Parashath Va-Yéra’ (Genesis XVIII,1-XXII-24) 11/11/11

A.

As our parasha opens, three mal’achim pay a visit to Avraham. Each has a separate mission (עיי בבא מציעא פ"ו:): One has been tasked to destroy the evil cities of Sëdom and ‘Amora, and another to rescue Avraham’s nephew, Lot, from the cataclysm. But the first order of business is to bring Avraham and his wife some long-awaited, good news: ויאמר שוב אשוב אליך כעת חי' והנה בן לשרה אשתך ושרה שמעת פתח האהל והוא אחריו: ואברהם ושרה זקנים באים בימים חדל להיות לשרה ארח כנשים: ותצחק שרה בקרבה לאמר אחרי בלתי היתה לי עדנה ואדני זקן: ויאמר ד' אל אברהם למה זה צחקה שרה לאמר האף אמנם אלד ואני זקנתי: היפלא מד' דבר למועד אשוב אליך כעת חי' ולשרה בן: ותכחש שרה לאמר לא צחקתי כי יראה ויאמר לא כי צחקת: (“And [the mal’ach] said, 'Returning I shall return to you at a time of living, and behold, for Sara, your wife, a son; and Sara was listening [at] the tent’s entrance, and he/it was behind him [vë-hu’ aharav]. And Avraham and Sara were elderly, come into years; Sara had ceased to have the way of women. And Sara laughed within her vicinity [bë-qirbah, i.e., such that those in the tent could hear her] to say, 'After my decline, I shall have pleaseure [‘edna], and my husband is old?!' And Ha-Shem said to Avraham, 'Why is it that Sara laughed, to say, "Will even I therefore give birth, and I am old?" Is there a thing too wonderful for Ha-Shem? At the season I shall return to you at a time of living, and for Sara, a son.' And Sara denied [it], to say, 'I did not laugh'; for she was afraid. And He said, 'No, for you laughed'”; XVIII, 10-15).

This is surely one of the most perplexing exchanges in the Torah. Rashi notes that the implication of the word ‘edna is that Sara immediately began to feel herself being rejuvenated, restored to the status quo ante such that her former child-bearing capability was restored (for this reason, she said that her husband was old, since she no longer felt so, as the Ha‘améq Davar explains).

But this begs the question yet further. If she actually felt her youth being restored, why did she seem to scoff? And when G-d called attention to it, why did she deny it? The entire passage screams out: Dorshéni! (“Research me!”).

B.

To understand what is proposed below, it is first necessary to examine a fundamental concept expressed by a word which has no precise equivalent in English or any other western language. That word is emuna.

If one looks in a Hebrew-English dictionary, one finds such words as faith, trust, belief, creed, and confidence on offer as definitions, each of which expresses part of the story. To understand what the word really means, we must examine how else the root is used.

The young lady who would become the queen of the Medio-Persian empire, Esther, is first encountered as an orphaned girl raised by her uncle, Mordëchai, concerning whom we read ויהי אומן את אסתר (“and he was training/guiding [omén] Hadassa” (Esther II, 7). This is the participle of the qal form of the verb, and it reveals the first stratum of meaning in the Holy Language.

An artisan is an uman, someone who has been trained or educated in a craft, brought from apprenticeship to journeyman status, then on to mastering the art. To train such a person, to bring a craftsman into being is immén, a verb in the factitive, pi‘él conjugation, which brings something into being (in this case, the craftsman).

With the above in mind, we turn the pages of our hypothetical dictionary, and discover that the entry for the English word “believe” is he’emin, in the causative, hif‘il conjugation.

The simple meaning of the root is “instruct, guide”; to do so seriously and intensively in order to produce a result is the factitive immén. So what, precisely, is being caused to happen by being ma’amin?

C.

The Birkath Tov proposes to explain our passage in light of something which he attributes to the first Belzer Rebbe, Rabbi Shalom Roqéah זצ"ל, the Sar Shalom.

In discussing the age-old Jewish practice, when one has a pressing personal need, of seeking the bëracha of a recognized tzaddiq, the Belzer tells us, in order for the bëracha to be efficacious צריך להיות לו אמונה בצדיק בזה ובאם לאו קשה לו להוושע (“[the petitioner] must have emuna in the tzaddiq in this matter, and if there is not, it is difficult for him to be helped”).

Furthermore, he continues, even if the petitioner himself has emuna, but עומד שם עוד איש אשר אין לו אמונה בצדיק אזי מקלקל גם כן לאותו האיש שלא יוכל להוושע ומקרר אותו גם כן וקשה לו להוושע (“another man is standing there who has no emuna in the tzaddiq, then he also corrupts [the [petitioner], so that he cannot be helped, and cools him down also, and it is difficult for him to be helped”).

The solution, says the Belzer, הוא שיקטין הדבר ויקרר הדבר לפני אותו האיש בדיבורים, מה יוכל להושיע זה הצדיק הדבר הלזה אין לו כלל כח לזה וכדומה שאותו האיש לא ידע שהוא מאמין במחשבתו בצדיק ואזי נשאר הדבר קיים אצלו באמונתו השלימה ולא יוכל אותו האיש האחר השומע לקרר אותו ולהשבית אותו מאמונתו (“is that he minimize the matter and cool the matter down before that man with words, ‘How can this tzaddiq resolve this matter, he has no power at all for this,’ and the like, so that that man will not know that he is ma’amin in the tzaddiq in his thought, and then the matter remains viable for him through his perfect emuna, and that other man who heard cannot cool him down and abate his emuna from him”).

To explain the Belzer’s statement in terms of a modern metaphor, the tzaddiq’s tëfilla and bëracha is a signal generated in response to the petitioner’s request, but the petitioner’s emuna that the tzaddiq can effect a change in his circumstances is the amplifier which boosts the signal, stepping it up to carry it through to the Divine receiver; it is in this sense that the petitioner’s ha’amana is actively causing something to take place. To continue the metaphor, the negativity of the scoffer within earshot is another signal, heterodyning on the first, causing interference and jamming it from getting through. The Birkath Tov quotes another illustrious authority, the great Rabbi Mordëchai of Neshchiz, שנקרא אמונה מל' "ויהי אומן את הדסה" שיכולים להמשיך על ידי אמונה כל דבר (“that it is called emuna because of the expression, ‘and he was omén Hadassa,’ for one can bring anything about through emuna”).

