblical examples of sacrificial devotion by, e.g. Noach, or Qayin and Hevel, which predated the very concept of âvoda zara, not to speak of the Egyptian nation, and decides that the purpose of a qorban is inherent in the root meaning of the word, to bring about qirva (“closeness”) bretween man and G-d. He then recounts the various steps necessary in offering a qorban, and notes that it is important שיחשוב אדם בעשותו כל אלה כי חטא לאלקיו בגופו ובנפשו וראוי לו שישפך דמו וישרף גופו לולא חסד הבורא שלקח ממנו תמורה (“that a person think whilst he is doing all these things that he has sinned against his G-d with his body and his soul, and it would be proper for his blood to be spilt and his body to be burnt, were it not for the kindness [chesed] of the Creator, Who takes a substitute for him....”; ע"ע שכתב שם בארןבות בזה).

From the Ramban’s word we thus gain an insight into the integration and interplay of din and rachamim in the way the Creator runs His world. Mi-tzad ha-din, the situation of an adam mi-Yisra’él is very simple and clear: G-d has graciously given him the Torah; he therefore should know what his duties and responsibilities are; if he fails to carry any of them out, the boom should be lowered on him. However, G-d exercises rachamim, accepting his sincere contrition and the effort and expense of bringing a qorban in lieu of what he really deserves to pay.

C.

There is a fascinating suggestion which I have heard in the name of Rabbi Yosef Dov ha-Levi Soloveitchik זצ"ל which affords us a glimpse of this Divine logic working itself out.

Rabbi Soloveitchik calls attention to the Biblical account of the âqeidath Yitzchaq, when Avraham was commanded to sacrifice his only son and heir (Genesis XXII), and takes note of the fact that, throughout the account, the Divine name Eloqim appears exclusively. The name Eloqim is indicative of the middath ha-din, our perception of the quality of Divine judgment in this world. He sees in this a clear indication that the sacrifice of Yitzchaq was perfectly justified, in complinace with Divine judgment.

Until we reach the climax of the account: וישלח אברחם את ידו ויקח את המאכלת לשחט את בנו: ויקרא אליו מלאך ד' מן השמים וכו' ויאמר אל תשלח ידך אל הנער ואל תעשה לו מאומה: כי עתה ידעתי כי ירא אלקים אתה וגו' (“And Avraham reached out his hand and took the knife to slaughter his son. And an angel of Ha-Shem called out thim from the heavens... Do not take your hand to the youth, and do nothing to him. For now I know that you are G-d [Eloqim] fearing....;" ibid., 10-12).

וישא אברהם עיניו וירא והנה איל וגו' (“And Avraham raised his eyes and saw, and behold, there was a ram....”; v. 13). Plainly the substitution of the ram for Yitzchaq was an act of Divine rachamim, heralded by the sudden appearance of the name Ha-Shem. Avraham himself recognised this implicitly: ויקרא אברהם את שם המקום ההוא ד' יראה וגו' (“And Avraham callefd the name of that place 'Ha-Shem is perceived....;'" v. 14).

Now return to our passage and take careful note of the wording: Moshe warns that Israel were heading toward the holy land אשר נתן לך ד' אלקיך, “which Ha-Shem Eloqecha is giving you." The Ramban makes clear that one’s son or daughter might very well deserve a fiery fate, as, indeed, the Canaanites seem to have been convinced; the strict prohibition of anything resembling this ritual to Israel, it would seem, comes about about because of the inseparable oneness of rachamim -- Ha-Shem -- and din -- "Eloqecha." Because of that, the verse seems to tell us, תועבת ד' כל עשה אלה, “an abomination of Ha-Shem is anyone who does these things," for to do them is to deny the fundamental, ineffable unity of Ha-Shem Eloqeinu.

D.

The import of the fact of the fundamental, Divine unity and inseparability of din and rachamim for each and every one of us as we enter into this highly propitious season of Elul, in preparation to meet the awesome yom ha-din a scant five weeks hence, is clear. Our relief, though, is tempered by more than a little apprehension: After all, due to our many sins, we do not today have a Béyth ha-Miqdash, and so we have no chance to take advantage of G-d’s magnanimity. The prospect of spilling blood and burning bodies, it seems, looms before us....

