Parashath Rë’é (Deuteronomy XI,26-XVI,17) 8/26/11

A.

A passage in this week’s parasha provides an example of how depths of meaning are encoded in the text of the Torah, as well as a timely lesson for this season in which we find ourselves.

בנים אתם לד' אלקיכם, Moshe tells us: “You are sons [banim] of Ha-Shem your G-d,” and then goes on to tell us the ramifications; therefore לא תתגדדו ולא תשימו קרחה בין עיניכם למת: כי עם קדוש אתה לד' אלקיך ובך בחר ד' להיות לו לעם סגלה מכל העמים אשר על פני האדמה: (“do not cut yourselves and do not put a bald-spot between your eyes for the dead. For you are a people holy to Ha-Shem your G-d, and [it is] you [whom] has Ha-Shem chosen to become a people precious to Him from all the peoples who are on the face of the earth”; XIV, 1-2).

As Rashi points out (following Talmudic sources) the simple meaning of the above prohibitions appears to be to forbid certain excessive mourning practices prevalent amongst ancient peoples who engaged in self-mutilation as a sign of grief (עיי' יבמות י"ג:, קידושין ל"ו., מנחות ל"ז: וע"ע ספרי פרשתנו על אתר). However, this is not the only place in the Torah in which self-mutilation is proscribed (cf. e.g. Leviticus XIX, 28 and XXI, 5-6, where the prohibition is similarly posed as a condition of qëdusha, “sanctity”).

The reader with a living sense of the Hebrew language will already have noted the sharp shift from the second-person plural forms of the first verse to the singular forms of the second (which are not readily apparent in the English translation). The shift is very striking, something no one would do in any ordinary narrative, and yet a glance at a sefer Torah shows that the two verses form a paragraph together, set off by blank spaces between the foregoing and following passages.

What is the change in number meant to tell us?

B.

We first take note that one of the Talmudic sources cited supra goes on a bit later to explain the phrase lo’ thithgodëdu, “you will not cut yourselves,” as meaning לא תעשו אגודות אגודות, “you will not make groups and groups” (יבמות י"ד.), in a rabbinic pun of the verb on the related word agudda, “band” or “group” (in the sense of a “faction” “cut out” of the whole), seeing in the verse a call for Jewish unity (with reference to the specific example of a single béyth din in a single city, hopelessly split between competing schools of thought, half agreeing with Béyth Shammai and half with Béyth Hillél).

With this in mind, we turn to the midrash and learn: "אספה לי" זש"ה "הבונה בשמים מעלותיו ואגודתו על ארץ יסדה" למה"ד לפלטין שהיתה בנוי' ע"ג הספינות כ"ז שהספינות מחוברות פלטין שעל גביהן עומדת כך הבונה בשמים מעלותיו כביכול כסאו מבוסס למעלה בזמן שישראל עושין אגודה אחת. לכך נאמר "הבונה בשמים מעלותיו" אימתי בזמן "ואגדתו על ארץ יסדה" כו' שכינוסן של צדיקים הניי' להם והניי' לעולם וגו' (“‘Gather for Me’ [70 men...., i.e. the first Sanhedrin; Numbers XI, 16]; this is what Scripture says: ‘Who builds [Ha-bone] in the heavens His heights, and founds His group [aguddatho] on the earth’ [Amos IX, 6]. To what is the thing similar? To a pavilion built upon ships; so long as the ships are attached [one to the other], the pavilion upon them stands; thus, ‘Who builds in the heavens His heights’, is as though His throne is well founded Above at a time when Israel form one agudda. For this reason it is said, ‘Who builds in the heavens His heights’; when? At a time ‘and founds His agudda on the earth..for the association of tzaddiqim is a benefit to them and a benefit to the world’”; במדבר רבה פט"ו סי' י"ד).

Thus, we see that when Israel and our tzaddiqim, talmidei hachamim are united in their views and their efforts, it makes a tremendous impression Above, performing a necessary tiqqun. a “correction” or “adjustment”, since, as the prophet suggests, G-d’s heavenly throne, that is, His reign upon this earth, is founded upon this show of unity here below, where He established His agudda. Hence, our gëmara’s view of the prohibition lo’ thith-godëdu, that there not be other aguddoth, that we avoid mahloqeth, “controversy” and strive for unity amongst Israel. This, I believe, is why our second verse, with its reference to Israel’s qëdusha, is couched in the second person singular, to emphasize that unity.

But what does it mean that there be “one agudda” here below?

C.

The Mishna famously defines two sorts of mahloqeth: כל מחלוקת שהיא לשם שמים סופה להתקיים ושאינה לשם שמים אין סופה להתקיים. איזו היא מחלוקת שהיא לשם שמים, זו מחלוקת הלל ושמאי. ושאינה לשם שמים, זו מחלוקת קרח ועדתו (“Any mahloqeth for the sake of Heaven [lë-shém shamayim] will end with a continued existence, and one which is not lë-shém sha-mayim will not in the end have continued existence. Which is a mahloqeth lë-shém sha-mayim? This is the mahloqeth of Hillel and Shammai. And which is not lë-shém sha-mayim? This is the mahloqeth of Qorah and his sect [cf. Numbers XVI; אבות פ"ה מי"ז).

In his comment on this mishna, Rabbi ‘Ovadya mi-Bartenura explains the essence of a mahloqeth lë-shém shamayim: התכלית והסוף המבוקש מאותה מחלוקת להשיג האמת כו' מתוך הויכוח יתברר האמת וגו' (“the purpose and end which is sought from this mahloqeth is to grasp the truth...from out of the debate the truth is clarified....”). But surely in most such disputes, there can be only one thing which turns out to be true; so how can there be a mahloqeth which has a qiyyum, a continuous existence?

