Parshath Nitzavim (Deuteronomy XXIX,9-XXX,20)

A.

והי' כי יבאו עליך כל הדברים האלה הברכה והקללה אשר נתתי לפניך והשבת אל לבבך בכל הגוים אשר הדיחך ד' אלקיך שמה: ושבת עד ד' אלקיך ושמעת בקלו כו' ושב ד' אלקיך את שבותך ורחמך ושב וקבצך מכל העמים אשר הפיצך ד' אלקיך שמה: (“And it will be that all these things, the blessing and the curse [cf. last week’s parasha, XXVII, 11ff.] will come upon you, and you will effect a return to your heart amongst all the nations where Ha-Shem your G-d has exiled you. And you will return to Ha-Shem your G-d and you will listen to His voice... and Ha-Shem your G-d will return your returning, and have mercy on you, and gather you back from all the peoples where Ha-Shem your G-d has scattered you”; XXX, 1-3).

The discerning reader with a חוש חי לשפה העברית, a living sense of the Hebrew language, will already have spotted what sems to be an egregious grammatical error in the above passage, somewhat disguised by the English translation: The verb v’shav which begins verse 3 is an intransitive verb, that is, it means “come back,” rather than “bring back,” where we should expect the causative/factitive form v’héshiv. The verse cries out: Darshéni! (“Interpret me!”). Clearly the Torah is trying to tell us something here; what might it be?

B.

The oddity did not escape the sharp eyes of Chazal, and so we find:בוא וראה כמה חביבין ישראל לפני הקב"ה שבכל מקום שגלו שכינה עמהן ואף כשהם עתידין ליגאל שכינה עמהן כו' והשיב לא נאמר אלא ושב מלמד שאף הקב"ה שב עמהן מבין הגליות (“Come and see how precious are Israel before the Holy One, Blessed is He, for in every place where they have been exiled the Divine Presence [Shechina] is with them, and even when they are destined to be redeemed the Shechina is with them... v’héshiv is not said here, but v’shav, teaching that Ha-Shem, too, returns with them from amongst the exiles”; מגילה כ"ט.).

As the Torah Tmima notes, Rabbi Shim‘on bar Yochai, the author of the above statement, evidently reads our verse as though the word eth is not the accusative particle, but rather means “with”: ‘And Ha-Shem your G-d will return with your returning....”

Rashi cites the above gmara in his comments on our passage, adding that the day on which the exiles are gathered in will surely be a great day, and a difficult one, for it will be as though Ha-Shem takes each person by his hands to lead him out of the exile, and cites in support Yisha‘yahu’s prophecy: ואתם תלקטו לאחד אחד בני ישראל (“and you will be collected one by one, bnei Yisra’él”; Isaiah XXVII, 12). So far so good, but Rashi then adds: ואף בגליות שאר האומות מצינו כן, "ושבתי שבות מואב", "ושבתי את שבות מצרים" (“and even concerning the exiles of other nations we find it so, ‘and I shall return the returning of Mo’av’ [Jeremiah XLVIII, 47], ‘and I shall return the returning of Egypt’ [Ezekiel XXIX, 13]”).

But if the prophets and Rashi are right in the last clause, wherever is the chibba, the extra affection, which Rabbi Shim‘on ben Yochai seems to discern in our passage? Note that it is the same intransitive verb which is used in the two prophetic statements as in our passage; it is nice to know that G-d at least does not hate us more than He does Mo’av or Egypt, but where is the evidence that He loves us more, if He similarly “returns” with their exiles as with ours?

C.

The following is based on a synthesis of the views held by a number of the supercommentaries on Rashi (והרוצה לראות את המקורות יעיין נא גור ארי' למהר"ל מפראג, יריעות שלמה להרה"ג שלמה לוריא בעמ"ס ים של שלמה, ספר הזכרון להרה"ג אברהם בקראט מגולי ספרד, באר בשדה לרה"ג מאיר מנחם בנימין דנון, ומשכיל לדוד להרה"ג דוד פרדו).

First, consider the phrasing of our pronouncement and those of our two prophets: Clearly, G-d is speaking directly through Yirmyahu and Yechezqel, without any prologue: “I, Myself, for My reasons, will return Mo’av from exile, and Egypt from exile.” The implication is that Mo’av and Egypt themselves have no input into the matter, but are mere pawns being moved about on the board of history: First, they are sent into exile, then they are brought out, and both times it is a matter of high Divine policy which dictates the matter.

Contrast this with Moshe’s pronouncement: Your G-d, Israel, will send you into exile; there, you will first “effect a returning” (and here, the causative/factitive form of the verb is used, va-hashévotha). This sincere effort initiated by Israel will be successful: “And you will return to Ha-Shem your G-d, and you will listen to His voice....” And then, as a result, Israel will return from exile, and G-d Himself, who has shared and the burdens of His people in exile (as any parent suffers when he must punish a child), will return as joyfully as they from it.