Applying this principle to our passage, here is what is going on:

The Ha‘améq Davar reminds us that the mal’ach is addressing Avraham, and Avraham is repeating his words for Sara to hear. This is what she was hearing at the tent entrance; only in this way does it make sense that Ha-Shem (still speaking through the mal’ach) asks Avraham why Sara laughed, rather than asking her directly, changing her words from “and my husband is old” to “and I am old,” so as not to cause any discord or ill-feel-ing in the household (עיי' בבא מציעא פ"ז.).

The Rebbe now focuses on the phrase vë-hu’ aharav, an example of what I call the Torah’s creative ambiguity. The masculine singular pronoun can refer to the tent entrance (as Onqëlos understands it and Rashi writes), or it can be understood to refer to a person; as the Targum Yonathan and Yërushalmi render it: וישמעאל קאי בתרי' (“And Yishma’él was standing behind [the mal’ach]”).

Yishma‘él the scoffer, whom Sara would later have sent from the camp so that his negative influence not infect and corrupt Yitzhaq (XXI, 9-13). This, says the Rebbe, is what Sara was afraid of: That Yishma‘él’s scoffing would negatively affect the bëracha being effected by Avraham’s words; after all, she had been young once before, and had not then been able to bear a child. Hence, when confronted, she denied not that she laughed, but that she had scoffed at the effectiveness of her husband’s bëracha, that she had been afraid of Yishma‘él’s baleful interference.

But G-d objected that this consideration would apply only if Sara received the bëracha from Avraham’s initiative. This was not the case here: Avraham was clearly repeating the mal’ach’s words, and so a prophetess and tzadeqeth of Sara’s stature should surely have known that the decree was initiated by G-d directly, not by Avraham, and that therefore nothing could prevent it from coming about. From her mouth, in that instance, the employment of such a mechanism was tantamount to scoffing in her own right.

D.

Reading our passage in the light of the Belzer Rebbe’s insight, we find that לא קשיא מידי, there are in fact no difficulties, and everything is clear; what is more, the Torah has illustrated for us the mechanism underlying the age-old custom of seeking a bëracha from a tzaddiq, and the rôle played by the petitioner’s emuna in energizing it and making it effective.

Parshath Va-Yéra’ (Genesis XVIII,1-XXII,24) 10/22/10

A.

Our parasha ends with the starkly dramatic incident in which Avraham is bidden to carry out the sacrifice of his heir and only son by his wife, Sara, Yitzhaq. The account opens with the laconic words: ויהי אחר הדברים האלה והאלקים נסה את אברהם וגו' (“And it was after these things, and G-d tested Avraham....”; XXII, 1).