The Maharal mi-Prag builds on this idea: מחלוקת שהיא לשם שמים יש לה קיום אף כי הם הפכים כי הוא כו' המאחד שני ההפכים כי אף שמחולקים והפכים בעצמם מ"מ מצד השי"ת הם מתאחדים כי הוא ית' שהוא אחד הוא סיבה לשני הפכים דבר זה בעצמו אחדותו ית' שאם לא הי' הוא סיבה רק לדבר אחד כאילו תאמר שהוא סיבה לאש ואם כן ח"ו עוד סיבה להיפך האש הם המים כו' וזה כו' מחלוקת בית שמאי ובית הלל כי אף שאלו פוסלין ואלו מכשירים ואצל האדם הם שני דברים שהם הפכים מכל מקום מצד השי"ת אשר המחלוקת הזו לשמו ית' אשר הוא ית' כולל ההפכים ומן השי"ת יצאו ההפכים מצד זה הם אחד (“A mahloqeth lë-shém shamayim has a qiyyum even if [the sides] are opposites, for He is the One Who unites two opposites. For even if they are divided and opposed in themselves, nonetheless with regard to Ha-Shem they are united, for He, in that He is One, is the Source of the two opposites; this thing in itself is His unity, for if He were the cause of only one thing, it would be as if you were to say that He is the cause of fire, and if so, G-d forbid, there would be another cause for the opposite of fire, i.e. water... and this... is the mahloqeth of the House of Shammai and Hillel, for even though one forbids and the other permits [something], and to a person these are two things which are opposed, nonetheless with regard to Ha-Shem, for Whose sake this mahloqeth [occurs], and Who contains the opposites, and from Whom the opposites proceed, from His point of view they are one”; דרך חיים פ"ד).

If the purpose of the mahloqeth is to arrive at emeth (“truth”), then the fact that emeth for which both sides are striving and which originates with Ha-Shem, arises in this world from the dispute, this means that both parties to the argument will live on and remain valid for ever. As the Talmud tells us concerning the specific example of the mahloqeth béyth Shammai u-véyth Hillél, שלש שנים נחלקו ב"ש וב"ה הללו אומרים הלכה כמותנו והללו אומרים הלכה כמותנו יצאה בת קול ואמרה אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים הן והלכה כב"ה וכי מאחר שאלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים מפני מה זכו ב"ה לקבוע הלכה כמותו מפני שנוחין ועלובין היו ושונין דבריהן ודברי ב"ש ולא עוד אלא שמקדימין דברי ב"ש לדבריהן (“Three years Béyth Shammai and Béyth Hillél argued, one saying, 'The halacha is like us,' and the other saying, 'The halacha is like us'; a heavenly voice came out and said, 'These and these are the living words of G-d, and the halacha is like Béyth Hillél.' And if both are the living words of G-d, why did Béyth Hillél merit that the halacha should be like them? Because they were mild and humble, learning their words and the words of Béyth Shammai; and not only that, but they would give Béyth Shammai’s precedence over theirs”; עירובין י"ג:).

This is the level of mutual respect and love necessary in a mahloqeth lë-shém shamayim.

D.

We see, then, from the Maharal’s words that the Jewish unity implicit in the deeper meaning of our verse and explicit in our midrash can embrace differences, but they must be differences whose purpose is the unambiguous search for Ha-Shem’s truth, and whose acknowledgment is made with true love and respect. In this way, it is possible for many camps to flourish in Israel, hasidim, bënei yëshiva, Sëfardim, Ashkënazim, etc. lë-mineihem.

The mahloqeth against which our verse and the midrash warn us is the destructive sort, not for the sake of heaven; such mahloqoth engender not mutual respect and love but hatred and dissent. These, two, create an impression Above; it was only a short time ago that we were reminded, on the fast of Tish‘a bë-Av, that the second Temple’s destruction was due to sin’ath hinnam, “groundless hatred” (יומא ט.). The months in which the final, des-perate battle in the Holy City took place (both times) were Tammuz and Av, which the Bënei Yisaschar tells us are called ‘éynayim, “eyes,” based on the verse from Eicha: על אלה אני בוכי' עיני עיני יורדה מים (“because of these do I weep; my eye, my eye, drips water...”; Lamentations I, 116).

This, then, is what our verse warns us against: To be in unity with our hachamim and tzaddiqim; not to engage in mahloqeth she-éynah lë-shém shamayim, which is not sanctioned and hallowed by those very tzaddiqim and hachamim, lest we make, through mahloqoth of the wrong sort, a blemish, a “bald-spot” between the ‘éynayim.

By establishing instead the unity of purpose expressed by the Maharal, the unity in diversity which embraces mahloqeth lë-shém shamayim (symbolized by the plural forms of the first verse), we can truly be banim, that is bonim, “builders,” for Ha-Shem, as Hazal tell us: תלמידי חכמים מרבים שלום בעולם שנאמר "כל בניך למודי ד' ורב שלום בניך" אל תקרי בניך אלא בוניך (“talmidei hachamim increase peace in the world, as it is said, ‘All your sons [banayich], learned of Ha-Shem, and great is the peace of your sons’ [Isaiah LIV, 13]; read not banayich, but bonayich [‘your builders’]”; ברכות ס"ד.).

As a result, such mahloqoth lë-shém shamayim become not aguddoth, “factions”, but are united into aguddatho, “His faction”; as the united ships uphold the pavilion, so does the unitary truth emergent from mahloqoth lë-shém shamayim support the Divine throne, as it were, bringing about the infusion of the Shëchina ha-qëdosha in this world, whence Israel becomes the unified ‘am qadosh marked by the singular forms of our second verse.

Parshath Rë’é (Deuteronomy XI,26-XVI,17) 8/6/10

A.

ראה אנכי נתן לפניכם היום ברכה וקללה (“See, I am placing before you today a bëracha and a curse (qëlala). So begins our parasha.

The Sforno explains the very stark choice which this verse represents as follows: הביטה וראה שלא יהי' ענינך על אופן בינוני כי אמנם אנכי נותן לפניכם היום ברכה וקללה שהם שני הקצוות כי הברכה היא הצלחה יותר מן המספיק ע"צ היותר טוב והקללה היא מארה מחסרת שלא יושג המספיק. שניהם לפניכם להשיג כפי מה שתבחרו (“Look and see that your affairs will not be in any mediocre fashion, for I am really placing before you today a bëracha and a qëlala which are two extremes, for the bëracha is success beyond what is sufficient on the better side, and the qëlala is a depriving execration, such that what suffices will not be obtained. Both of them are before you to be achieved, as you choose”).

