Parshath B’Ha‘alothcha (Numbers VIII,1-XII,16) 6/12/09

A.

Our parasha tells of Moshe’s farewell to his father-in-law. It will be remembered that Moshe had married Tzippora, the daughter of Yithro, during his sojourn in Midyan (cf. Exodus II, 21). When Yithro heard of the Exodus, he brought Tzippora and their two sons, Eli‘ezer and Gershom, to Israel’s encampment at the foot of Mt. Sinai. There, Yithro, decided to join Israel, and underwent conversion (géruth), whereupon he took the additional name Chovav (as he is called in our parasha) על שחבב את התורה (“because he held the Torah to be precious [chibbév]”; רש"י לי' כ"ט עפ"י הספרי).

As Yithro/Chovav prepared to take his leave and return to his native land, Moshe begged him to stay with them: אל נא תעזב אתנו כי על כן ידעת חנתנו במדבר והיית לנו לעינים (“Please don’t leave us, since for this reason you have full and complete knowledge of our circumstances camping in the desert, and you have been/will be like our eyes”; X, 31, with a little help from Rashi).

Rashi offers three possible interpretations of the last clause in the verse:

1) Following Onqelos, he reads the verb v’hayitha as perfective, and explains that Yithro saw the miraculous events surrounding Israel in the desert with his own eyes;

2) Reading the verb v’hayitha as imperfective, that Yithro from his own, unique and fresh perspective would perceive many things which the bnei Yisra’él might overlook, such that he would “enlighten their eyes”;

3) שתהא חביב עלינו כגלגל עינינו שנא' "ואהבתם את הגר" (“That you will be as precious as the ball of our eyes, as it is said, ‘And you will love the gér” [Deuteronomy X, 19]”).

The Sifthei Chachamim tells us that each of these explanations is somewhat unsatisfactory: The first is difficult grammatically, for it fails to account properly for the word lanu (“to/for us”); the second is difficult, he writes, שהשכינה ביניהם שמאיר עיניהם ע"י משה ומה להם ליתרו(“for the Divine Presence was amongst them, enlightening their eyes through Moshe, so what need had they of Yithro?”). Hence, he concludes, Rashi preferred the third explanation, as we deduce from the fact that it is last in the series, but this, too, is a bit difficult, as one would expect the last word to read k‘éynayim (“like eyes”) rather than l‘éynayim (“to/for eyes”), for which reason, he concludes, Rashi also decided to cite the first two explanations.

Why, then, does the word read l‘éynayim? And whilst we’re asking questions, why should it be that the eyeball is, apparently, more precious than any other organ or limb in the body?

B.

The fact that the Torah sees the necessity for a separate mitzva of ahavath ha-gér, as distinct from the general mitzva of ahavath Yisra’él, is itself interesting. A true gér tzedeq, after all, is someone who has accomplished a feat comparable to that of Avraham avinu. All by himself, he has come not only to the recognition of the Creator, and not only to understand that His existence implies that mankind, created in His “image,” has a purpose in that Creation, outlined in specific obligations imposed upon him by his Creator. That recognition could be amply satisfied by his consciously and conscientiously assuming the Seven Noachide Mitzvoth, whose observance marks him as a tzaddiq ummoth ha-‘olam, a “righteous member of the nations,” who thereby secures a part in the world to come (עיי' רמב"ם הל' מלכים פ"ט ופ"י).

The gér tzedeq goes beyond that, and entirely voluntarily takes on himself the 613 mitvoth commanded to Israel, thereby joining the world’s ממלכת כהנים וגוי קדוש (“kingdom of kohanim and holy nation”; Exodus XIX, 6), so called because they are responsible, by means of exemplary lives led in service to Ha-Shem through observance of His Torah, for showing the nations of the world what a human being truly can and should be.