The impression is heightened if we next consider that both prophetic verses refer to the nations of Mo’av and Egypt in the collective, the aggregate; nowhere does it say that each and every Mo’avi or Mitzri will return from the exile -- only that the collective entities of Mo’av and Egypt will be returned. Careful examination of our passage, however, reveals that each and every second person pronoun in it is singular; G-d will see to it that each and every one of faithful Israel will be pulled out of exile, b’yadav mamash, “actually by his hands” (as Rashi writes), by the Holy One, Blessed is He. No one will be left behind. Hence, the chibba yetheira noted by Rabbi Shim‘on ben Yochai.

D.

The point, it seems to me, is this:

Ha-Shem yithbarach is nosé’ b‘ol, sympathetic and empathetic, with all of His creatures, as may be gleaned from the use of the intransitive verb in all three citations: He shares the pain of exile with everybody who endures it. In evidence of this Divine quality, there is the well-known drasha which speaks of Israel’s song of triumph as their oppressors’ army is being wiped out at Yam Suf. When the mal’achim sought to join in the song, G-d rebuked them: מעשי ידי טובעין בים ואתם אומרים שירה?! (“My creatures are drowning in the sea and you are singing?!”; מגילה י:).

But the nations of the world are undiscerning and largely clueless; they are כל גוים שכחי ד' (“All the nations, forgetful of Ha-Shem”; Psalms IX, 18), mere pawns on the board of history. Faithful Israel, cognizant of the truth, we are in fact able to effect our own redemption, by initiating the “return” of which our passage speaks; we are assured that such a t’shuva, such a return, on the part of each and every individual, when it reaches the critical mass necessary, will be successful; and the result will be that we, with G-d’s help, will have brough about not only our own redemption, but that of the Shechina, kav’yachol.

To be borne in mind, as we approach a new year, in this most propitious season of t’shuva.

Parshath Re’eh (Deuteronomy XI,26-XVI,17)

A.

את כל הדבר אשר אנכי מצוה אתכם אתו תשמרו לעשות לא תסיף עליו ולא תגרע ממנו (“The entire word which I am commanding you, you shall keep to do; you shall not add to it and you shall not detract from it”; XIII, 1).

At first blush, our verse seems an unnecessary repetition, given that only two weeks ago, in Parshath Va-Ethchannan, we read: לא תספו על הדבר אשר אנכי מצוה אתכם ולא תגרעו ממנו לשמר את מצות ד' אלקיכם אשר שנכי מצטה אתכם (“You shall not add to the word which I am commanding and you shall not detract from it, to keep the mitzvoth of Ha-Shem your G-d which I am commanding you”; IV, 2).

This impression of unnecessary repetition is strengthened by the fact that Rashi makes a very similar comment, based upon the Sifrei in our parasha (פסקא ל'), on both verses, providing as examples of unwarranted addition: חמשה טוטפות בתפילין, ה' מינין בלולב, ארבעה ברכות בברכת כהנים (“five paragraphs in t’fillin [there should only be four], five species with a lulav [there should only be four; cf. Leviticus XXXIII, 40], and four blessings in the birkath kohanim [there should only be three; cf. Numbers VI, 22-27]”), the only difference being that, in the comment on IV, 2 he adds five tzitziyoth as an example (there should be one on each corner of a four-cornered garment; cf. Numbers XV, 38-39) and omits the birkath kohanim. The latter is all the more striking since, although the Sifrei adduces it in connection with our verse, the Talmud (ראש השנה כ"ח.) derives it from IV, 2.

So what is going on?

B.

We must begin our enquiry by asking what would motivate, for example, a kohén to add to birkath kohanim.

If we turn to the Talmudic citation above concerning birkath kohanim, we find that it reads: מנין לכהן העולה לדוכן שלא יאמר, הואיל ונתנה לי תורה רשות לברך את ישראל, אוסיף ברכה משלי כגון "יוסף עליכם ככם אלף פעמים", ת"ל "לא תוסיפו על הדבר" (“Whence [do we learn] that a kohén who goes up to duchan should not say, "Since the Torah has granted me permission to bless Israel, I’ll add a blessing of my own, such as ‘[G-d] will increase your like a thousand times’ [Deuteronomy I, 11]; the teaching is, ‘you shall not add to the word....’”).

Rashi quoted the midrash on I, 11 in his comment, that Moshe himself added this blessing to the Torah; hence, the Torah Tmima explains, the kohén, armed with this precedent and the certain knowledge that G-d wishes Israel to be blessed, understand our prohibition as a matter of reshuth, of “permission,” כלומר שיאמר הקב"ה איני מטריח עליכם להוסיך על המצות, אבל אם תרצו, רשאים אתם (“that is to say, that the Holy One, Blessed is He says, I am not troubling you to add to the mitzvoth, but if you wish, you have permission”).

This would seem to be a worthy motivation; after all, G-d Himself declared to Avraham Avinu ואברכה מברכיך (“And I shall bless those who bless you....” Genesis XII, 4). So why should it be that the desire to add a blessing to the blessings of Israel is suspect? Why should the Torah care?

The Torah Tmima offers in answer that the fear is that once one arrogates to himself the right to add to the Torah as he wishes, he will ultimately come to feel that the numbers in all such enumerated mitzvoth as the examples Rashi cites are lav davqa, not necessarily so, and so will be tempted also to do less than the scriptural mandate. This is why, he suggests, Chazal state that כל המוסיף גורע (“anyone who adds [to the mitzvoth] detracts [from them]”; סנהדרין כ"ט.).