After all, as our parasha also informs us later on, בנים אתם לד' אלקיכם כו' כי עם קדוש אתה לד' אלקיך בך בחר ד' להיות לו לעם סגלה מכל העמים אשר על פני האדמה (“You are sons to Ha-Shem your G-d.... For you are a people holy to Ha-Shem your G-d; He has chosen you to become His treasure-nation [‘am sëgulla] from all the nations which are on the face of the earth”; XVI, 1-2).

Having accepted the bargain at Sinai, Israel has evermore been subject to the obligation to live up to the mandates of the Torah. The Talmud points out that: בין כך ובין כך אתם קרוים בנים (“one way or the other, you are called sons”, i.e., whether we are observant or not, citing in support, amongst other verses, בנים לא אמון בם (“sons with no trust in them [bam]”; Deuteronomy XXXII, 20; קידושין ל"ו.).

In his comments on this verse, Rashi observes אין גדולי נכרים בהם כי הוריתים דרך טובה וסרו ממנה (“My great ones are not recognizable amongst them, for I taught them a good way and they departed from it”), going on to note that the unusual word émun, translated here “faith,” is related to omén in Esther II, 7, where it connotes training or raising a child, as well as לשון אמונה כו' אמרו בסיני נעשה ונשמע ולשעה קלה בטלו הבטחתם (“an expression of faithfulness... they said at Sinai ‘We shall do and we shall hear,’ and in a short while broke their promise....”).

The first paragraph of the Shëma‘ teaches us ושננתם לבניך ודברת בם (“And you will teach [words of Torah] to your children and speak about them”; Deuteronomy VI, 7), and the sëfarim ha-qëdoshim have long noted the odd word bam where we expect bahem, seeing in it an allusion to both the Written Torah, which begins with béyth, bë-réshith, “In the beginning” (Genesis I, 1), and the Oral Torah, which begins with mem, mé-eimathai, “From when” (ברכות פ"א מ"א). It seems to me likely that its recurrence in our verse is again an allusion to the “good path” to which Rashi refers.

So we see that, whilst G-d will not abandon us, and will continue to treat us as His children, neither will He coddle us, should we choose not to strive to live up to His expectations. Whether we are blessed or cursed depends upon us.

So what does it mean to be a holy nation?

B.

It is told of Rabbi David Leibovitz זצ"ל, founding rosh yëshiva of Yëshivath Hafétz Hayyim, that he was conversing with a lady who remarked, "Men darf zain frum un gut (One must be pious and good)." "Neyn," he gently corrected her, "Men darf zain gut un frum (No, one must be good and pious)." Some of the ramifications of Rabbi Leibovitz’s emphasis for a holy people are evident in our parasha.

Somewhat later, we read: כי יהי' בך אביון מאחד אחיך וכו' פתח תפתח את ידך לו ותתן לו די מחסרו אשר יחבר לו: השמר לך פן יהי' דבר עם לבבך בליעל לאמר קרבה שנת השבע שנת השמטה ורעה עינך באחיך האביון ולא תתן לו וגו' (“For there will be amongst you a poor man [evyon] of one of your brothers...Opening shall you open your hand to him and granting shall you grant him enough for his need which is lacking him. Guard yourself lest an unworthy thing be with your heart, to say, the seventh year has drawn near, the shëmitta year, and you look malevolently at your impoverished brother and do not give to him....”; XV, 7-9).

The Talmud (גיטין ל"ו.) records: רבי אומר "וזה דבר השמטה שמוט" בשתי שמטות הכתוב מדבר אחת שמטת קרקע ואחת שמטת כספים בזמן שאתה משמט קרקע אתה משמט כספים וגו' (“Rabbi [Yëhuda ha-Nasi’] says, ‘And this is the matter of the shëmitta, shamot [release]’ [ibid., v. 2]; Scripture speaks of two shëmittoth, one is shëmittath qarqa‘ [under which cropland must lie fallow every seventh year] and one is shëmittath kësafim [under which debts are nullified]; at a time when you are releasing land, you are releasing funds....”). Plainly, the context of our parasha’s passage is the reluctance to lend to the poor in the shadow of the approaching shëmitta year, when the debt would be cancelled.

Rambam uses the passage to apply to lending to the poor in general (which, as he also notes, is actually derived from Exodus XXII, 24), concluding והתורה הקפידה על מי שימנע מלהלוות לעני שנאמר "ורעה עינך על אחיך האביון" (“And the Torah is stringent with one who refuses to lend to the poor, for it is said, ‘and you look malevolently on your poor brother’”; הל' לוה ומלוה פ"א ה"א).

The Lehem Mishne explains Rambam’s logic: וי"ל דמ"מ מיית ראי' דהוי איסור למנוע להלוות משמטה דכתיב בי' "ורעה עינך באחיך האביון" משמע דקפיד על מה שעינו רעה שאינו רוצה להלוות (“And one may say that he brings evidence that there is a prohibition of refusing to lend from shëmitta, concerning which it is written, ‘and you look malevolently at your poor brother’, indicating that [G-d] is concerned with the malevolent look, for he does not want to lend”). In other words, the impending shëmitta is only being used as an excuse for the miser’s stinginess. The stinginess is the issue, and needs the work.

C.

With this in mind, consider the encounter between Rabbi ‘Aqiva and the evil Roman military governor of Judaea, Turnus Rufus, recorded in the Talmud. Turnus Rufus asked: אם אלקיכם אוהב עניים הוא מפני מה אינו מפרנסן? (“If your G-d is such a lover of the poor, why does He not support them?”), Rabbi ‘Aqiva answered: כדי שניצול אנו בהם מדינה של גיהנם (“In order that we might be rescued through them from the judgment of Geihinnom”; בבא בתרא י.).

It is brought down in a multitude of sources that the Alter of Kelm questioned Rabbi ‘Aqiva’s explanation: What is it about the mitzva of tzëdaqa, of charitable giving or lending, which is more protective from punishment than any of the other mitzvoth?

He answered that the secret lies not in performing the mitzva simply because G-d wills it, and we wish to perform His will (important as that is); it lies in feeling the poor man’s pain and plight as though it were one’s own. Observed in this way, the merit of the mitzva of tzëdaqa is uniquely able to protect us from punishment for other transgressions.