As we read on, we note the following: וילך אל המקום אשר אמר לו האלקים: כו' ויאמר אברהם אלקים יראה לו השה לעלה וכו' ויבאו אל המקום אשר אמר לו האלקים וגו' (“And [Avraham] went to the place which G-d [ha-Eloqim] told him.... And Avraham said, 'Eloqim will see for Himself the ram for the burnt offering...And they came to the place [of] which ha-Eloqim told him....”; XXII,3-9). And then, suddenly: ויקרא לו מלאך ד' מן השמים וגו' (“And an angel [mal’ach] of Ha-Shem called to him from the heavens....”; ibid., 11). In other words, the entire account is couched in language using the Divine Name Eloqim, until suddenly, at the climax, the name changes to Ha-Shem.
What is the significance of this shift in Divine names?
B. We begin our investigation by taking note of a famous dispute between the Rambam and the Ramban concerning the significance of qorbanoth (“sacrifices”).
The Rambam’s view may be found in his classic Moré Nëvuchim, wherein he notes that Israel spent considerable time exiled amongst the Egyptians, who worshipped the zodia-cal sign Aries (which they identified with their creator-god, Khnum, always pictured as a potter with a human body and a ram’s head). It is this which underlay the Egyptians’ abhorrence of shepherds (e.g. כי תועבת מצרים כל רעה צאן [“for an abomination of Egypt is every herder of ovicaprids”; Genesis XLVI,34, or כי תעבת מצרים נזבח לד' אלקינו [“for the abomination of Egypt shall we sacrifice to Ha-Shem our G-d”; Exodus VIII,22). Simi-larly, Israel was exposed to the very widespread worship of shédim, “demons”, in the ancient world, in the form of goats (së‘irim) a practice to which the Torah refers several times in e,g, Leviticus XVII,7: ולא יזבחו עוד את זבחיהם לשעירים (“And they shall no longer make their sacrifices to the së‘irim”), or יזבחו לשדים לא אלוק (“They sacrifice to shédim, not G-d”; Deuteronomy XXXII,17). Indeed:
תמצא אנשי הודו עד היום הזה לא ישחטו בקר בשום פנים כו' וכן שיהיו מתבטלים אלה האמונות נצטוו להקריב שלשת אלה המינים מן הבהמות מן הבקר ומן הצאן ומן העזים כדי שיודע כי הדבר שהיו חושבים כי הם תכלית העבודה הוא אשם לבורא ובמעשה ההיא יתכפרו העונות כי כן ירופאו האמונות הרעות שהם מדוי הנפשות וכל מדוה וחלי לא יתרפא כי אם בהפכו וגו' (“You will find [that] the men of India to this day do not slaughter cattle in any fashion....And so that these beliefs should be nullified, these three species of beast, cattle, sheep, and goats [cf. e.g. Leviticus I,2], were com-manded to be sacrificed so that it be known that the thing which they had been thinking was the object of worship is a guilt-offering to the Creator. and through that action sins are atoned; for thus are these bad beliefs, which are diseases of souls, healed, and every disease or illness is only cured by its opposite....”; שם ח"ג פמ"ו בתרגום ר' יהודה אלחריזי).
The Ramban takes sharp issue with the Rambam, saying that, by this view, יעשה שלחן ד' מגואל שאינו רק להוציא מלבן של רשעים וטפשי עולם (“Ha-Shem’s table is made contaminated, if its sole purpose is to refute rësha‘im and the stupid of the world....”), and goes on to elaborate his view, in his comment to Leviticus I,9:
ויותר ראוי לשמוע הטעם שאומרים בהם כי בעבור שמעשי בני אדם נגמרים במחשבה בדבור ובמעשה צוה השם כי כאשר יחטא ויביא קרבן ויסמוך ידיו עליו ויתודה בפיו כנגד הדבור וישרוף באש הקרב והכליות שהם כלי המחשבה והתאוה והכרעים כנגד ידיו ורגליו של אדם העושים כל המלאכה ויזרוק הדם על המזבח כנגד דמו בנפשו כדי שיחשוב אדם בעשותו כל אלה כי חטא לאלקיו בגופו ובנפשו וראוי לו שישפך דמו וישרף גופו לולי חסד הבורא שלקח ממנו תמורה וגו' (“And it is more proper to hear the reason which [Hazal] say concerning them, that since the acts of human beings are completed in thought, speech, and deed, Ha-Shem commanded that when one sins, he bring a sacrifice and place his hands on it and confess with his mouth, apposite speech; and burn with fire the innards and the kidneys, which are the organs of thought and lust; and the limbs, apposite a person’s hands and legs, which carry out all the work; and sprinkle the blood on the altar apposite his own blood, so that a person think, as he is doing all this, that he has sinned against his G-d with his body and soul, and it is proper for him that his blood be shed, and his body be burnt up, were it not for the kindness [hesed] of the Creator, Who has taken a substitute from him....”).
Next we consider Rashi’s famous comment on Genesis I,1: Throughout the account of Creation, he notes, the only Divine Name used is Eloqim: שבתחלה עלה במחשבה לבראתו במדת הדין וראה שאין העולם מתקיים והקדים מדת רחמים למדת הדין והיינו דכתיב "ביום עשות ד' אלקים ארץ ושמים" (“for at the beginning it was intended to create [the universe] with the mea-sure of judgment [middath ha-din], and He saw that the world was not enduring, and pre-ëmpted the middath ha-din with the measure of mercy [middath ha-rahamim], as it is written, ‘on the day Ha-Shem Eloqim made earth and heaven’ [II,4]”). From this we can discern that the Divine Name Eloqim is emblematic of din, and that the shém Ha-Shem is emblematic of rahamim.
With this in mind, we consider a comment which I have heard in the name of Rabbi Yoséf Dov ha-Lévi Soloveitchik זצ"ל. Rabbi Soloveitchik suggests that our episode ref-lects the Ramban’s view of the sacrificial order, in that all of the steps leading up to Yitz-haq’s sacrifice at Moriya are driven by Divine din, as indicated by the repeated and exclusive use of Eloqim. Only at the last moment does Divine hesed and rahamim come into play, as the mal’ach Ha-Shem cries out, אל תשלח ידך אל הנער ואל תעש לו מאומה כו' וישא אברהם את עיניו וירא והנה איל אחר נאחז בסבך בקרניו וגו' (“Do not set your hand against the young man [na‘ar] and do nothing to him....And Avraham lifted his eyes andd saw, and behold, a ram was behind, caught in the thicket by his horns....”; ibid., 12-13).
As Rabbi Soloveitchik notes, then, our passage clearly supports the Ramban’s view of the sacrificial order. It can also be shown, however, that that there is a scriptural basis for the Rambam’s view. For instance, in Deuteronomy XVIII,9-12, we read: כי אתה בא אל הארץ אשר ד' אלקיך נתן לך כו' לא ימצא בך מעביר בנו ובתו באש כו' כי תועבת ד' כל עשה אלה וגו' (“For you are coming to the land which Ha-Shem your Eloqim is giving you....There will not be found amongst you one who passes his son and his daughter into the fire....For an abomination of Ha-Shem is anyone who does these things....”).
The reference is to the particularly worship of the idol Molech. Note how the passage begins; it is Ha-Shem Eloqim, Rahamim and Din, which will sustain us in the Holy Land. The human sacrifice hinted at in this passage (and confirmed in Canaanite archaeological sites) is the essence of unremitting Din without Rahamim, cruel, inexorable, and unyield-ing, despite what must have been a tradition amongst the bënei Yisra’él extending back to Avraham, confirmed and enshrined in the written Torah at Sinai, of the substitution of animal for human sacrifices. Anyone who would so reject the Divine hesed and rahamim inherent in the acceptance of animal over human sacrifice, the preëmption of Din by Rahamim which was witnessed by Avraham and Yitzhaq is indeed a to‘avath Ha-Shem, an abomination of that ineffable Name in particular, the embodiment of rahamim.
The fact that this experience of Avraham and Yitzhaq was private, shared with no-one else, and is to-day known only through the Torah (even though Noah was acutely aware of the species to be used for sacrifice [cf. VII,2 and VIII,20], this knowledge was apparently forgotten during Nimrod’s reign) is crucial to later developments.
When Avraham set out for that fateful encounter at Moriya, the Torah tells us, ויקח את שני נעריו אתו (“he took his two në‘arim with him”: XXII,3). Rashi fills in the gap by telling us that the në‘arim were Eli‘ezer and Yishma‘él. As he approached the holy site, he told the në‘arim, שבו לכם פה עם החמור ואני והנער נלכה עד כה וגו' (“Seat yourselves here with the donkey, and I and the na‘ar [i.e., Yitzhaq] will go onward”; v. 5). Yishma‘él and Eli‘ezer were not there; they did not witness the preëmption of Din by Rahamim, Eloqim by Ha-Shem . All that they saw of Divine interaction was the earlier Din noted by Rabbi Soloveitchik.
This has ramifications especially for Yishma‘él’s descendants, in whose Arabic language the very word for religion is – din, and the only name by which they know the Creator is Allah, whose root, alef-lamed-hé, be it noted, is clearly that of the shém Eloqim.
D. The mal’ach Ha-Shem went on to proclaim to Avraham: עתה ידעתי כי ירא אלקים אתה ולא חשכת בנך יחידך ממני . As anyone with a living sense of the holy Hebrew language will attest, the juxtaposition of the word ‘atta, “now”, with the perfective verb yada‘ti pre-cludes translating the verb temporally, “I knew” (as it often is rendered); instead, it indi-cates completeness and perfection of knowledge: “Now I know perfectly that you are G-d-fearing, and you did not spare your only son from me”. What was the source of the mal’ach’s perfect knowledge?
Hazal tell us: העושה מצוה אחת קונה לו פרקליט אחד (“One who does a single mitzva acquires a single advocate”; אבות פ"ד מי"א), which Rabbi ‘Ovadya mi-Bartenura tells us is a מלאך מליץ טוב, “a mal’ach interceding [for] good.” So how did the mal’ach know? Mimmenni! “From me”. The very fact of the mal’ach’s presence was the testimony of what Avraham had done, for he had just come into existence as a result of Avraham’s perfect perform-ance of the mitzva which G-d had given him.
The Talmud tells us: חשב אדם לעשות מצוה ונאנס ולא עשאה מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו עשאה (“[If] a person thought to do a mitzva and was prevented by circumstance from doing it, Scripture considers it as though he had done it”; ברכות ו.). Avraham’s perfect intent brought into being the mal’ach Ha-Shem which prevented the execution of the mitzva, and converted it into the sublime act of Divine hesed described by the Ramban.