The Torah Tmima goes on to quote the Maharsha’s comment to the gmara concerning our well-meaning but misguided kohén that לא אמרו בל תוסיף אלא במה שאדם מוסיף מדעת עצמו, אבל מה שתקנו חכמים לצורך אין איסור בל תוסיף (“[the Torah] does not say ‘you shall not add’ save concerning what an individual may add according to his personal opinion, but taqqanoth, corrective decrees issued by legitimate rabbinical authority do not fall under the prohibition of ‘you shall not add’”). The fear that adding something capriciously, because it feels good to do so at the moment or under the circumstances, is a temptation for individuals only; the collective action of the rabbanim in administering the Torah is exempt from this consideration.

Fair enough; but why is it necessary that there be two separate verses?

C.

The Maharal mi-Prag (גור ארי' על פסוקנו) also asks this question, and in analyzing it, details a yesod, a fundamental principle in Biblical exegesis:

There is, he asserts, a qualitative difference between the individual kohén adding his own bracha to birkath kohanim and the other hosafoth (“additions”) cited by Rashi. The difference between our verse and IV, 2 is דכאן הזהיר אפילו דלא אגידי כלל כמו ברכת כהנים, דאף על גב דברכה רביעית של ברכת כהנים בפני עצמו קאי, דלא דמיא לחמש מינין שבלולב ולא לה' פרשיות שבתפילין דהתם כיון דאגידי התוספת עמהם עובר בבל תוסיפו (“For here [G-d] has warned even when they are not unified at all, as in the case of birkath kohanim, for even though a fourth bracha of birkath kohanim stands by itself, in that it is not like five species with a lulav or five paragraphs in t’fillin, for there it is because they are unified wholes that an addition to them violates ‘you shall not add’”).

In other words, the cases of lulav and t’fillin constitute organic wholes, a fact emphasized by the Hebrew expressions arba‘ath ha-minim and arba‘ ha-parshiyoth ordinarily employed to describe them, in which the use of the smichuth, the “construct state” of the numerals indicates an integral unity, as any reader possessed of a חוש חי לשפה העברית, a “living sense of the Hebrew language” (a favourite phrase of one of my rebbe’im) will attest. To add a fifth species of plant to the lulav or a fifth paragraph to the t’fillin is tantamount to grafting a fifth leg on a cow.

Not so in the case of birkath kohanim, a grouping of three free-standing brachoth, three cows in the same patch of meadow, as it were. To introduce a fourth cow into the pasture is clearly not the same thing. If it is to be prohibited, it requires a separate statement. The Maharal finds that the wording of the Talmudic passage alludes to this difference: ת"ל "דבר", אפילו דבר לא יוסיף, הרי דבעי קרא להכי בפני עצמו (“the teaching is [based on] davar, even a davar cannot be added; for this, a separate verse is needed”). To add a species to the lulav or a paragraph to the t’fillin is to introduce a foreign component; to add a bracha to a group of brachoth is to add a free-standing entity.

It is for this reason, the Maharal explains, that Rashi does not include the example of birkath kohanim in his comment on Va-Ethchannan, דכאן מיתורא ילפינן דאף הוספה לברכת כהנים חייב (“for here we learn from yittur [“superfluity” of the verse] that even an addition to the birkath kohanim is impermissible”), whereas Rashi did add the case of five tzitzyoth, which does not actually appear in the Sifrei, כי דרך להביא ראי' מג' דברים (“because it is [good] practice to cite three things in evidence”); for this same reason, the Sifrei does cite, and Rashi does quote, the cases of lulav and t’fillin together with birkath kohanim.

ואף על גב דבספרי משמע דדריש שלא יוסיף על ברכת כהנים מלשון "דבר", יש לומר דלא מן "דבר" נפקע אלא מיתורא דקרא, דלא הוי למכתב כלל קרא דהכא כו' מדכתיב קרא מיותר שמע מינה דהך "דבר" דכתיב בקרא רצה לומר אפילו דבר לא יוסיף וגו' (“And even though in the Sifrei it is said that not to add to the birkath kohanim is drawn from the term davar, it must be said that it does not actually derive from davar, but rather from the yittur of the verse, for it was not necessary to write the present verse at all... From the fact that a superfluous verse has been written we understand that this term davar in the verse is intended to say, not even a davar should be added”).

D.

Having thus viewed our two verses through the Maharal’s prism, b’siyya‘ta di-shmayya I believe that two additional internal hints to the essential correctness of his analysis can be discerned.

The first is evident from the fact that the verbs of the verse in Va-Ethchannan are couched in the plural, lo thosifu... v’lo thigr‘u (not immediately evident from the English translation); thus, the verse applies directly to every individual member of Klal Yisra’él and has the broadest possible application to many commonly performed mitzvoth, as Rashi’s examples attest.