An illustration of this quality may be found in a story I have heard concerning Rabbi Eliyahu Hayyim Meisels of Łódź, Poland, who was known for his empathy. One particularly brutal winter day, he set out to collect from a wealthy man who had the reputation of being a miser. When the householder saw the rabbi at his door, he bade him quickly come in, but the rabbi insisted on remaining outside to make his appeal. When the rich man protested that he could not stand the cold, the rabbi told him that he was there to collect for people so destitute that they could not afford a fire even on such a day. The putative miser saw the point, and gave generously.

D.

This, it seems to me, is the point of what Rabbi Leibowitz was quoted as saying above: That in order to fulfill the purpose for which Israel came into existence, an ‘am qadosh la-Shem (nation holy to Ha-Shem”) which is perceived as fit to bear the standard of Torah in the world, it is necessary to observe especially the mitzvoth she-béyn adam la-havéro (“between man and his fellow”) in a fashion which is li-fnim mi-shurath ha-din, more than a formal observance of the Torah’s requirements.

To paraphrase, it is necessary to make the conscious effort to be good, in order to be truly frum.

Parshath Rë’é (Deuteronomy XI,26-XVI,17) 8/14/09

A.

Our parasha discusses the mitzva of tzëdaqa: כי יהי' בך אביון מאחד אחיך כו' כי פתח תפתח את ידך לו והעבט תעביטנו די מחסרו אשר יחסר לו: השמר לך פן יהי' דבר עם לבבך בליעל וגו' (“For there will be amongst you a poor man of one of your brothers... For open shall you open your hand to him and lend shall you lend him enough for his lack which is lacking him. Guard yourself lest there be anything in your heart unworthy [bëliyya‘al]....”; XV, 7-9).

The Talmud compares the word bëliyya‘al in our verse to the same word in יצאו אנשים בני בליעל כו' לאמר נלכה ונעבדה אלהים אחרים אשר לא ידעתם (“There will come forth bënei bëliyya‘al... to say. 'Let us go and serve other gods whom you have not known'”; XIII, 14) and concludes כל המעלים עיניו מן הצדקה כאלו עובד עבודת כוכבים (“Anyone who turns his eyes away from [an opportunity for] tzëdaqa, it as if he is worshipping idols”; כתובות ס"ח.).

One might well think that the warning of השמר לך might be applied to many mitzvoth in the Torah: Guard yourself lest you fail to wear tzitzith, for instance, or lest you wear sha‘atnéz. Yet, the Torah states it specifically here, in this connection. What is it about the mitzva of tzëdaqa that the Torah finds it necessary to issue this warning of השמר לך, “guard yourself”?

B.

The search for an answer begins elsewhere in the Talmud where we learn: רבי פתח אוצרות בשני בצורת, אמר יכנסו בעלי מקרא בעלי משנה בעלי גמרא בעלי הלכה בעלי הגדה אבל עמי הארץ לא יכנסו. דחק רבי יונתן בן עמרם ונכנס, אמר לו רבי פרנסני. אמר לו בני קרית? א"ל לאו. א"ל שנית? א"ל לאו. אם כן במה אפרנסך? א"ל פרנסני ככלב וכעורב. פרנסי'. בתר דנפק יתיב רבי וקא מצטער ואמר אוי לי שנתתי פתי לעם הארץ! אמר לפניו רבי שמעון בר רבי שמא יונתן בן עמרם תלמידך הוא שאינו רוצה ליהנות מכבוד תורה מימיו? בדקו ואשכח. אמר רבי יכנסו הכל (“Rebbi [Rabbi Yëhuda ha-Nassi’] opened the storehouses in years of scarcity; he said, 'Let those learned in Scripture, Mishna, Gëmara, halacha, or aggadëta enter, but the ignorant [‘ammei ha-aretz] should not enter.' Rabbi Yonathan ben ‘Amram knocked and entered and said to him, 'Rabbi, support me!' [Rebbi] said to him, 'My son, have you studied Scripture?' He said, 'No.' 'Have you studied the Oral Torah?' He said, 'No.' 'If so, by what [justification] should I support you?' [Rabbi Yonathan] said, 'Support me like a dog or a raven.' [Rebbi] supported him. [i.e., authorized that he be given food]. After he left, Rebbi sat and lamented, 'Woe is me that I have given my bread to an ‘am ha-aretz!' Rabbi Shim‘on ben Rebbi said before him, 'Perhaps Yonathan ben ‘Amram is your student, in that he does not wish to benefit from the honor of Torah during his lifetime?' They checked and found [that it was so]. Said Rebbi, 'Let everyone enter'”; בבא בתרא ח. וע"ע תוס' שם דה"מ ככלב).

To say the least, the above episode is in need of elucidation. How are we to explain Rebbi’s conduct? If there was indeed a famine in Eretz Yisra’él and Rebbi had the means to alleviate it, as the head of the Jewish community in the Holy Land (nassi’) it was surely incumbent upon him to do so, if only in light of the passage quoted from our parasha. We see no indication of any such test of scholarship in the verse as Rebbi evidently proposed.

Even if we accept the story as it appears to be told, the very fact that the Talmud calls Yonathan ben ‘Amram “Rabbi” obviously means that he was a talmid chacham eligible for help under Rebbi’s criteria. What was the point of his confrontation with Rebbi?

C.

There can be no question that Rabbi Yëhuda ha-Nassi’ was a tzaddiq gamur. Indeed, the Yërushalmi records that רבי הוה יתיב לי' בציפורין שבע עשרה שנין וקרא על גרמי' "ויחי יעקב בארץ מצרים שבע עשרה שנה", ויחי יהודה בציפורין שבע בשרה שנה. ומן גובעין עבד תלת עשרה שנין חשש בשניו. אמר רבי יוסי בי רבי בון כל אותן שלש עשרה שנה לא מתה חי' בארץ ישראל ולא הפילה עוברה בארץ ישראל (“Rebbi lived in Tzipporin [Sepphoris] for [his last] seventeen years, and would read out upon himself, ‘And Ya‘aqov lived in the land of Egypt seventeen years’ [Genesis XLVII, 28] – And Yëhuda lived in Tzipporin seventeen years, of which he spent thirteen years suffering in his teeth. Said Rabbi Yossi ben Rabbi Bun, 'All those thirteen years, no woman died in childbirth in Eretz Yisra’él or miscarried in Eretz Yisra’él”; כלאים פ"י ה"ג וע"ע בראשות רבה פל"ג סי' ג').