Parshath Va-Éra’ (Exodus VI,2-IX,35) 1/14/10

A.

Our parasha details the opening of the campaign to free the bënei Yisra’él from Egyptian bondage by forcing the Egyptians to acknowledge the existence and sovereignty of Ha-Shem over the world and the natural forces governing it. Both goals were to be accomplished through the administration of ten makkoth, “blows” (commonly termed “plagues” in English).

The first of these was Makkath Dam: כה אמר ד' בזאת תדע כי אני ד' הנה אנכי מכה במטה אשר בידי על המים אשר ביאר ונהפכו לדם: והדגה אשר ביאר תמות ובאש היאר ונלאו מצרים לשתות מים מן היאר: (Moshe declares: “Thus has Ha-Shem said, 'By this will you know that I am Ha-Shem: Behold, I am striking with the staff in my hand the waters in the Nile, and they will turn to blood [dam]. And the fish in the Nile will die, and the Nile will stink, and the Egyptians will loathe drinking water from the Nile”; VII, 17-18). The miracle came about as predicted and panic was sown amongst the Egyptians, but its import with the king was negated when the chartumei Mitzrayim, his “brain-trust,” proved able to duplicate it through their techniques. ויחזק לב פרעה ולא שמע אליהם (“And Pharaoh’s heart was strengthened and he did not listen to [Moshe and Aharon]”; ibid., 22).

Next was Makkath Tzëfardéa‘: הנה אנכי נגף את כל גבולך בצפרדעים ושרץ היאר צפרדעים ועלו ובאו בביתך ובחדר משכבך ועל מטתך ובבית עבדיך ובתנוריך ובמשארותיך: (“Behold, I am plaguing your entire border with frogs [tzëfardë‘im], and the Nile will swarm [with] frogs, and they will ascend and come into your house, and into your bedroom, and upon your bed, and into your servants’ house, and into your ovens and kneading troughs”; ibid., 28). Again, the miracle came to pass, and again ויעשו כן החרטמים בלטיהם וגו' וירא פרעה כי היתה הרוחה והכבד את לבו ולא שמע אליהם וגו' (“And the chartumim did the same.... And Pharaoh saw that there was relief, and he hardened his heart, and did not listen to [Moshe and Aharon]....”; VIII, 3, 11).

The third makka was Kinnim: ויאמר ד' אל משה אמר אל אהרן נטה את מטך והך את עפר הארץ והי' לכנים בכל ארץ מצרים: (“And Ha-Shem said to Moshe, 'Say to Aharon, Stretch out your staff and strike the dust of the earth, and it will become lice [kinnim] throughout the land of Egypt”; ibid., 12). This time, when the chartumim tried to reproduce the phenomenon, they failed, and told Pharaoh אצבע אלקים היא (“It is the finger of G-d”). From this point on, the chartumim evidently gave up trying to replicate the blows (at least, we hear no more of their efforts), yet nonetheless ויחזק לב פרעה ולא שמע אליהם וגו' (“And Pharaoh’s heart was strengthened and he did not listen to them....”; ibid., 15).
Why not? Why did this and the subsequent blows rained down on the hapless Egyptians fail to convince Pharaoh, now that he knew that this, at least, was no conjurer’s trick?

B.

The Talmud records Rav Pappa’s opinion as to why the chartumim were able to reproduce frogs but not lice: אפילו כנמלא נמי לא מצי לברוא אלא האי מכניף לי' והאי לא מכניף לי' (“Even an insect like an ant they could not create, but rather they could collect [frogs] and could not collect [lice]”; סנהדרין ס"ז:). The Torah Tëmima comments: ר"ל כשצריך לבריות גדולות הוא מאסף ומביא מן ההפקר ובריות גדולות נוחים לקבצם ונאספים יחד אליו אבל ברי' קטנה אינה נאספת שאין בה כח לבוא ממקום רחוק (“I.e., when [a practitioner] needs larger creatures, he collects them and brings them from [those not otherwise involved], and larger creatures are easily gathered and collected together; but a small creature cannot be gathered, because it has no strength to come from a distant place”).

In other words, the chartumim did not create frogs at all, but in some fashion brought them from regions not involved in the miracle to some spot in order to claim that they had reproduced the miracle. The lice, however, were created from dust בכל ארץ מצרים, throughout the land of Egypt. So tiny an insect as the louse has no real range, and hence lice from other regions of Africa simply could not travel to Egypt for this purpose.

The chartumim, apparently, honestly recognized that this was a miraculous feat; in Rashi’s words: מכה זו אינה ע"י כשפים מאת המקום היא (“This blow is not due to tricks, it is from G-d”). Pharaoh, however, chose not to hear Eloqim, “G-d”, in their words and as they intended, but elohim, the “forces”, presumably of nature (cf., e.g., the way G-d Himself uses elohim in speaking to Moshe in VII, 1), and strengthened his heart yet again.

We can discern a similar pattern of deliberate, and increasingly desperate, self-deception on the king’s part in the rest of the makkoth as well. The next one, ‘Arov, which brought a mixed group of venomous and predatory animals into the Egyptians’ fields and houses, he was doubtless able to dismiss as the same sort of “trick” worked with the frogs, also “rather larger” creatures than the tiny lice. Again, Pharaoh failed to be impressed.

But then we come to the fifth makka, Dever: הנה יד ד' הוי' במקנך אשר בשדה בסוסים בחמרים בגמלים בבקר ובצאן דבר כבד מאד (“Behold, the hand of Ha-Shem is actively upon your livestock, upon your horses, your donkeys, your camels, your cattle, and your ovicaprids, a very heavy pestilence”; IX, 3). But this was clearly no ordinary, “natural” pestilence. Every single Egyptian beast dropped dead in the fields, וממקנה בני ישראל לא מת אחד: וישלח פרעה והנה לא מת ממקנה ישראל עד אחד ויכבד לב פרעה ולא שלח את העם: (“And of the livestock of the bënei Yisra’él not one died. And Pharaoh sent [to know what was going on] and behold, of the livestock of Yisra’él up to one did not die; and Pharaoh’s heart was hardened and he did not release the people”; ibid., 6-7).

What could have been the king’s excuse this time?

C.