Our verse, on the other hand, is not only put in the singular, lo thosif... v’lo Thigra‘, a clear allusion to “the” kohén going up to duchan but it begins éth- kol ha-davar.... The accusative particle את is vocalised éth, in which form it can mean “with” as well as express the definite direct object of a transitive verb. Thus, the verse seems to hint that, with any formula of words which the Torah bids us to use, whether, as in the case of the birkath kohanim, it is contained in the written Torah, or (as the Maharsha assured us above) it is mandated by Chazal, we are neither to add nor delete anything. Each part has an independent existence, but is nonetheless part of the greater whole, part of the fabric woven by Torah.

And so we have a valuable case study in Torah exegesis, as well as an object lesson: If we view the Torah, both the written text and the oral tradition of Chazal through the stereoscope of our Gdolim (in this case, Rashi, the Maharal, the Maharsha, and the Torah Tmima), we can reach below the surface, and discern some of the Torah’s true multi-dimensional depth.

Parshath ‘Eqev (Deuteronomy VII,12-XI,25)

A.

Moshe recounts some of the miraculous events which accompanied Israel’s forty-year sojourn in the desert, amongst them: ואשר עשה לדתן ולאבירם בני אליאב בן ראובן אשר פצתה הארץ את פי' ותבלעם ואת בתיהם ואת אהליהם ואת כל היקום אשר ברגליהם בקרב כל ישראל (“And what [G-d] did to Dathan and Aviram, sons of Eli’av son of Re’uven, when the earth opened its mouth and swallowed them, and their households, and their tents, and all the substance which was at their feet amidst all Israel;” XI, 6). The reference, of course, is to the decisive end which G-d put to their part in Qorach’s revolt (cf. Numbers XVI, 28-35).

Rashi comments on the above: כל מקום שהי' אחד מהם בורח הארץ נבקעת מתחתיו ובולעתו, אלו דברי רבי יהודה. א"ל רבי נחמי' והלא כבר נאמר "ותפצח הארץ את פי'" ולא "פיותי'". א"ל ומה אני מקיים "בקרב כל ישראל"? א"ל שנעשית הארץ מדרון כמשפך וכל מקום שהי' אחד מהם, הי' מגלגל ובא עד מקום הבקיעה (“Every place that one of them would flee, the earth would split beneath him and swallow him; these are Rabbi Yehuda’s words. Rabbi Nechemya told him, And does it not already say, ‘And the earth opened its mouth’ [Numbers XVI, 32], and not ‘its mouths?’ [Rabbi Yehuda] told him, And what am I to do with ‘Amidst all Israel?’ [Rabbi Nechemya] told him that the earth was made to slope like a funnel, and every place one of them was, he would roll to the site of the rupture [in the earth]”).

Rashi does not reveal his source for the above exchange (and I have been unable to find it in the Talmud or any of the standard collections of midrashim), but the issue underlying the dispute seems clear enough: Rabbi Yehuda appears willing to accept that piha ("its mouth") can be used in a generic, collective sense to refer to “mouths” in general, and therefore imply more than one, whilst Rabbi Nechemya wishes to read the verse literally, as referring only to one, specific mouth; had the Torah meant more than one mouth, the verse would have read piyotheha (“its mouths”).

B.

Fair enough, but if we look in the midrash, we encounter Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Nechemya again. The occasion is Ya‘aqov’s instructions to his emissaries, to tell his brother ‘Esav: ויהי לי שור וחמור צאן ועבד ושפחה וגו' (“And I have had ox and donkey, ovicaprid and manservant and maidservant...’ Genesis XXXII, 6).ר"י אומר משור אחד יצאו שוורים הרבה ומחמור אחד יצאו חמורים הרבה. ר"נ אמר לשנהון דברייתא היא, חמורתא, גמלתא (“Rabbi Yehuda says, 'From one ox came forth many oxen; and from one donkey came forth many donkeys.' Rabbi Nechemya says, 'It is the [common] usage of people [to say] donkey, camel'”).

Rashi appears to agree with Rabbi Nechemya in his comment on this verse: דרך ארץ לומר על שוורים הרבה שור. אדם אומר לחבירו, בלילה קרא התרנגול ואינו אומר קראו התרנגולות (“[It is] the way of the world to say about many oxen, ox. A person says to his comrade, 'the cock crows at night,' and does not say, 'the cocks crow'”; ע"ע אבן עזרא ובעל הטורים שם בבראשית ).

A little consideration reveals that the positions of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Nechemya in our midrash appear diametrically opposed to those cited by Rashi on our verse supra: There, it is Rabbi Yehuda who wishes to understand the singular noun piha in a generic or collective sense, and Rabbi Nechemya who is the literalist, insisting that a singular noun be singular in meaning; here, Rabbi Yehuda wishes to understand shor as referring to a specific, singular ox, and Rabbi Nechemya recognises the generic or collective use of the singular.

Can their positions be reconciled so that Rabbi Yehuda becomes consistent with Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Nechemya with Rabbi Nechemya?

C.