The Pënei Moshe explains that the point of the story is וקמ"ל חסידותו של רבי שאף שהי' לו יסורין אלו קבל באהבה וקרא על עצמו "ויחי יעקב" וגו' לומר שדומה לו כמו שהי' יעקב חי באלו השנים ובשלוה גדולה הי' (“that it tells us of Rebbi’s piety, that even though he had these sufferings, he accepted them with love and read out upon himself ‘And Ya‘aqov lived....’, to say that he was similar to him, just as Ya‘aqov lived in those years [of relative comfort in Egypt], and was in great ease and comfort”).

Someone at such an exalted level of tzidqiyuth and chasiduth would certainly fall into the select group characterized by the navi’ as אבירי לב הרחוקים מצדקה (“heroes of the heart, far from tzëdaqa”; Isaiah XLVI, 12), concerning whom Chazal comment: כל העולם כולו ניזונין בצדקה והם ניזונין בזרוע (“All [the rest of] the world are sustained by tzëdaqa, and they are sustained by their own merit”; ברכות י"ז: ועיי' מהרש"א שם דה"מ והם) and Rashi elucidates that the world is sustained בצדקתו של הקב"ה ולא בזכות שבידן (“by the tzëdaqa of the Holy One, blessed is He and not by the merit in their hands”), whilst the members of the prophet’s group are sustained בזכות שבידם ובצדיקים משתעי קרא וקרי להו רחוקים מצדקתו של הקב"ה (“through the merit in their hands; Scripture is referring to tzaddiqim, and calls them ‘far’ from the tzëdaqa of the Holy One, Blessed is He [because they have no need of it]”).

As a member of the select group of tzaddiqim, it seems to me, Rebbi felt it incumbent on himself to concentrate his relief efforts on those who seemed likely candidates, if not already actually members, of the same club, those people for whom תורתן אומנותן, כ"ק הרבנים, הדיינים, ראשי הישיבה וכו', the rabbinical functionaries, those learned people of whom he spoke. The rest of këlal Yisra’él, the ‘ammei ha-aretz, he was confident, would be taken care of through Ha-Shem’s tzë-daqa, either directly or indirectly, through the donations of their more fortunate fellows.

When Rabbi Yonathan ben ‘Amram presented himself as a candidate for aid and suggested that he was an ‘am ha-aretz, Rebbi, motivated by chesed and our mitzva, helped him. However, he saw in the fact that he had been “set up” to aid an ‘am ha-aretz evidence of Divine message that, perhaps, he was not really such a tzaddiq, the he had perhaps erred in his cheshbon ha-nefesh, his self-assessment, and perhaps some sin had slipped out unperceived.

His son, Rabbi Shim‘on, suggested that perhaps Yonathan ben ‘Amram was not what he seemed to be (as we have seen, the Talmud provides a clue by referring to him as Rabbi). Not that he lied to Rebbi, G-d forbid, but that he judged himself particularly harshly because he adhered to a principle dear to Rebbi’s heart, and did not wish to benefit in any way from his Torah learning in this world; it was in this sense that Rabbi Shim‘on called him Rebbi’s “student,” not that he had literally studied under his father (who would then, of course, have recognized him).

D.

We find this principle articulated in the Mishna, by another of Rebbi’s sons: רבן גמליאל בנו של רבי יהודה הנשיא אומר, יפה תלמוד תורה עם דרך ארץ כו' וכל תורה שאין עמה צלאכה סופה בטילה וגוררת עון (“Rabban Gamli’él son of Rabbi Yëhuda ha-Nassi’ says, 'Torah learning is beautiful together with a worldly occupation... and any Torah which is not accompanied by a trade will in the end be nullified and occasions sin'”; אבות פ"ב מ"ב).

Rebbi clearly recognized the need the need for religious functionaries and leaders; he was, after all, the nassi’, the head of the Jewish community which clung to the Galil in the aftermath of the Bar Kochva revolt, and was succeeded in that post by his son Rabban Gamli’él. Within that community, the towns and villages had need of rabbanim, of dayyanim to serve on battei dinim, and those positions were of course fed by the three great yëshivoth located in Tzipporin, Tëverya (Tiberias) and Qesarya (Caesarea) There is, in other words, a clear necessity for הלומד על מנת ללמד, “one who learns in order to teach” (שם פ"ג מ"ו).

Beyond those, though, also members of the Jewish community were the farmers, shepherds, ba‘alei mël’acha of all sorts, and many of them, too, were bënei Torah, learned in their own right, true talmidei chacahmim. These men had as their ideal the determination to avoid, in any sense, making the Torah either עטרה להתגדל בה ולא קרדום לחפור בה (“a crown with which to magnify oneself or a shovel with which to dig”; שם מ"ז).

Rabbi Yonathan ben ‘Amram plainly belonged to this latter group. Duly reminded by Rabbi Yonathan’s example that such bënei Torah also exist in Këlal Yisra’él, Rebbi prudently opened the otzaroth to everyone.

Parshath Re’eh (Deuteronomy XI,26-XVI,17)

A.

את כל הדבר אשר אנכי מצוה אתכם אתו תשמרו לעשות לא תסיף עליו ולא תגרע ממנו (“The entire word which I am commanding you, you shall keep to do; you shall not add to it and you shall not detract from it”; XIII, 1).

At first blush, our verse seems an unnecessary repetition, given that only two weeks ago, in Parshath Va-Ethchannan, we read: לא תספו על הדבר אשר אנכי מצוה אתכם ולא תגרעו ממנו לשמר את מצות ד' אלקיכם אשר שנכי מצטה אתכם (“You shall not add to the word which I am commanding and you shall not detract from it, to keep the mitzvoth of Ha-Shem your G-d which I am commanding you”; IV, 2).

This impression of unnecessary repetition is strengthened by the fact that Rashi makes a very similar comment, based upon the Sifrei in our parasha (פסקא ל'), on both verses, providing as examples of unwarranted addition: חמשה טוטפות בתפילין, ה' מינין בלולב, ארבעה ברכות בברכת כהנים (“five paragraphs in t’fillin [there should only be four], five species with a lulav [there should only be four; cf. Leviticus XXXIII, 40], and four blessings in the birkath kohanim [there should only be three; cf. Numbers VI, 22-27]”), the only difference being that, in the comment on IV, 2 he adds five tzitziyoth as an example (there should be one on each corner of a four-cornered garment; cf. Numbers XV, 38-39) and omits the birkath kohanim. The latter is all the more striking since, although the Sifrei adduces it in connection with our verse, the Talmud (ראש השנה כ"ח.) derives it from IV, 2.