The following is based upon an explanation which I have heard in the name of the Vilner Ga’on (the Gra), though I’ve not been able to find in any of the collections of his comments.
In order to appreciate the Gra’s reasoning, a number of things have to be noted in advance. First, we can understand the phrase ‘ad echad, ”up to one,” in line with the Talmudic principle עד ולא עד בכלל (“’up to’, and not inclusive”; hence, ‘ad echad can mean that only one animal died ברכות כ"ו:, רש"י שם ד"ה עד ועד בכלל. אבל עיי' מפרשים אחרים שפירשו אחרת כגון ההעמק דבר ושבעים פנים לתורה ). Next, we must note the following halacha, that עובד כוכבי' ועבד הבא על בת ישראל הולד כשר (“Should an idolator or [non-Jewish] servant impregnate a daughter of Israel, the child is kosher”, that is, the child’s ethnic identity follows that of his mother (יבמות כ"ג. וקידושין ס"ז:, וע"ע רמב"ם הל' איסוררי ביאה פ"א ה"ג ושו"ע אה"ע סימן ד' סע' י"ט). Finally, we note the tragic story in Leviticus XXIV, 10-16, of the mëqallél who cursed G-d, described as a בן איש מצרי, the “son of an Egyptian man” (and an Israelite mother, Shëlomith bath Divri).

The Gra notes the subtle differences between the two verses: The first concerns the livestock of the bënei Yisra’él, whilst the second mentions only Yisra’él; the first states that “not one” of the animals of the bënei Yisra’él had died, whilst the second states that “up to one” of the animals of Yisra’él had died.

Ramban, in his comments to the passage from Leviticus, quotes rabbeinu ha-Tzorfathim, “our French rabbis,” as noting that the principle of ethnic identity came into effect only with Mattan Torah; before that time, ethnic identity in Israel was the same as amongst all the other bënei Noach, through the father. Now, our “son of an Egyptian” father was surely alive during the makkoth, and doubtless was already living with his mother, rather than his father. Says the Gra, this person owned an animal; since he was held to be an Egyptian under the Noachide laws, his animal perished in the plague. However, since he was living amongst the bënei Yisra’él, it appeared to Pharaoh, when he sent to discover the status of Israel’s livestock, that one of the Israelites’ animals had died.

In short, the first verse reflects objective reality, that none of the animals of the bënei Yisra’él had perished. The second reflects Pharaoh’s perception, that only one, ‘ad echad, of Israel’s animals had died. The Egyptians had suffered a mass catastrophe, but the perceived death of a single animal of Israel’s was enough to negate Moshe’s words, and provide Pharaoh with another excuse to “harden his heart.”

D.

This shows us how far willful self-deception can go. The sinner who wishes to deny reality, who wishes to believe that לית דין ולית דיין, there is neither judgment nor Judge, is able in this ‘alma dë-shiqra, this world of prevarication, to fool himself right up to the point of ultimate self-destruction.

The nature if idolatry is, ultimately, egotism; when one creates his own gods and then bows down to them, he is, in fact, worshipping himself, the ultimate “creator.” Had Pharaoh possessed even a modicum of humility, had he been willing to admit, as his chartumim had done, that the blows falling on this nation were neither natural nor subject to human control, he could have spared Egypt the worst. The consequences of his stubborn refusal are now history and common knowledge.

And, as the philosopher George Santayana famously said, those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.

Parshath Va-Éra (Exodus VI,2-IX,38)

A.

As our parasha unfolds, Pharaoh has refused to meet Moshe’s demand that he let the bnei Yisra’él go, and the Ten Makkoth, the great supernatural blows which would bring Egypt to her knees and force her ruler to acknowledge the sovereignty of Israel’s G-d, have commenced. The second of these was the Makkath Tzfardéa‘ which engulfed Egypt in millions of frogs, clambering all over everybody and getting into everything.

From the first mention of the plague of frogs in VII, 27 the Torah consistently refers to tzfard‘im, “frogs” in the plural; the word occurs four times in as many verses. But then, we suddenly read: ויט אהרן את ידו על מימי מצרעם ותעל הצפרדע ותכס את ארץ מצרים (“And Aharon stretched forth his hand over the waters of Egypt, and the frog arose and covered the land of Egypt”; VIII, 2), whereupon the Torah reverts to the plural, which occurs five more times until the end of the account in v. 8. Why this sudden switch from the plural to the singular and back again?

The midrash asks our question and provides in answer: רבי עקיבא אומר , צפרדע אחת היתה והשריצה ומלאה כל ארץ מצרים. אמר לו רבי אלעזר בן עזרי', עקיבא, מה לך אצל אגדה? כלה מדבריך ולך אצל נגעים ואוהלות! צפרדע אחת היתה ושרקה להם והן באו (“Rabbi ‘Aqiva says, 'There was one frog, and it swarmed with young and filled the entire land of Egypt.' Said Rabbi El‘azar ben ‘Azarya to him, '‘Aqiva, what have you to do with aggada? Desist from your words and go over to afflictions [nega‘im] and tents [ohaloth]! There was one frog, and it croaked to [the others] and they came'”; שמות רבה פ"י סי' ה' וע"ע סנהדרין ס"ז).

In commenting on the Talmud’s record of this exchange, Rashi explains Rabbi El‘azar ben ‘Azarya’s riposte: מנע מדבריך ופנה להלכות נגעים ואוהלות דהן חמורים ובהם אתה מחודד ולא באגדה (“Desist from your words and turn to the laws of nega‘im and ohaloth, which are difficult and in which you are sharp, and not in aggada”). This is usually taken to imply that Rabbi ‘Aqiva was, as it were, a specialist in halacha who had no business departing from his speciality to dabble in interpretations of the narrative portions of Torah, or aggada. Yet, we find Rabbi ‘Aqiva quoted numerous other times in midrashic and aggadic passages without any hint of disapproval; indeed, elsewhere the Talmud informs us: רבי עקיבא התקין מדרש הלכות ואגדות (“Rabbi ‘Aqiva established [the techniques of] interpretation of halachoth and aggadoth”; ירושלמי שקלים פ"ה ה"א).

This being so, it seems worth investigating what, really, did Rabbi El‘azar ben ‘Azarya mean, and why did he consider his drasha superior to Rabbi ‘Aqiva’s?

B.

So, let us turn to the halachoth of nega‘im and ohaloth.

Let us start with ohaloth, the “halachoth of tents.” To understand what this means, we turn to Numbers VIV, 14 and read: זאת התורה אדם כי ימות באהל יל הבא אל האהל וכל אשר באהל יטמא שבעת ימים (“This is the Torah: [If] a human being [adam] should die in a tent [ohel], everyone who comes to the tent and everything which is in the tent will be metaphysically defiled [tame] for a period of seven days”). The dead body is a prime source of metaphysical defilement (tum’a), and the tent retains and holds this tum’a, such that it and everybody and everything in it are rendered tame. The complex laws governing the status of people and objects which are thus in contact with the tum’a of the dead are what Rabbi El‘azar ben ‘Azarya means by ohaloth.