Rabbi David Pardo, in his supercommentary on Rashi, Maskil l’David, takes note of the fact that Rashi has appended his comment to the final clause of our verse above. In the Hebrew language, the accusative case is indicated by placing the preposition eth (את) before the direct object of a transitive verb. In our verse, this preposition occurs four times, the last one at the head of the last clause, where it is pointed slightly differently than the rest, and hence read éth. Vowelled in this way, it can also be understood to mean “with.” It is a principle of Torah exegesis that such forms may be interpreted l’rabboth, i.e., in an expansive or inclusive manner.

This is how Rabbi Pardo believes that Rabbi Yehuda reads it in our verse: v’éth kol ha-yequm, together with the phrase b’qerev kol Yisra’él, suggests to him that wherever Dathan or Aviram attempted to flee within the camp of Israel, subsidiary “mouths” would open to receive them. ור"נ אולי לא דריש אתין לרבות; Rabbi Nechemya, he suggests, did not apply this principle, and so saw no reason to interpret the term “mouth” as meaning anything other than the singular.

This seems reasonable, but it does not take into account the example of our midrash, for the fact is that the word eth is totally lacking from the verse in Genesis, and yet Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Nechemya still differ concerning the collective usage, or not, of the nouns in the verse.

So, our questions remains.

It seems to me that the key to understanding the stances of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Nechemya concerning this point of usage lies elsewhere. In our midrash, Rabbi Nechemya refers to the use of the singular in a collective sense as לשנהון דברייתא, i.e. a colloquial expression, a references echoed in Rashi’s use of the phrase דרך ארץ, “the way of the world.” But note that the text under consideration is a literal quotation of Ya‘aqov’s words to his messengers, whereas in our parasha (as, indeed, throughout the book of Deuteronomy), Moshe is speaking in prophetic mode, delivering himself of the “burden” (massa’) of prophecy. as numerous prophets refer to it (cf., e.g., Nachum I, 1; Habakkuk I, 1; Zechariah IX, 1 and XII, 1; Mal’achi I, 1). He was, that is, not using his own words, not speaking as one human being to another, but rather acting as the conduit for G-d’s words.

This suggests that the real grammatical rule is as Rabbi Nechemya suggests in Rashi’s passage, that as a rule the singular is singular in meaning and the plural, plural when G-d speaks; it is only when people are speaking, lishn’hon di-vriyatha, as Rabbi Nechemya says, that the sort of imprecision implicit in Ya‘aqov’s instructions to his messengers can be accepted or countenanced. Hence, in our passage, the term piha must be understood as a singular; in the passage from Genesis, shor va-chamor, etc., can be understood collectively. That Rabbi Nechemya’s opinion is decisive, at least concerning the pshat, is suggested by his being the second tanna quoted concerning the pshat, both by Rashi and in our midrash.

D.

We see in this another indication of the great precision and accuracy of the Torah’s massora, that we can safely recognise that when the Torah quotes a Biblical figure. it is not “putting words in his mouth,” but quoting his words precisely, in all their grammatical imprecision, as he or she spoke them.

Parshath Va-Ethchannan (Deuteronomy III,23-VII,11)

A.

ואתחנן אל ד' בעת ההיא לאמר כו' אעברה נא ואראה את הארץ הטובה וגו' (“And I beseeched Ha-Shem at that time, saying.... Please let me cross and see the good land....” III, 23-25.)

Moshe relates that he begged G-d to rescind the decree which He had issued in the wake of the failure at Mei M’riva (Numbers XXVII, 12-14), and allow him to enter the Holy Land. The great Chida (Rabbi Chayyim Yosef David Azulai) cites the Sifrei in his sefer Parshath Drachim (דרוש ח' דה"מ ודרך אגב) to the effect that Moshe was convinced that G-d had nullified His vow not to let Moshe enter the Holy Land, and on that basis made his petition. He goes on to quote the opinion of a contemporary of his, the Mahari Adarbi, that Moshe believed that Transjordan was, indeed, part of Eretz Yisrael, and that he reasoned that, since G-d had allowed him to enter the plains of Mo’av, He had at least partially nullified His vow, and there is a halachic principle that בטל מקצתו בטל כולו; once something has been partially nullified, it may be considered nullified in its entirety.

Later on, in his sefer Rosh David, the Chida returned to this question, and noted that the question is in fact dependent upon a dispute between Tanna’im, in this case, Rabbi Shim‘on bar Yochai and Rabbi Yehuda ben Betheira; Rabbi Shim‘on bar Yochai held that Transjordan is indeed part of Eretz Yisrael, whilst Rabbi Yehuda ben Betheira held that it was not. (עיי' בכורות נ"ה., וע"ע ספרי פר' מסעי, פסקא ג').

The Chida draws the obvious conclusion, namely that Moshe Rabbeinu must have held in accordance with Rabbi Shim‘on bar Yochai’s view that Transjordan is in fact an integral part of Eretz Yisrael, as well as the equally obvious conclusion that G-d begged to differ, that rather Transjordan is not part of Eretz Yisrael, as Rabbi Yehuda ben Betheira held, and that therefore the Divine vow had been in no way nullified.

The Szatmárer Rebbe, Rabbi Yo’el Teitelbaum זצ"ל, revisited this issue (דברי יואל, פרשתנו, דה"מ והחיד"א ) and asked how it could be that Moshe held like Rabbi Shim‘on bar Yochai in this instance and apparently got the halacha wrong. After all, had Moshe not received the entire Torah on Mt. Sinai, to include the opinions of the Tanna’im? If so, how had he managed to miss Rabbi Yehuda ben Betheira’s opinion?