So what is going on?

B.

We must begin our enquiry by asking what would motivate, for example, a kohén to add to birkath kohanim.

If we turn to the Talmudic citation above concerning birkath kohanim, we find that it reads: מנין לכהן העולה לדוכן שלא יאמר, הואיל ונתנה לי תורה רשות לברך את ישראל, אוסיף ברכה משלי כגון "יוסף עליכם ככם אלף פעמים", ת"ל "לא תוסיפו על הדבר" (“Whence [do we learn] that a kohén who goes up to duchan should not say, "Since the Torah has granted me permission to bless Israel, I’ll add a blessing of my own, such as ‘[G-d] will increase your like a thousand times’ [Deuteronomy I, 11]; the teaching is, ‘you shall not add to the word....’”).

Rashi quoted the midrash on I, 11 in his comment, that Moshe himself added this blessing to the Torah; hence, the Torah Tmima explains, the kohén, armed with this precedent and the certain knowledge that G-d wishes Israel to be blessed, understand our prohibition as a matter of reshuth, of “permission,” כלומר שיאמר הקב"ה איני מטריח עליכם להוסיך על המצות, אבל אם תרצו, רשאים אתם (“that is to say, that the Holy One, Blessed is He says, I am not troubling you to add to the mitzvoth, but if you wish, you have permission”).

This would seem to be a worthy motivation; after all, G-d Himself declared to Avraham Avinu ואברכה מברכיך (“And I shall bless those who bless you....” Genesis XII, 4). So why should it be that the desire to add a blessing to the blessings of Israel is suspect? Why should the Torah care?

The Torah Tmima offers in answer that the fear is that once one arrogates to himself the right to add to the Torah as he wishes, he will ultimately come to feel that the numbers in all such enumerated mitzvoth as the examples Rashi cites are lav davqa, not necessarily so, and so will be tempted also to do less than the scriptural mandate. This is why, he suggests, Chazal state that כל המוסיף גורע (“anyone who adds [to the mitzvoth] detracts [from them]”; סנהדרין כ"ט.).

The Torah Tmima goes on to quote the Maharsha’s comment to the gmara concerning our well-meaning but misguided kohén that לא אמרו בל תוסיף אלא במה שאדם מוסיף מדעת עצמו, אבל מה שתקנו חכמים לצורך אין איסור בל תוסיף (“[the Torah] does not say ‘you shall not add’ save concerning what an individual may add according to his personal opinion, but taqqanoth, corrective decrees issued by legitimate rabbinical authority do not fall under the prohibition of ‘you shall not add’”). The fear that adding something capriciously, because it feels good to do so at the moment or under the circumstances, is a temptation for individuals only; the collective action of the rabbanim in administering the Torah is exempt from this consideration.

Fair enough; but why is it necessary that there be two separate verses?

C.

The Maharal mi-Prag (גור ארי' על פסוקנו) also asks this question, and in analyzing it, details a yesod, a fundamental principle in Biblical exegesis:

There is, he asserts, a qualitative difference between the individual kohén adding his own bracha to birkath kohanim and the other hosafoth (“additions”) cited by Rashi. The difference between our verse and IV, 2 is דכאן הזהיר אפילו דלא אגידי כלל כמו ברכת כהנים, דאף על גב דברכה רביעית של ברכת כהנים בפני עצמו קאי, דלא דמיא לחמש מינין שבלולב ולא לה' פרשיות שבתפילין דהתם כיון דאגידי התוספת עמהם עובר בבל תוסיפו (“For here [G-d] has warned even when they are not unified at all, as in the case of birkath kohanim, for even though a fourth bracha of birkath kohanim stands by itself, in that it is not like five species with a lulav or five paragraphs in t’fillin, for there it is because they are unified wholes that an addition to them violates ‘you shall not add’”).

In other words, the cases of lulav and t’fillin constitute organic wholes, a fact emphasized by the Hebrew expressions arba‘ath ha-minim and arba‘ ha-parshiyoth ordinarily employed to describe them, in which the use of the smichuth, the “construct state” of the numerals indicates an integral unity, as any reader possessed of a חוש חי לשפה העברית, a “living sense of the Hebrew language” (a favourite phrase of one of my rebbe’im) will attest. To add a fifth species of plant to the lulav or a fifth paragraph to the t’fillin is tantamount to grafting a fifth leg on a cow.

Not so in the case of birkath kohanim, a grouping of three free-standing brachoth, three cows in the same patch of meadow, as it were. To introduce a fourth cow into the pasture is clearly not the same thing. If it is to be prohibited, it requires a separate statement. The Maharal finds that the wording of the Talmudic passage alludes to this difference: ת"ל "דבר", אפילו דבר לא יוסיף, הרי דבעי קרא להכי בפני עצמו (“the teaching is [based on] davar, even a davar cannot be added; for this, a separate verse is needed”). To add a species to the lulav or a paragraph to the t’fillin is to introduce a foreign component; to add a bracha to a group of brachoth is to add a free-standing entity.

It is for this reason, the Maharal explains, that Rashi does not include the example of birkath kohanim in his comment on Va-Ethchannan, דכאן מיתורא ילפינן דאף הוספה לברכת כהנים חייב (“for here we learn from yittur [“superfluity” of the verse] that even an addition to the birkath kohanim is impermissible”), whereas Rashi did add the case of five tzitzyoth, which does not actually appear in the Sifrei, כי דרך להביא ראי' מג' דברים (“because it is [good] practice to cite three things in evidence”); for this same reason, the Sifrei does cite, and Rashi does quote, the cases of lulav and t’fillin together with birkath kohanim.

ואף על גב דבספרי משמע דדריש שלא יוסיף על ברכת כהנים מלשון "דבר", יש לומר דלא מן "דבר" נפקע אלא מיתורא דקרא, דלא הוי למכתב כלל קרא דהכא כו' מדכתיב קרא מיותר שמע מינה דהך "דבר" דכתיב בקרא רצה לומר אפילו דבר לא יוסיף וגו' (“And even though in the Sifrei it is said that not to add to the birkath kohanim is drawn from the term davar, it must be said that it does not actually derive from davar, but rather from the yittur of the verse, for it was not necessary to write the present verse at all... From the fact that a superfluous verse has been written we understand that this term davar in the verse is intended to say, not even a davar should be added”).