The Talmud considers the question of whether a fetus (‘ubbar) which is stillborn, and thus obviously had died in the womb renders the mother an ohel and thus tamé. Rabbi Yishma‘el argues that it does not do so; Rabbi ‘Aqiva argues that it does (עיי' חולין ע"ב.).

If we consider Rabbi ‘Aqiva’s argument in conjunction with our verse, it appears easy to conclude that, at least in matters of the tum’a of dead bodies, Rabbi ‘Aqiva considers an ‘ubbar to have the same status as a full-fledged adam.

C.

Now let us consider nega‘im. A nega‘ is one of a series of a skin afflictions, each of which is designated in Hebrew by its own technical term, which potentially have metaphysical causes and consequences, one of which is that it renders the adam who has one tame.

In Leviticus XIII, 2, we read: אדם כי יהי' בעור בשרו שאת או בפחת או בהרת וגו' (“An adam, for there will be in the skin of his flesh a s’éth or a sappachath or a bahereth….”). Each of the Hebrew words is a technical term for a type of nega‘. The important thing to know here is that the nega‘ must be seen as soon as possible after it appears by a competent kohén to determine whether or not it is tamé.

The midrash Torath Kohanim discusses nega‘im שהיו בע"א ונתגייר בקטן ונולד כו' נשתנו מראיהם בין להקל בין להחמיר ר"א בן עזרי' מטהר כו' ר"ע אומר בין להקל בין להחמיר תראה בתחלה לכך נאמר "אדם כי יהי'" (“which were on an idolator who has [just] converted to Judaism, or on a small child who has [just] born…[If] their appearance has changed, whether leniently or stringently, Rabbi El‘azar ben ‘Azarya deems it cleansed… Rabbi ‘Aqiva says, 'Whether [the change] is lenient or stringent, it must be seen by a kohén at the beginning; for this reason it is said, "An adam, for there will be…."'”; פרשת נגעים פ"א סי' א').

As the Chafétz Chayyim points out in his Bi’ur to the above, the issue is that the apparent nega‘ in the skin of the non-Jew who has just converted was not examined by a kohén when it first appeared. Similarly, in the case of the newborn who exits his mother’s womb with an apparent nega‘, the nega‘ must have been בעובר במעי אמו דאינו מטמא משום דלא חזי לי' כהן לטמויי (“on the ‘ubbar in his mother’s belly, which does not impart tum’a because a kohén did not see it to determine its status”).

In the event that this original nega‘ undergoes some physical change, Rabbi El‘azar ben ‘Azarya rules that, regardless whether the change would ordinatily occasion leniency or stringency in a matter of tum’ath nega‘im, it is considered clean because the original status of the nega‘ is now unknowable. Rabbi ‘Aqiva agrees with Rabi El‘azar ben ‘Azarya concerning the original nega‘; however, now that its appearance has changed, he holds that it is in fact a new nega‘, which needs to be seen by a kohén to determine its status.

Rash mi-Shantz, in his comments on the above, explains that Rabbi ‘Aqiva has to rule concerning the status of the original nega‘ precisely because (as we have already established) he holds that an ‘ubbar is equivalent to an adam in matters of tum’a, and our verse again begins with the word adam. The only reason that the original nega‘ does not render the ‘ubbar tame, then, is that it was hidden from view when it first appeared.

D.

So we see that Rabbi ‘Aqiva held, both in hilchoth ohaloth and in hilchoth nega‘im, that an ‘ubbar is really equivalent to an adult adam, and that Rabbi El‘azar ben ‘Azarya was aware of his opinion.

This, I believe, is what Rabbi El‘azar ben ‘Azarya really meant: ‘Aqiva, your drasha is inconsistent with your views in ohaloth and nega‘im. There you equate an ‘ubbar with an adult; if there is a single “pregnant” frog, filled with thousands of embryonic frogs, why, in your view, should it count as a single creature? It’s just one more of the general group of frogs, in your opinion. You’ve therefore not explained why the word in our verse should be in the singular; whereupon Ranni El‘azar ben ‘Azarya offered his suggestion of the “croak heard round the world.”

Another demonstration of the wonderful internal consistency of Chazal.

Parshath Va-Era (Exodus VI,2-IX,35) 1/4/08

A.

The second of the ten miraculous, Divinely orchestrated strokes (popularly termed the “Ten Plagues”) designed to break the Egyptian will to resist, the plague of frogs, is our subject this week.

Moshe warns Pharaoh: ובכה ובעמך ובכל עבדיך יעלו הצפרדעים (“And on [lit., “in”] you and your people and all of your servants the frogs will climb;” VII, 29). The midrash tells us: רבי יוחנן אמר כ"מ שהי' שם עפר וטפה של מים בו הי' נעשה צפרדעים (“Rabbi Yochanan said, Every place where there was dust and a drop of water, there were frogs made”), and a later authority, Rav Acha. picks up on the literal meaning of the prepositional prefix in our verse to tell us that the dust was not a necessary concomitant: "ובכה" ראי' שהי' שותה מים וטפה אחת יורדת על לבו ונעשית צפרדע ונבקעת שם (“’And in you’ is evidence that [Pharaoh] would drink water, and as each drop descending into him became a frog and was split there,” that is, digested and absorbed by him; שמות רבה פ"י סי' ד' ועיי' מתנות כהונה שם).

The midrash begs an interesting question: The Talmud asks: מנין שלא יושיט כוס יין לנזיר ועבר מן החי לבני נח? ת:ל "ולפני עור לא תתן מכשול" (Whence [do we learn] that one should not offer a cup of wine to a nazir or part of a living animal [ever min he-chai] to a ben Noach? This is the teaching of ‘and before a blind man you shall not place an obstacle’ [Leviticus XIX, 14];” פסחים כ"ב:).

Yet here we find G-d, through Moshe, causing Pharaoh, surely a ben Noach, to swallow, in effect, living animals whole. surely a most egregious of ever min he-chai. How can this be? Does G-d not obey His own rules?

B.

That our question is not trivial and needs to be taken seriously can be derived from a similar incident discussed elsewhere in the Talmud, which, in fact inspired it.

In I Kings XVII, 6, the prophet Eliyahu, who has been ordered by G-d to go into hiding after predicting that a terrible drought would afflict the northern kingdom of Israel due to the wickedness of its king, Ach’av: והעאבים מביאים לו לחם ובשר בבקר ולחם ובשר בערב (“And the ravens were bringing [Eliyahu] bread and meat in the morning and bread and meat in the evening”), his sustenance was being taken care of by these birds.