B.

In order to propose an answer to the Rebbe’s question, we must first reexamine a principle which has been mentioned before in these divrei Torah (עיי' למשל א"ז ישיר לפר' לך לך, שנת תשס"ז). The principle may be summarised as follows:

The midrash (בראשית רבה פס"א סי' א') takes note of the fact that Avraham Avinu is said to have observed the entire Torah, to include the fine distinctions of the Oral Torah, and then asks: אב לא למדו ורב לא הי' לא ומהיכן למד את התורה? (“[His] father did not teach him, and he did not have a rabbi; from where did he learn the Torah?”). Avraham had to know what he was to do, after all, before he could be observant. Rabbi Shim‘on answers: זימן לו הקב"ה שתי כליותיו כמין שני רבנים והיו נובעות ומלמדות אותו תורה וחכמה (“The Holy One, Blessed is He, furnished him with his two kidneys as a sort of pair of rabbis, and they derived and taught him Torah and wisdom”).

In order fully to appreciate the implications of what Rabbi Shim‘on is suggesting, we note first the wording of Genesis XV, 4 concerning Yitzchaq, where G-d says אשר יצא ממעיך יירשך (“the one who comes out of your belly will inherit you”). Of course, Yitzchaq was born in the manner of all the rest of us, from his mother’s abdomen, but the Torah here quite clearly alludes to what was common knowledge to Chazal (עיי' למשל נדה ל:), and is confirmed by modern genetics, namely that both parents have input into the characteristics of their offspring. However, Chazal tell us that the matter goes much farther than the mere physical make-up of the children: אב ואם אית לנשמתא כמא כמא דאית אב ואם לגופא בארעא (“The soul has a father and mother, just as the body on earth has a father and mother;” זוה"ק ח"ב י"ב: וע"ע ח"ד קע"ד: ), which means that a person’s metaphysical nature is as much an inherent potential in his parents as is the physical nature.

As a prophet, Avraham had the ability to “see” not only in the physical sense, but also to “see” in a metaphysical fashion (hence, there are two verbs for “see” in the Holy Language, ראה, which is a general reference, and חזה, which appears to be a specific reference to this metaphysical phenomenon). As such, then, חזיון is a form of perception which transcends the four physical dimensions (including time) which bound and limit our world.

Nor was Avraham the only person of prophetic sensitivity who possessed such a faculty of metaphysical sight. The midrash, for instance, tells us that the conflict between Yosef and his brothers was fueled, in part, because they were aware that Yerov‘am ben Nevat, the first king of the northern kingdom of Israel who deliberately introduced an idolatrous cult into his country and thereby led to the estrangement of the Ten Tribes, would be a descendant of Efrayim ben Yosef (בראשית רבה פ"ד סי' ז' מתנת כהונה שם). Similarly, Qorach was motivated in his rebellion against Moshe, in part, because he knew that amongst his descendants would be the prophet Shmuel, about whom it would be said ששקול כנגד משה ואהרן שנאמר "משה ואהרן בכהניו ושמואל בקראי שמו" (“that he was comparable to Moshe and Aharon, as it is said, ‘Moshe and Aharon with his kohanim and Shmu’el with those who call His name’ [Psalms XCIX, 6];” במדבר רבה פ"ח סי' ז' ).

Now, Moshe was the greatest of prophets, as the Torah attests: ולא קם נביא עוד בישראל כמשה (“And there did not arise another prophet in Israel like Moshe....” Deuteronomy XXXIV, 10), and as such had this faculty to an unprecedented degree. Thus, for instance, before he killed the Egyptian overseer who was beating a helpless Israelite to death, the Torah tells us וירא כי אין איש (“And he saw that there was no man;” Exodus II, 12) and Rashi explains that he looked into the miscreant’s future progeny and determined that none would be worthy, before dispatching him.
With such a capability of prophetic vision, then, we can well stipulate that, in the midst of Israel, Moshe had access to all of them, and to everything which their progeny would learn. But even this wonderful faculty had an inherent limitation: Moshe could only “read” those who were, in fact. present with him at Sinai.

C.

Elsewhere (סנהדרין צ"ב:), the Talmud tells us that a faction of the bnei Efrayim erred in attempting to calculate the end of the Egyptian exile, and therefore attempted to leave Egypt prematurely; as a result, they were slaughtered by the Plishtim. These men were the “dry bones” which were subsequently revived, during the Babylonian exile, by the prophet Yechezqel (Ezekiel XXXVII, 1-14), so that they rejoined Israel, married, and sired children. The gmara goes on to explain that Rabbi Yehuda ben Betheira testified that he was descended from these men.

With this in mind, I would suggest that Moshe Rabbeinu, through his unequalled prophetic “sight,” did indeed have access to the work of all those Tanna’im and Amora’im whose ancestors were present at Mt. Sinai. For this reason, he was familiar with Rabbi Shim‘on bar Yochai’s opinion that Transjordan is a part of Eretz Yisra’él, and based his conclusions and actions on it.