No wonder Chazal are effusive in their praise of gérim, telling us, e.g.: בא וראה כמה חביבין הגרים לפני הקב"ה כיון שנתנה דעתה להתגייר השוה הכתוב אתה לנעמי (“Come and see how precious are gérim before the Holy One, Blessed is He; since [Ruth] made up her mind to be converted, Scripture has compared her to Naomi”; רות רבה פ"ג סי' ה'); or חביבין הגרים שבכל מקום שנקראו נקראו כישראל (“Precious are the gérim, for in every place that they are mentioned, they are mentioned like Israel; במדבר רבה פ"ח סי' ב'); or גרים שעוסקים בתורה שקולים הם ככהן גדול (“Gérim who are occupied in Torah are considered equal to a kohén gadol”; מדרש תנחומא פר' ויקהל סי' ח' ); or גר שנתגייר לשם שמים זוכה שיוצאים מבניו בנים שיהא הקדשים שלהם (“A gér who has been converted for the sake of heaven merits that from his sons will come forth sons who will have sacred donations [i.e., they will be kohanim]”; במדבר רבה פ"ח סי' י').

C.

But the path to true géruth is a very difficult one; the ties of habit and family are strong, and it is hard to overcome one’s upbringing and childhood. Witness, as a case in point, the account of the ‘erev rav, the “mixed multitude” who, overawed by the miraculous events surrounding Egypt’s downfall and Israel’s liberation and exodus, accompanied Israel to the foot of Mt. Sinai. When, through a misunderstanding, they miscalculated the day on which Moshe was to descend from the mountain-top, they panicked, forced Aharon to enable the making of the Golden Calf, and their panic infected some of the weaker members of the bnei Yisra’él (Exodus XXXI, cf. A”z Yashir, parshath Ki Thissa, 5769).

So, Chazal also tell us: קשים גרים לישראל כספחת (“Gérim are as hard on Israel as a sappachath” [one of the manifestations of tzora‘ath; cf. Leviticus XIII, 1ff.]; יבמות מ"ז:). Gérim may not only be guilty of backsliding themselves; they may take weaker members of the Holy Nation with them.

In short, géruth is a two-edged sword, and both edges are reflected in the Torah’s somewhat ambiguous attitude toward gérim.

Now, elsewhere in the Talmud we find: ארבעה חשובים כמתים, עני ומצורע וסומא ומי שאין לו בנים (“Four [categories of people] are considered as if they are dead: A destitute person and a m’tzora‘ and a blind person and one who has no children”; נדרים ס"ד:).

Each of these categories has a Biblical basis; for instance a poor man is derived from the passage כי מתו כל האנשים (For all of the men are dead,” said of Dathan and Aviram, even though both were very much alive, since they had become impoverished; Exodus IV, 19, Rashi ad loc. A m’tzora‘ is derived from the passage אל נא תהי כמת (“Please don’t let her be like a dead person,” said by Aharon of Miriam when she was afflicted with tzora‘ath; Numbers XII, 12). A blind person is derived from במחשכים הושבני כמתי עולם (He has seated me amongst those who are in the dark, like the dead of the world”; Lamentations III, 5), and childless person is derived from Rachel’s lament, הבה לי בנים ואם אין מתה אנכי (“I must have children, and if not, I am dead”; Genesis XXX, 2).

Hence, we see that there is an equivalency between a m’tzora‘ and a blind man, both of which are considered living death, the former because his condition forces him to live outside of human habitation, alone and in exile, the latter because his condition prevents him from reading and hence learning Torah, the עץ חיים היא למחזיקים בה ) "Tree of Life to those who cling to it”; cf. Proverbs III, 16-18). For this reason, it seems to me, functioning eyes, in the view of a society based upon Torah and steeped in Torah, are precious indeed, for they stave off a living death.

And so Chazal apply this equivalency to gérim, who can be as hard on Israel as the living death brought on by a sappachath, when they fail, but are as precious as one’s eyes, providing a sterling example through their entirely voluntary grasping of the Tree of Life, when they are successful.

D.

So why did Moshe say v’hayitha lanu l‘éynayim rather than k‘énayim?