Where did the bread and meat come from? ואמר רב יהודה אמר רב, מבי טבחי דאחאב (“And Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, 'From Ach’av’s kitchens'”). But how could it be that the saintly and holy prophet Eliyahu would eat food from that idolator’s kitchens? Answers the gmara, על פי הדבור שאני (“[when done by] Divine fiat, it is different”), and Rashi explains, citing I Kings XVII, 4, שהקב"ה התירו לפי שעה (“for the holy One, Blessed is He, permitted it temporarily;” חולין ה.).

The Ritva (שם, ד"ה על פי הדבור שאני) is bothered by this Rashi and asks, inter alia, למה יתיר לו הקב"ה איסור שלא לצורך, וכי אין לו להקב"ה בשר של היתר לתת לו?! (“Why should the Holy One, Blessed is He, permit a prohibition unnecessarily? Does the Holy One, Blessed is He, not have kosher meat to give him?”).

The Ritva goes on to explain that what Rashi meant was not that G-d had permitted non-kosher meat, but that He permitted Eliyahu to rely on the ravens’ “hashgacha,” secure in the knowledge that Divinely-directed ravens would select only the meat and bread which were products of the upright and faithful Ovadya (who became a prophet in his own right) and his comrades, even though they were a minority amongst Ach’av’s servants, כי נקל הוא אצל השי"ת וליכא למימר לגבי דידי' כל דפריש מרובא פריש (“for [such a thing] is easy for Ha-Shem, and there is no reason to say concerning His actions [the usual rule] that anything which is separated is separated from the majority”).

Ordinarily, we assume that part of some group or class has the character of the majority of items in the class, but in this case, in which G-d sent the ravens specifically to bring food to Eliyahu, they could be relied upon to select the kosher items from amongst the others.
So G-d does follow his own rules.

C.

With this in mind, we return to our original question.

The prohibition of ever min he-chai as the seventh Noachide commandment is derived from the verse אך בשר בנפשו דמו לא תאכלו (“But meant with its life, its blood, you shall not eat;” Genesis IX,4). However, the precise nature of the prohibition is the subject of Talmudic discussion: רבי חנינא בן גמלואל אומר, אף הדם מן החי כו' ורבנן, ההוא למישרי שרצים הוא דאתא (“Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel says, 'Even the blood of a living animal [is prohibited]...' And the Rabbis [say], 'That [verse] comes to permit lesser animals [shratzim];'” סנהדרין נ"ט.).

Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel understands the verse as a blanket prohibition of any animal blood; his Rabbinical colleagues, however, understand the word ach, “but”, to limit the prohibition to מי שדמו חלוק מבשרו, יצאו שרצים שאין דמם חלוק מבשרם (“those whose blood is distinguishable from their flesh, excluding shratzim, whose blood is not distinguishable from their flesh;” שם נ"ט:).

Therefore, they conclude, there is no prohibition of ever min he-chai concerning shratzim.
So, if we take note that frogs fall into the general category of shratzim (רמב"ם הל' מאכלות אסורות פ"ב ה"ב), it appears that our question is only pertinent according to Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel; according to the Rabbanan, there is no issue at all concerning the consequences of the second plague as described by our midrash, since the prohibition does not apply.

But if we accept that the midrash is describing what, in fact, happened during the plague of frogs, the question arises: How did Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel understand those events? Did he, G-d forbid, imagine that G-d did not follow his own laws?

D.

Another question which arises in the Talmud is at what point one has violated the prohibition of ever min he-chai. Rabbi Yochanan, we learn, holds that הנאת גרונו, the benefit or enjoyment one derives by eating and swallowing is the issue, whilst Reysh Laqish holds that אכילה במעיו בעינן, eating presupposes that it passes into the digestive system (עיי' חולין ק"ג:).

If we return now to our midrash, we notes that the authorities quoted are Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Acha. As was already noted, the two were not contemporaries: Rav Acha lived and taught nearly 200 years after Rabbi Yochanan. His opinion, therefore, can be understood to depend upon, and be an elaboration of, Rabbi Yochanan’s. According to Rav Acha, it is quite clear that what passed through Pharaoh’s throat was water, not prohibited in any way. It was only after it had reached a point well inside him, על לבו (literally, “on his heart”), that the water drops became frogs; hence, there was no prohibited הנאת גרונו.

So, even according to Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel, there was no violation of ever min he-chai, according to Rabbi Yochanan and Rav Acha.

We have here another illustration of the fundamental centrality of halacha in understanding how the world is really run; G-d does follow His own laws; "הליכות עולם לו", אל תקרי "הליכות" אלא "הלכות" (“’The ways [halichoth] of the world are His’ [Habakkuk III, 6]; read not halichoth, but halachoth;” מגילה כ"ה:).

Parshath Va-Yéra (Genesis XVIII,1-XXII,24) 10/26/07

A.

This week’s parasha ends with the account of the âqeidath Yitzchaq, the final test of Avraham’s faith, discipline, and obedience administered by G-d, in which Avraham was instructed: קח נא את בנך את יחידך אשר אהבת את יצחק ולך לך אל ארץ המורי' והעלהו שם לעלה וגו' (“Take, please, your son, your only one whom you love, Yitzchaq, and go to the land of Moriya and raise him up there as a burnt offering....;” XXII, 2).

Avraham set out to comply with this heart-wrenching demand. As the account reaches its climax, we read: וישא אברהם את עיניו וירא והנה איל אחר נאחז בסבך בקרניו וילך אברהם ויקח את האיל ויעלהו לעלה תחת בנו (“And Avraham lifted his eyes and saw, and behold, there was a ram in back caught in the thicket by its horns; and Avraham went and took the ram and raised it up as a burnt offering instead of his son;” ibid., 13).

Rashi tells us of this ram: מוכן הי' לכך מששת ימי בראשות (“It had been ready for this since the six days of creation”). His source for this is apparently the Talmud: עשרה דברים נבראו בערב שבת בין השמשות וכו' רבי יאשי' אמר אף האיל של אברהם (“Ten things were created on the eve of the [first] sabbath at twilight.... Rabbi Yoshiya said, Even Avraham’s ram;” פסחים נ"ד.).

This leads us to ask: What did Rashi see that led him to make this comment?

B.