D.

Having thus viewed our two verses through the Maharal’s prism, b’siyya‘ta di-shmayya I believe that two additional internal hints to the essential correctness of his analysis can be discerned.

The first is evident from the fact that the verbs of the verse in Va-Ethchannan are couched in the plural, lo thosifu... v’lo thigr‘u (not immediately evident from the English translation); thus, the verse applies directly to every individual member of Klal Yisra’él and has the broadest possible application to many commonly performed mitzvoth, as Rashi’s examples attest.

Our verse, on the other hand, is not only put in the singular, lo thosif... v’lo Thigra‘, a clear allusion to “the” kohén going up to duchan but it begins éth- kol ha-davar.... The accusative particle את is vocalised éth, in which form it can mean “with” as well as express the definite direct object of a transitive verb. Thus, the verse seems to hint that, with any formula of words which the Torah bids us to use, whether, as in the case of the birkath kohanim, it is contained in the written Torah, or (as the Maharsha assured us above) it is mandated by Chazal, we are neither to add nor delete anything. Each part has an independent existence, but is nonetheless part of the greater whole, part of the fabric woven by Torah.

And so we have a valuable case study in Torah exegesis, as well as an object lesson: If we view the Torah, both the written text and the oral tradition of Chazal through the stereoscope of our Gdolim (in this case, Rashi, the Maharal, the Maharsha, and the Torah Tmima), we can reach below the surface, and discern some of the Torah’s true multi-dimensional depth.

Parshath Re’eh (Deuteronomy XI,26-XVI,17) 8/10/07

A.

בנים אתם לד' אלקיכם לא תתגדדו ולא תשימו קרחה בין עיניכם למת: כי עם קדוש אתה לד' אלקיך וגו' (“You are sons of Ha-Shem your G-d; you shall not gash yourselves or put a bald strip between your eyes for the dead. For you are a holy people of Ha-Shem your G-d...." XIV, 1-2).

Rashi explains our verse: לא תתנו גדידה ושרט בבשרכם על מת כדרך שהאמוריים עושין לפי שאתם בנים של מקום ואתם ראויין להיות נאים ולא גדודים ומקורחים (“Do not make a gash or scratch in your flesh vecause of the dead in the way that the Emoriyyim do, because you are sons of G-d and you are fit to be comely, and not gashed or made bald”).

This, it would seem, is the plain meaning of our verse, and the Talmud connects it to what the Torah prescribes for the kohanim in Leviticus XXI, 5-6: לא יקרחה קרחה בראשם ופאת זקנם לא יגלחו ובבשרם לא ישרטו שרטת: קדשים יהיו לאלקיהם וגו' (“They shall not make a bald spot on their heads and the corners of their beards they shall not shave, and in their flesh they shall not scratch a scratch. Holy shall they be to their G-d....” קדושין ל"ו., מכות כ'.), which, the Sifrei points out, was in fact the practise of the priests of Ba’al (cf. I Kings XVIII, 28).

Ramban notes Rashi’s comment and questions it sharply: ואיננו נכון, שאם כן תהי' המצוה גם לא על המת (“It is not correct, for if so, the mitzva would apply even not because of the dead”). In other words, if the real reason for the mitzva is, as Rashi states, that we are “sons of G-d” and therefore fit to look nice, then why does the verse prohibit self-mutilation specifically over someone who has died? Indeed, if the custom is prohibited to all of Israel “because [we] are sons of G-d,” why does it have to be separately prohibited to the kohanim?

B.

After asking his question, Ramban goes on to quote the Even Êzra: שתדעו שאתם בנים לשם והוא אוהב אתכם יותר מהאב לכן אל תתגודדו על כל מה שיעשה כי כל אשר יעשה לטוב הוא ואם לא תבינוהו כאשר לא יבינו הבנים הקטנים מעשה אביהם רק יסמכו עליו כן תעשו גם אתם כי עם קדוש אתה ואינך כשאר כל הגויים על כן לא תעשה כמעשיהם (“For you should know that you are sons of Ha-Shem and He loves you more than a father; therefore, do not gash yourselves over anything which He does, for everything which He does is for good, and if you do not understand Him, just as small children do not understand what their father is doing, yet still rely on him, so, too, should you do, for you are a holy people and not like all the rest of the nations; therefore, don’t do as they do”).

Adds Ramban: ולפי דעתי "עם קדוש" הבטחה בקיום הנשמות לפניו ית' ואמר אחרי שאתם עם קדוש וסגולת ד' ולא ישא אליהם נפש וחשב מחשבות לבלתי ידח ממנו נדח אין ראוי להם להתגודד ולהקרח ואפי' ימות בנוער כו' ומכאן סמך לרבותינו באסרם להתאבל יותר מדאי (“And in my opinion, ‘holy people’ constitutes a promise concerning the preservation of souls before Him, may He be blessed, and He said, 'Since you are a holy people and a treasure of Ha-Shem’s, such that He would not grant them a nefesh amidst thoughts of casting it away from Him, it is not proper for them to gash themselves or be rendered bald, even if [the deceased] dies young....' And from here [we have] support for the Rabbis’ prohibition of excessive mourning”).

The death of a loved one is naturally the occasion for the wildest emotions; mourners often irrationally blame themselves, try to hurt themselves, to hurl themselves into the grave so as not to be permanently parted from the deceased parent, spouse, sibling, or (G-d forbid) child. It is this, apparently, which underlies the Emori custom of gashing or scratching oneself over the dead (as is indeed still the mourning custom amongst some primitive peoples in our day). For Israel, such displays are neither justified nor seemly, for in our case the parting is not permanent. A measure of sadness is in order, to be sure, just as it would be were the loved one to be emigrating to a far-off land; but since we are בנים לד', Ha-Shem’s sons, we are assured of an eventual “family reunion."

But there are deeper implications worthy of some exploration.

C.