I believe that, having so recently witnessed the sad object lesson provided by the ‘erev rav, he was very concerned for his father-in-law. Yithro had just finished undergoing géruth, and was about to return to the land and people whence he had come, with all their idolatrous ways. Would it not be better for him to remain amongst Israel, to grow with them as he learnt Torah together with them, to elevate himself in his level of ‘avoda?

The idiomatic usage of the verb haya followed by an object construed with the prefix l is “to become.” Yithro, Moshe promised, if he remained amongst Israel would become as precious through his example to the native bnei Yisra’él as their very eyes.

So that actual usage of the final clause in fact dovetails very nicely with Rashi’s preferred explanation, Q.E.D.]”; רש"י לי' כ"ט עפ"י הספרי).

Parshath B’ha’âlothcha (Numbers VIII,1-XII,16) 6/1/07

A.

ויהי העם כמתאוננים רע באזני ד' כו' וזכרנו כו' את הקשואים ואת האבטיכים וגו' ועתה נפשנו יבשה אין כל בלתי אל המן עינינו: (“And the people were like murmuring evil in the ears of Ha-Shem.... And we remembered... the cucumbers and the melons.... And now, our souls are dry, there is nothing before our eyes except the man;” XI, 1-6).

Rabbi Shim’on was moved to comment מפני מה המן משתנה לכל דבר חוץ מאלו? מפני שהן קשים למניקות. (“Why did the man change into anything [they wanted to eat] save for these? Because they are hard on nursing women....ספרי פיסקא כ"ט בגירסת רש"י, עיי' עמק הנצי"ב שם בספרי).

There does not appear to be a nutritional consideration as to why these specific items are not recommended for nursing mothers, so we look elsewhere for an explanation.

B.

We begin by noting a proverbial statenent, recorded in at least three different places in the Talmud: טבא חדא פלפלתא חריפתא ממלי צנא דקרי (“Better is one sharp pepper than a basketful of cucumbers”; חגיגה י., יומא פ"ה:, מגילה ז., בעצם "קר" נראה שפירושו כל מין ירק המתגדל ע"י גפן). In order to establish the reason behind the peper’s superiority, we note the following:

Rashi is bothered by an apparent inconsistency between Genesis I, 11 and the next verse. In the first, G-d commands: תדשא הארץ דשא עשב מזריע זרע עץ פרי עשה פרי למינו (“Let the earth bring forth greenery, seed-bearing grass and fruit trees bearing fruit of their kind”). The very next verse records the earth’s execution of that command, and we read: ותוצא הארץ כו' ועץ עשה פרי (“And the earth brought forth... trees bearing fruit”). In other words, no longer is it a “fruit tree bearing fruit” but simply a “tree bearing fruit."

So, Rashi observes: "עץ פרי" שיהי' טעם העץ כטעם הפרי והיא לא עשתה כן, אלא "ותוצא הארץ וגו' ועץ עושה פרי" ולא עץ פרי. לפיכך כשנתקלל האדם על עוונו נפקדה גם היא ונתקללה (“'Fruit tree,' that the flavor of the tree should be like the flavor of the fruit, and [the earth] did not do so, but ‘and the earth brought forth... a tree bearing fruit’ and not a fruit tree. Therefore, when the [first] man was cursed because of his transgression, [the earth] was also taken into account and cursed”).

Thus, Rashi explains the fact that when mankind was kicked out of the garden, the earth was also cursed: ארורה האדמה בעבורך וגו' וקוץ ודרדר תצמיח לך וגו'... (“Cursed is the ground because of you.... And thorn and thistle will it sprout for you....” III, 17-18).