The mishna assures us: כל העושה מצוה אחת קונה לו פרקליט אחד (“Anyone who does a single mitzva acquires for himself a single advocate;" אבות פ"ד מי"א), and Rabbi Ovadya of Bartenura explains an “advocate” to be a מלאך מליץ טוב, an “angel recommending good."

If we turn to the Talmud, we find: חשב אדם לעשות מצוה ונאנס ולא עשאה מעלה עליו הכתוב כאלו עשאה ([“If] a person thinks of doing a mitzva and is prevented by circumstances and does not do it, Scripture considers it for him as though he has done it;" ברכות ו.).

In the story of the âqeida, it seems to me, we have a clear, Biblical demonstration of the application of this principle. Consider what the mal’ach Ha-Shem said to Avraham: עתה ידעתי כי ירא רלקים אתה לא חשכת את בנך “Now I know that you are G-d fearing; you did not spare your son....”). And how was it that G-d knew this?

Continues the mal’ach: ממני (“from me”).

Avraham had not, after all, actually slaughtered Yitzchaq; but at the very moment that his hand grasped the knife, his every intention was to carry out the inscrutable Divine command, and at that instant “Scripture considered it as though he had done it," and this very מלאך מליץ טוב, this advocate, came into being. It was the sudden appearance of the mal’ach as Avraham, in effect, performed the mitzva, which consitituted the evidence of his G-d fearing character, as well as of Divine rachamim overriding din: It was, after all, a mal’ach Ha-Shem, not a mal’ach Eloqim.

Thus, we have Biblical assurance, as well as that of the Oral Torah, that if our contrition and confession are sincere enough, our yearning to perform the requisite sacrifices intense enough, it will be considered “as though we had done it," and entered in our favour in the Divine ledger on the yom ha-din.

Surely in testimony whereof, Chazal established the âqeida as the Torah reading on Yom Kippur.

The Creator’s chesed stands available to us; it is up to us to avail ourselves of it.

Parshath Nitzavim/Va-Yélech (Deuteronomy XXIX,9-XXXI,30) 9/7/07

A.

כי המצוה הזאת אשר אנכי מצוך היום לא נפלאת היא ממך ולא רחקה הוא: לא בשמים היא וגו' (“For this commandment which I am commanding you today is not too wonderful for you, and it is not too far away: It is not in heaven....;" XXX, 11-12).

The Talmud recounts: שאלו אנשי אלכסדרי' את רבי יהושע בן חנניא, מתים לעתיד לבוא צריכין הזאה או אין צריכין? אמר להם לכשיחיו נחכם להם, איכא דאמרי, לכשיבוא משה רבינו עמהם (“The people of Alexandria asked Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananya, 'Will the dead of the future require sprinkling [of water mixed with the ashes of a para adumma, when they are resurrected, to remove the tum’a of death] or not?' He told them, 'When they are resurrected we shall consider their case,' and there are those who say [that he added], 'When Moshe our teacher comes with them;'” נדה ס"ט:).

What makes Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananya’s response remarkable is the fact that in numerous places we find that the Talmud assigns this role of resolving doubts and settling irresolvable conflicts to the prophet Eliyahu when he returns heralding the advent of ha-Melech ha-Mashiach, our “anointed king." Thus, for instance, we find a debate concerning whether or not wine can serve as the basis for a meal requiring recitation of birkath ha-mazon, the “grace after meals," which ends with: לכשיבוא אלי' ויאמר אי הויא קביעותא (“When Eliyahu will come, he will say whether it constitutes the basis [of a meal];” ברכות ל"ה:). Or, to cite another example, יבוא אלי' וילמדנו אם עור פלוני כשר לתפלין (“Eliyahu will come and tell us whether such-and-such a hide is kosher for t’fillin”; שבת קי"ח:). Indeed, the common Talmudic term תיקו is made up of the initials of תשבי יתרץ קושיות ואיבעיות (“The Tishbi [i.e., Eliyahu; cf. I Kings XVII, 1] will resolve difficulties and questions”; עדיות פ"ח מ"ז, תוס' יו"ט שם).