However, Rabbi Yehuda ben Betheira’s paternal ancestors were not present at Mt. Sinai; at that moment in history, their bones were whitening in the desert, and would only be revived by Yechezqel some nine centuries later. Hence. Moshe was unaware of his opinion, and so G-d Himself informed him of it, and that in light of it, the Divine vow had not been nullified at all.

D.

In my humble opinion, this explication of metaphysical reality goes far to explain how it was possible that Moshe Rabbeinu received the entire Torah on Mt. Sinai, to include its oral component, and yet that oral tradition, embodied for us in the Talmudim and the midrashei halacha, is in large part expressed in terms of the opinions of later scholars, many of whom lived in the Second Temple period and afterward, over a millennium after Mattan Torah.

Armed with the written Torah, the thirteen rules of Talmudic logic, the precise definitions of technical terms, and the precise values of the Torah’s weights and measures, Moshe was able to work out the rest, cross-checking and evaluating all of the input from Chazal which was available to him through the metaphysical germ plasm of their ancenstors who were present at Sinai, accessible to him through his unrivaled prophetic vision.

Parshath Mattoth (Numbers XXX,2-XXXII,42)

A.

ומקנה רב היו לבני ראובן ולבני גד עצום מאד ויראו את ארץ יעזר ואת ארץ גלעד והנה המקום מקום מקנה: ויבאו בני גד ובני ראובן אל משה כו' ויאמרו אם מצאנו חן בעיניך יתן את הארץ הזאת לעבדיך לאחזה אל תעבירנו את הירדן: ויאמר משה לבני גד ולבני ראובן האחיכם יבאו למלחמה ואתם תשבו פה (“And the bnei Re’uvén and bnei Gad had abundant livestock, very many, and they saw the land of Ya‘zer and the land of Gil‘ad and behold, the place was a place for livestock. And the bnei Gad and bnei Re’uvén came to Moshe.... And they said, 'If we have found favor in your eyes, let this land be given to your servants for a holding; do not make us cross the Jordan.' And Moshe said to the bnei Gad and bnei Re’uvén, 'Will your brothers go to war and you will sit here!?'” XXXII, 1-7).

The incident cries out to be explained. Whatever could have been the thoughts of the bnei Gad and bnei Re’uvén in making this request, not least in light of their certain knowledge (as Moshe went on to point out) that their parents’ generation had perished in the desert because they had disparaged the Holy Land and mutinied against the idea of conquering it? It seems unlikely that the real issue was their abundance of cattle; after all, all of the tribes of Israel had abundant cattle. Rather, it appears that the issue at hand was their reluctance to cross the Jordan, and it is that, and not their cattle, which Moshe seems to address in his rebuke.

Why, then, were these two particular tribes reluctant to cross the Jordan? And whilst we are asking questions, what is the significance of the change in order, the first verse referring to Re’uven and Gad, but the subsequent ones to Gad and Re’uven?

B.

Ramban asks our second question, and suggests that the bnei Re’uvén are mentioned first in the first verse as a matter of right, כי הוא הבכור ובן הגבירה וכן כשיספר הכתוב המעשה הזה יאמר "ולראובני ולגדי נתתי" (“For [Re’uven] was the first-born, and son of the senior wife, and so when Scripture tells this story [elsewhere] it says, ‘And to the Re’uveni and to the Gaddi I have given....’ [Deuteronomy III, 16]”). However, he goes on, the actual idea of settling in Transjordan had originated with Gad, and it was therefore the bnei Gad who took the lead in speaking to Moshe about the matter. Furthermore, he notes, Gad was militarily stronger than Re’uven (cf. ibid., XXXII, 20), and unafraid to dwell alone east of the Jordan (ע"ע אבן עזרא ובעל הטורים כאן).

The Kli Yaqar, for its part, notes the juxtaposition of the phrase עצום מאד, “very many” to the bnei Gad, and sees in it an allusion to the fact that Gad was richer in cattle than Re’uven, adding that their relative wealth imparted to them a certain chutzpa, a forwardness or assertiveness which was not altogether seemly, כי ע"י העושר הוא מתרומם (“for because of [their] wealth they were exalting themselves”).

This should serve to set the stage for understanding the first question.

C.

The Torah appears to mark the center of the epic conflict between Ya‘aqov’s original twelve sons by referring to the kthoneth ha-passim, the “striped coat” which Ya‘aqov had awarded Yosef (Genesis XXXVII, 3). Talmudic sources, for their part, tell us that the conflict centered on Ya‘aqov’s appointing Yosef his bechor, his “first-born” (עיי' למשל ברכות ז:). The nexus between the two may be found in Rashi’s comment on Genesis XXV, 31 that, before Mattan Torah, the principal issue at stake in primogeniture was the kehunna, and the Chazal confirm that Yosef’s distinctive garment was meant to mark that office (עיי' תורה שלימה לבראשית ל"ז ג' בשם מדרשים וירושלמי מגילה פ"א הי"ב דבגדי עשו היו בגדי כהונה וכתונת הפסים שנתנה ליוסף היתה ביניהם, וע"ע ערכין ט"ז.).