The Talmud establishes elsewhere that there is an עץ שטעם עצו וטעם פריו שייה, הוי אומר זה פלפלין (“tree such that the flavor of the tree and the flavor of the fruit is the same; I would say this is the pepper”; סוכה ל"ה:, ע"ע ברכות ל"ו:). If so, the Divine commandment was carried out concerning the pepper tree to the letter; as such, it arguably has a certain status over the others, in that it had no share in the transgression which had rendered the earth vulnerable to the curse when mankind had been cursed (cf. my remarks on Parshath Acharei Moth/Qedoshim a few weeks ago, in which I discussed this matter at some length in a different connection).

This theme of vulnerability at some crucial juncture, such as a time of danger, is shot through Torah literature (עיי' למשל משניות שנת פ"ב מ"ו, ר' עובדי' מברטנורא שם, ועוד הרבה). It is simply prudent at such a time not to invite extra scrutiny by calling attention to old sins.

Now consider: At the time of that primordial curse, the first woman had been told: הרבה ארבה עצבונך והרנך בעצב תלדי בנים (“Greatly will I increase your pain and [the length of] your pregnancy, in pain you will bear children;" ibid., v. 16). Rashi, ad loc., tells us that the references to pain and pregnancy refer to צער העבור, צער הלידה, וצער גידול בנים (“the pain of pregnancy, the pain of birth, and the pain of raising children”).

In other words, as a result of her part in the “forbidden fruit” incident, Chava would have additional suffering in the bearing and rearing of children (note that G-d did not say that it would have been painless had they not eaten the fruit; rather, הרבה ארבה עצבונך, “I will increase your pain" (cf. Sforno ad loc. in this connection).

The items in our verse share the same curse, but so do others; why these in particular?

In the case of trees (as was established in Acharei Moth/Qedoshim) fulfilling the mitzva of ôrla, in which Israel abstains from the fruit for the tree’s first three fruit-bearing years, and then dedicates the produce of the fourth year to the kohanim, removes the sting of the original curse, and renders the fruit fit for human consumption. However, in the case of the cucumber and melon, in particular, which grow on a vine, it is arguably in doubt whether or not ôrla ought to have applied (as it does, e.g., in the case of grapes, since the bracha recited on grapes is boré pri ha-êtz). Hence (I believe), Rabbi Shim’on argues, it is best for a woman at such a time of vulnerability (her suffering having already been augmented due to the curse above) not to increase her exposure, as it were, and avoid these items.

Which leads us to consider the contexts in which our proverb occurs in the Talmud.

C.

The three passages are remarkably similar. In each one, a fundamental question is posed, and several tanna’im (authorities of the mishna) present their approaches to dealing with the issue at hand. However, each of these approaches constitutes only a partial answer, and so is rejected. Enter the great Shmu’el who, together with his colleague Abba Aricha (Rav) founded the two famous Babylonian yeshivoth whose edited deliberations make up the gmara. Shmu’el says: אי הואי התם, אמרי להו דידי עדיפא מדידכו (“Had I been there [at the deliberations of the tanna’im] I would have said, my [explanation] is preferable to yours”), whereupon he provides the drasha which solves the gmara’s problem.

For instance, in Chagiga 10a the question is the source of rabbinical authority to nullify vows. As Rashi explains the issue: מעט רמז יש במקרא ואין על מה לסמוך אלא שכן מסור לחכמים בתורה שבעל פה (“There is only a little hint in Scripture and nothing to rely on, save that [this function] was delegated to the Rabbis by the Oral Torah”). The gmara then presents the attempts of several tanna’im to find the “hint” to which Rashi alludes. Shmu’el’s offering is: "לא יחל דברו", הוא אינו מוחל אבל אחרים מוחלין לו (“‘He will not profane his word’ [Numbers XXX, 3]; he [the one who made the vow] cannot forgive [his vow], but others can forgive it for him”).
אמר רבא לכולהו אית להו פירכא לבר מדשמואל דלית לי' פירכא (“Said Rava, 'All of them have a question, save Shmu’el’s [drasha] which has no question'”). In each of the other suggestions, the verse or verses cited could be understood in alternate ways; only Shmu’el’s is unambiguous. The passage ends by quoting our proverb of the pepper.