So why does Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananya appear to dissent from the others concerning
Eliyahu?

B.

The Talmud records a famous dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua, at the head of the Sanhedrin, and Rabbi Eli’ezer ben Hyrkanos, one of the greatest sages of that age, also known as Rabbi Eli’ezer “the Great." The technical details of the dispute do not concern us here, but Rabbi Eli’ezer stubbornly held to his point of view despite a clear majority against him, and attempted to prove his case by working various miracles. Rabbi Yehoshua, for his part, either dismissed or nullified each of the miraculous events.

At the end, Rabbi Eli’ezer summoned a bath qol, a “heavenly voice”, which proclaimed: מה אצלכם לרבי אליעזר שהלכה כמותו בכל מקום (“What is between you and Rabbi Eli’ezer, according to whom the halacha is decided in every place?”), whereupon Rabbi Yehoshua arose and quoted our passage: לא בשמים היא: The Torah is not in Heaven, but ever since the revelation at Sinai has been given into the hands of the Rabbis to administer (בבא מציעא נ"ט:). Furthermore, as the Talmud attests elsewhere, Rabbi Yehoshua asserted this principle that אין משגיחין בבת קול, “one may not accept the evidence of heavenly voice," often (עיי' למשל יבמות י"ד.).

It should also be noted before we go forward that Rabbi Yehoshua, without the patronymic, is always a reference to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananya (נזיר כ"ו:, רש"י שם).

Now consider that Eliyahu was unique, in that he did not die as other men (II Kings II, 1-14), even Moshe. The implication of this is made plain by a halachic ruling of the Trumath ha-Deshen. Asked to esplain whether or not Eliyahu’s wife had been permitted to remarry after the prophet’s unique ascent into Heaven, he concludes that Eliyahu had achieved the status of a mal’ach, an “angel," ויש לומר דאשת רעהו אסורה ולא אשת מלאך שכולו רוחני ולא גופני (“And one may say that it is the wife of one’s fellow who is prohibited [to marry] and not the wife of a mal’ach, [since a mal’ach] is entirely spiritual and not corporeal”; ח"ב סי' ק"ב).

If, by ascending to Heaven in the way that he did, Eliyahu was in some fashion uniquely transformed into a mal’ach, as the Trumath ha-Deshen suggests, then he would arguably constitute a “heavenly voice," not unlike the bath qol. If so, Rabbi Yehoshua would discount his help: לא בשמים היא; he would prefer the decision of the rabbinical authorities of that day, with the help of the resurrected Moshe (as well as himself; note that he had answered “we shall consider” [נחכם] not “they will consider”).

But even without Eliyahu’s unique status, the fact is that it is decided halacha that in questions of halachic interpretation, ever since Sinai אין הנביא רשאי לחדש דבר (“a prophet is not permitted to say anything new”; רמב"ם הל' יסודי התורה פ"ט ה"א), a principle which protects Israel from the potential chaos which might result from false prophets. There was only one revelation of the Torah, to Moshe, at Sinai.

If so, what do the rest of Chazal expect from Eliyahu? Why did they differ from Rabbi Yehoshua?

C.

To understand, we turn to another episode recorded in the Talmud.

אמר ר' יוסי, פעם אחת הייתי מהלך בדרך ונכנסתי לחורבה אחת מחורבות ירושלים להתפלל. בא אלי' זכור לטוב ושמר לי על הפתח עד שסיימתי תפלתי. לאחר שסיימתי תפלתי אמר לי שלום עליך רבי ואמרתי לו שלום עליך רבי ומורי. אמר לי בני מפני מה נכנסת לחורבה זו? אמרתי לו להתפלל ואמר לי הי' לך להתפלל בדרך ואמרתי לו מתיירא הייתי שמא יפסיקו בי עוברי דרכים ואמר לי הי' לך להתפלל תפלה קצרה. באותה שעה למדתי ממנו שלשה דברים, למדתי שאין נכנסין לחורבה ולמדתי שמתפללין בדרך ולמדתי שהמתפלל בדרך מתפלל תפלה קצרה.