The holy Zohar juxtaposes our verse to Genesis IX, 6: בצלם אלקים עשה את האדם (“in the image of G-d [tzelem Eloqim] did He make the adam”), and draws the conclusion: ואילין אינון בצלם אלקים ואילין ירתין ירותא עלאה כגוונא דילי' ועל דא אזהר באורייתא "לא תתגודדו" וכו' דהא לא אתאביד והא שכיח בעולמין טבין עלאין ויקירין להוון חדן כד אסתלק צדיקא מהאי עלמא (“and these [Israel] are in the image of G-d, and they inherit a supernal legacy which is of Him, and therefore He warned in the Torah ‘do not gash yourselves,’ etc., for [an individual Jew who dies] is not lost, and finds himself in good, supernal, precious worlds, such that one ought to rejoice when a tzaddiq leaves this world;” ח"ג קנ"ט:).

This is a central theme in Torah thought; the Talmud, for its part, informs us: אתם קרויים אדם ואין העובדי כוכבים קרויים אדם (“You [Israel] are called adam and the idolators are not called adam;” יבמות ס"א.), and the Maharal mi-Prag returns to it over and over again in his writings; for instance:
ישראל הם מציאות אמיתי שהרי הם עלולים מן השם יתברך ונקראים בשביל כך בנים למקום שהם נמצאים מאתו בעצם ובראשונה (“Israel are a true actuality, for they were brought about from Ha-Shem, and are called on that account “sons of G-d,” for they are in existence from Him in essence and from the beginning;” גור ארי' על פסוקנו). And: ישראל נקראים בנים בשביל שהם עלולים מאמיתתו יתברך, ודבר זה גורם החבור והדביקות לגמרי (“Israel are called ‘sons’ because they came about from His truthfulness, may He be blessed, and this is what causes [their] connectedness [chibbur] and total adherence [dveiquth]”; נצח ישראל פי"ב). And: ישראל המה נבראו מן השם יתברך בעצם, לא כמו שאר נמצאים שאין נבראים מן השם יתברך בעצם רק שהם נבראים לשמש אחרים, לכן לא נקראים בשם בנים כו' רק ישראל שבריאתם לא לשמש זולתם (“Israel were created from Ha-Shem in essence, not like the rest of existing things which were not created from Ha-Shem in essence; rather, they were created to serve others, and therefore are not called by the term ‘sons...,’ only Israel, whose creation was not to serve any others;” באר הגולה, באר שלישי), multa inter alia.

All this is very heady stuff. Israel would seem to be a race of Übermenschen, of Jewish supermen. Yet, the Torah is very careful to delineate Israel’s genetic heritage, descended from Shem, son of Noach. Others, too, are descendants of Shem, and, of course, all mankind are ultimately descended from Noach, meaning that they share the same genetic heritage as Israel. What is more, if Israel have this essential, qualitative difference over everyone else, how is giyyur, “conversion,” from one of the nations to Israel possible?

D.

We can begin to clarify this with a mishna (אבות פ"ג מי"ד). The mishna opens by juxtaposing Genesis IX, 6 and our verse in a fashion similar to the Zohar cited supra, then continues: חביבין ישראל שנתן להם כלי חמדה. חבה יתירה נודעת להם שנתן להם כלי חמדה שבו נברא העולם, שנאמר "כי לקח טוב נתתי לכם תורתי אל תעזבו" (“Favored are Israel because [G-d] gave them a precious instrument. Special affection is known to them because He gave them the precious instrument with which the world was created, as it is said: ‘For I have given you a good portion, My Torah; do not abandon [it]’ [Proverbs IV, 2]”). Indeed, the Zohar, a bit before the passage cited supra, itself asserts: בכל מאן דאיהו דחיל חטאת איקרי אדם אמיתי. א"ר אלעזר דאית בי' יראה, ענוה, חסידות כללא כולא (“Everyone who fears sin is called a true adam; said Rabbi El’azar, For he has in him fear and humility; piety summarizes it all;” ח"ג קמ:ה:).

The above can be reconciled with all the foregoing by first remembering the Talmud’s assessment that the human body contains 248 “limbs” (évarim) and 365 “sinews” (gidim; מכות כ"ג:). Presumably, so does the body of an ape. What differentiates an adam, the tzelem Eloqim, from an ape is the addition of the neshama, the metaphysical, spiritual component whose structure is exactly parallelled by the body, such that each éver and each gid has its metaphysical counterpart. This is the tzelem Eloqim (עיי' בית חכמה לשל"ה הקדוש).

As any physical therapist will tell you, lack of exercise leads to physical atrophy; when I was hospitalized, I was told that it begins to set in within the first 48 hours that one is bedridden. The same is true of the neshama, however the atrophy begins to set in immediately.

Chazal, in the Talmud, op. cit., do the arithmetic, and note that the number of évarim and gidim, not coincidentally, equals the number of mitzvoth in the Torah, 613. "Favored are Israel," for G-d has given them the “exercise manual” by which they can maintain and strengthen the chibbur and dveiquth to Ha-Shem which confers on them the right to be called an adam and G-d’s “sons.” It is the Torah which frees them from the “service of others,” as the baraitha tells us, שאין לך בן חורין אלא מי שעוסק בתלמוד תורה (“For no-one is free save one who is occupied in Torah-study;” אבות פ"ו ה"ב).

Through the Torah, the Maharal notes, we are engaged in the service of the uniquely, utterly unitary G-d, a union such that din (“judgment”) and rachamim (“mercy”) are indivisible and indistinguishable from one another. The nations, on the other hand, turn Divinity into “divinities;” they serve “others.” They see din as isolated from rachamim, and there seems no plainer expression of din than death. Hence the Torah’s emphasis on invalidating “gashing,” and so on in connection with the dead, and with Divine service (גור ארי' שם, וע"ע נפש החיים ש"א פ"ד, פירוש ובחרת בחיים שם ובמלואים בענין חבור הנשמות לעולמות העליונים, שהוא נעשה אך ורק דרך לשון הקדש, ושחבור זה נפסק מן הגויים ע"י בלבול הלשונות במגדל בבל).

Any member of the nations wishing to be free of the service of “others” and wishing to (re-)establish the chibbur and dveiquth which will create an adam amithi, a true adam rather than the mere physical shadow of one, has the path of giyyur open to him.

For G-d is One, and din and rachamim are not, in the end, separable.