To begin to find an answer, we first turn elsewhere in the Torah, where we read: שור או כשב או עז כי יולד והי' שבעת ימים תחת אמו ומיום השמיני והלאה ירצה לקרבן אשה לד': ושור או שה אתו ואת בנו לא תשחטו ביום אחד: (“An ox or sheep or goat which is born and has been seven days with its mother, from the eighth day onward it will be suitable as a burnt offering to Ha-Shem. And an ox or sheep, you will not slaughter it and its son [otho v’eth bno] in one day;” Leviticus XXII, 27-28).

The various ramifications of this passage are discussed at some length in the Talmud. The issue which concerns us now turns on the implications of the phrase otho v’eth bno. The gmara tells us of a dispute amongst Tanna’im concerning the phrase’s application: "אותו ואת בנו" נוהג בנקבות ואינו נוהג בזכרים. וחנני' אומר נוהג כין בנקבות בין בזכרים (“’It and its son’ is in effect with female [animals] but not with males; and Chananya says, 'It is in effect whether with females or with males;'” חולין ע"ח:). In other words, the Chachamim hold that otho v’eth bno means that one may not slaughter the mother and her young on the same day, but that it does not similarly apply to the father animal, whilst Chanaya holds that it applies equally to males and females.

The gmara strives to illustrate the principle underlying this difference of opinion by reference to another dispute. In Leviticus XX, 9, we read: כי איש איש אשר יקלל את אביו ואת אמו מות יומת אביו ואמו קלל דמיו בו: (“For each man who curses his father and his mother shall surely be put to death; he has cursed his father and his mother, his blood is upon him”).

Here the issue is whether the miscreant has to have cursed both his parents to warrant the death sentence, or if cursing either one is bad enough: אין לי אלא אביו ואמו, אביו שלא אמו ואמו שלא אביו מניין? ת"ל "אביו ואמו קלל", אביו קלל, אמו קלל, דברי ר' יאשי'. ר' יונתן אומר, משמע שניהם כאחד, משמע אחד בפני עצמו עד שיפרוט לך הכתוב "יחדיו" (“All that I have is ‘his father and his mother,’ whence [do we learn that this applies to] his father without his mother, or his mother without his father? This is taught by ‘he cursed his father and his mother,’ his father he cursed [or] his mother he cursed; these are the words of Rabbi Yoshiya. Rabbi Yonathan says, 'Both have the same meaning as [either] one, meaning either one by itself, unless the Scripture details for you [the word] "together"’”).

In other words, Rabbi Yoshiya needs the second clause to tell him that the prohibition applies to either the father or the mother. Rabbi Yonathan, on the other hand, sees the first clause as distributive by itself, leaving the second clause available for another purpose (עיי' רש"י שם).
If we now analyze our verse according to their respective criteria, it is clear that Rabbi Yonathan would agree with Chananya, in that the first clause refers to either a cow or a ewe, therefore the word otho is available to be interpreted as referring also to a male of the species. Rabbi Yoshiya, on the other hand, would agree with the Chachamim, in that he views the first clause as referring to the joint slaughter of a cow and a ewe, and needs the word otho to tell him that either a cow or a ewe may not be slaughtered on the same day as its calf or kid (הלכה פסוקה היא שודאי אסור לשחוט את האם ואת בנה כאותו היום, ונוהג גם בזכרים מספק משום מחלוקת התנאים. עיי' רמב"ם הל' שחיטה פי"ב הי"א ושו"ע יו"ד סי' ט"ז סע' ב' ).

It would appear, therefore, that in the case of Avraham’s ram, created ex nihilo at twilight on the eve of the first Sabbath, Rabbi Yonathan would hold that otho v’eth bno might apply to the ram, whilst Rabbi Yoshiya would hold that it would have no application, since the ram had no mother and is, of course, a male.

So what?

C.

Near the beginning of next week’s parasha, Rashi comments on Genesis XXIII, 2, summarising the midrash: ונסמכה מיתת שרה לעקידת יצחק לפי שעל ידי בשורת העקידה שנזדמן בנה לשחיטה וכמעט שלא נשחט פרחה נשמתה ממנה ומתה (“And Sara’s death is placed near to the âqeidath Yitzchaq because it was due to the news of the âqeida, when her son was presented for slaughter and nearly slaughtered, that her soul took wing from her and she died”).

It is plain both from Rashi’s summary and the original wording of the midrash that Sara was vouchsafed a vision in Chevron of what was transpiring on Mount Moriya (the Temple Mount in Jerusalem) in real time, and died before any actual slaughter took place. The Maskil li-Shlomo picks up on the word בשורה, which ordinarily signifies “good news,” and sees in it a triumphant vindication: When Sara saw that she and her husband had succeeded in raising a son so perfect, so free of blemishes from the surrounding, debased culture that he was fit to be an ôla tmima la-Shem, a “perfect offering to Ha-Shem,” she knew that her mission here below was complete, and immediately returned her pure soul whence it had come. He finds confirmation of this in the poetic verb used to describe her death, for which he offers the alternate possible translation aufgeblüht, “blossomed” -- Sara’s soul “blossomed” forth at the news.

If all of this is true, then, it would also seem true that it runs afoul of our conclusion in the gmara, that otho v’eth bno means that the mother of the sacrifice cannot be “slaughtered” on the same day as the sacrifice. Whatever his other qualities, Yitzchaq was arguably rendered ineligible to be sacrificed on that day because he was predeceased by Sara.

"הליכות עולם לו" -- אל תקרי "הליכות" אלא "הלכות" (“’The ways of the world are His’ [Habakkuk III, 6] -- read not ‘ways’ [halichoth], but ‘laws’ [halachoth];” מגילה כ"ח:). As I have explained several times, halachoth are no less chuqqei teva, “laws of nature,” than gravity or conservation of energy, describing discrete physical and metaphysical phenomena. Since it was G-d Who commanded the sacrifice of Yitzchaq, and G-d Who took back Sara’s neshama at the instant He did, it was G-d Who rendered the sacrifice invalid at that moment.

As proof that such an outcome was planned from the very beginning, we have Avrahm’s ram, waiting in the wings since Creation, מוכן לכך מששת ימי בראשית...

D.

We are once again afforded a glimpse of the way in which Divine Providence anticipates every need, and runs the world. The contingency of Avraham’s final test was planned from the first, provision made that he would pass it, but it was never envisioned that the ôla tmima would actually be slaughtered and sacrificed, but instead constitute the next stage in the evolution of the ממלכת כהנים וגוי קדוש (Exodus XIX, 6), Israel.

Nor is it any accident that it is Rabbi Yoshiya who clarifies that Avraham’s ram was created for the purpose from the beginning, the same Rabbi Yoshiya who holds like the Chachamim, that otho v’eth bno applies only to the mother and her young, so that nothing could invalidate the substitute sacrifice.