(“Said Rabbi Yossi, 'Once I was traveling and entered one of the ruins of Jerusalem to pray. Eliyahu the well-remembered came, and waited for me at the entrance until I had finished my prayer. After I had finished my prayer, he said, "Peace be on you, Rabbi." I said to him, "Peace be on you, my Rabbi and teacher." He asked me, "My son, why did you enter this ruin?" I said, "To pray." He said, "You should have prayed on the way." I said, "I was afraid that passers-by might disturb me." He said, "You should have prayed an abbreviated prayer." From that moment I learnt three things: I learnt that one should not enter a ruin, and I learnt that one prays on the way, and I learnt that one who prays on the way should pray an abbreviated prayer;'" ברכות ג.).

The great Rabbi Tzvi Hirsch Chajes was very much disturbed by this account, and asked: ואיך למד הש"ס דינים אלו מאלי'? (“And how did the Talmud learn these points of law from Eliyahu?”), on the basis of our passage. He answered: ואפשר לומר דאם אלי' אומר דינים מצד הנבואה, אזי שייך "לא בשמים היא" ו"אין נביא רשאי לחדש דבר", אבל אם אומר מלתא מטעם מה ששמע מפי חכמים אחרים, אזי שומעין כו' אלי' אמרם מה ששמע בבית המדרש (“And it is possible to say that if Eliyahu says halachoth as a matter of prophecy, then 'it is not in Heaven' and 'a prophet is not permitted to say anything new' applies, but if he says something on the authority of other scholars, then they would listen... Eliyahu had said what he had learnt in the béyth midrash”).

In other words, a claim to resolve halachic questions as a matter of prophetic revelation has to be dismissed, but if a prophet should say a svara, a halachic theory, or transmit a massora, a tradition learnt in the béyth midrash, it is as acceptable as anyone else’s contribution, since it is also subject to the same rigorous Talmudic analysis as anyone else’s contribution. It is not “Torah from Heaven."

This, too, seems reasonable. Why would Rabbi Yehoshua seem not to agree with it?

D.

It must be noted that the Torah, in fact, is not an artefact of this world. Its creation predated the creation of the universe; indeed, it is the blueprint for the universe (עיי' בראשות רבה פ"א סי' ב', ועוד). It is therefore the case that all Torah, from the contents of the séfer Torah to the most recent chiddush heard at the daf yomi shi’ur, comes into existence בסייעתא דשמיא, “with the support of Heaven." Torah represents, in essence, the metaphysical reality encapsulating and actuating our physical realm, which it contains. This supernal, metaphysical Torah has been injected into our world, and placed in our hands, in a physical dress, the words and letters of the Torah, as we received it at Sinai and, I would venture to say, also as transmitted by the modulated changes in air pressure which we call speech (עיי' רמב"ן, הקדמה לפירוש התורה).

The Torah mandates physical actions, to be performed in this world by the physical Israel. It follows, then, that Torah can only be brought into this world by physical, and not metaphysical, means. It is we who are the intermediaries between this world and the next; mal’achim do not have a role to play in this.

So the dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and the rest of Chazal would seem to boil down to the status of Eliyahu. Rabbi Yehoshua, it seems, holds that a mal’ach can have no influence whatever in clarifying halachoth; now that he is in Heaven, he is, as it were, a bath qol. The other chachamim would seem to hold like the Mahara”tz Chajes, that so long as Eliyahu restricts himself to telling us what he had learnt in his béyth midrash, filling in the gaps which the passage of time and decline of the generations have inevitably created in our Torah knowledge.

And, of course, we shall eventually also have the resurrected Moshe, and be able to hear Torah directly from our original teacher.