In M’gilla 7a, the issue is whether or not the book of Esther was written ברוח הקדש, with Divine input. An assortment of tanna’im offer in evidence verses which seem to record things which Mordechai (the author) could not otherwise have known. For instance, Rabbi Eli’ezer cites ויאמר המן בלבו (“And Haman said in his heart;" Esther VI, 6). Shmu’el says: "קיימו וקבלו" -- קיימו למעלה מה שקבלו למטה (“‘They sustained and they accepted’ [Esther IX, 27] -- they sustained Above [in the Béyth Din shel Ma’âla] what [the Anshei Knesseth ha-Gdola] had accepted Below”). Again, Rava points out that all of the other explanations were objectionable -- Haman’s thoughts, for example, could have been deduced from what was known of his ambition and what the king told him to do. Only Shmu’el’s suggestion concerning the proceedings of the Béyth Din shel Ma’âla could not have been known without supernatural access. The passage closes with our proverb.

Finally, in Yuma 85b, the issue is: מניין לפקוח נפש שדוחה את השבת (“Whence do we know that saving someone’s life overrides the sabbath”)? Yet again, the tanna’im say what they say, and Shmu’el proposes: "וחי בהם" ולא שימות בהם (“[It is written] ‘And live by them’ [Leviticus XVIII, 5] and not that one should die by them”). Rava considers this the best answer, and closes with our proverb.
In each case, then, the one “sharp pepper” of Shmu’el’s was held to be better than the basketful of other possible interpretations which had been proposed by the tanna’im.

D.

A careful and critical review of the three Talmudic passages cited supra reveals, it seems to me, a yet deeper connection between our proverb and Rabbi Shim’on’s explanation of our verse.

In the versions in Chagiga and M’gilla, our pepper proverb is introduced by דאמרי אינשי (“for people say”). In Yuma, however, it is introduced by אמר רבינא ואי תימא אמר רבי נחמן בר יצחק (“Said Ravina, and if you like, said Rabbi Nachman bar Yitzchaq”). In other words, the proverb is quoted בשם אומריו, in the name of those who actually said it. Why the difference?

In disqualifying all of the suggestions of sources in the written Torah for the principle that saving a life supersedes the Sabbath, Rava notes that each one is a clear justification in a case of ודאי פקוח נפש, in which one is certainly and unquestionably saving a life, but unclear in a case of ספק פקוח נפש, i.e. a case in which it is uncertain whether or not the Sabbath need be desecrated on someone’s behalf. Only Shmu’el’s application of וחי בהם clearly works in such a case; hence, it is the final, accepted explanation.

The chét’ êtz ha-da’âth (alluded to in the proverb, as we have seen) which brought about the curses on the first couple and the earth brought death into the world; the spiritual implications of the curse on the earth are alleviated, we have seen, by observance of ôrla. The mitzva of ôrla, I have suggested, might arguably be applied to other things which grow on vines (such as cucumbers and melons) as it is to grapes, at least עפ"י סברא, logically. For this reason, there may be said to be an element of saféq, of doubt, concerning the status (cursed or not) regarding things which grow on vines. Rabbi Shim’on’s drasha relieves the potential danger in this doubtful status for pregnant women, by noting the apparent heavenly ban on emulation of such things by the man.

Each of the suggestions concerning saving a life on shabbath rejected by the gmara could have led to someone dying, since it was unclear in a case in which there was a doubt as to whether overriding the Sabbath is necessary to save one’s life. Shmu’el’s explanation resolves the doubtful case, and “lifts” the matter up from death, just as Rabbi Shim’on’s explanation of the caution behind our verse similarly avoids and clarifies a doubtful case. Since the proverb has a direct bearing on the actual subject under discussion (unlike the other two passages, where it is simply a pun refering to the “sharpness” of Shmu'el’s observation vice the “blandness” of the others) it is important to know who said it, and so it is quoted בשם אומריו, with attribution.