If we turn next to Numbers III, 12 we learn that a bechor for purposes of the kehunna, is defined as a פטר רחם, i.e. first-born not so much from the father’s side as from the mother’s (ועיי' רש"י שם). This means that Ya‘aqov had, in fact, four possible bechoroth: Re’uven ben Le’a, Gad ben Zilpa, Yosef ben Rachel, and Dan ben Bilha. Since Zilpa and Bilha were originally the maidservants of Le’a and Rachel, respectively, we can discern that the essential conflict over the bechora was between the “house of Le’a” (on the grounds that she was Ya‘aqov’s first, principal wife and Re’uven her bechor), and that of Rachel (on the grounds that she was Ya‘aqov’s true love, the only woman whom he had wished and intended to marry). It was Ya‘aqov, of course, who decided the winner of the argument.

The relevance of this ancient dispute to our parasha becomes clear from a comment of the midrash on Psalms LXXXVII, 13: הירדן לא נקרע אלא בזכותו של יוסף ותולדות יעקב לא באו אלא בזכותו של יוסף (“The Jordan was split only in the merit of Yosef, and Ya‘qov’s descendants came [across the river into the Holy Land] only in the merit of Yosef;” ילקוט שמעוני ח"ב רמז תתי"ז).

D.

Now we can understand the reluctance of Re’uven and Gad to chance crossing the Jordan.

Aware that the crossing was dependent on the merit of their old antagonist, Yosef, they could hardly be certain that that merit extended to them. They might never get across the river; worse, they might be caught in it and drowned.

Inspired by their abundant cattle, Gad looked around them at the lush pastures of Transjordan and conceived a solution to the problem. They convinced Re’uven, and took the matter of staying east of the river with Moshe.

Hearing their case, Moshe assured them that their fears were groundless; like their brothers, did they not wish to participate in the great mitzva of kibbush ha-aretz, the conquest of the Holy Land? If so, they could rest assured that שלוחי מצוה אינן ניזוקין, those embarked upon a mitzva are not harmed (עיי' זוה"ק ח"ג רע"ג. שמאמר זה הלכה למשה מסיני, וע"ע פסחים ח: ).

The bnei Gad and bnei Re’uvén responded enthusiastically that, if so, they would spearhead the assault, leaving behind their women, children, and cattle in Transjordan. But what of their return? After completion of the conquest, at war’s end, they would be making yerida, leaving the Holy Land for the pastures which had been wrested from Sichon and ‘Og. What zechuth would they have to see them safely back over the river?

ויתן להם משה לבני גד ולבני ראובן ולחצי שבט מנשה בן יוסף וגו' (“And Moshe gave [the land] to the bnei Gad, the bnei Re’uvén, and half of the tribe of M’nashe ben Yosef....” v. 33). If they would not have safe passage over the river in their own merit, they would surely have it accompanied by. Yosef’s descendants. This, I believe, is why M’nashe was added to the Transjordanian settlers, and why the verse seemingly unnecssarily mentions M’nashe’s father, as though we did not already know who M’nashe was.

Our story is a cautionary tale which goes to show how deep machloqeth, strife and division within Israel, can run, how its echoes can reverberate, even amongst succeeding generations, centuries later, in circumstances of which the original ba‘alei ha-machloqeth could hardly conceive.

Parshath Pinchas (Numbers XXV,10-XXX,1)

A.

At the end of last week’s parasha we learnt that the bnei Yisra’él camped at a place called Shittim, where the brazen Mo’avi and Midyani women offered themselves as the “ultimate weapon” in Balaq’s arsenal to destroy Israel’s standards of decency and bring them down from their exalted status as the ממלכת כהנים וגוי קדוש (“kingdom of kohanim and holy nation;” Exodus XIX, 6). ותקראן לעם לזבחי אלהיהן ויאכל העם וישתחוו לאלהיהן (“And they called the people to the sacrifices of their gods, and the people ate and bowed down to their gods;” Numbers XXV, 2).

Things went from bad to worse: והנה איש מבני ישראל בא ויקרב אל אחיו את המדינית וגו' (“And behold, a man of the bnei Yisra’él came and brought close to his brothers the Midyani woman....” ibid., 6), openly cavorting with the woman before Moshe and the rest of Israel. וירא פינחס בן אלעזר בן אהרן הכהן ויקם מתוך העדה ויקח רמח בידו: ויבא אחרי איש ישראל אל הקבה וידקר את שניהם וגו' (“And Pinchas ben El‘azar ben Aharon ha-kohen saw, and he arose from amidst the community and took a spear in his hand. And he came after the man of Israel to the tent, and he ran both of them through....” ibid., 7-8).

At the beginning of our parasha, G-d expresses His approval of Pinchas’ action: פינחס בן אלעזר בן אהרן הכהן השיב את חמתי מעל בני ישראל וגו' (“Pinchas ben El‘azar ben Aharon ha-Kohen returned My wrath (chamathi) from upon the bnei Yisra’él....” ibid., 11). So the verse is conventionally translated.

However, perhaps with a bit of research, we can can discern in the Divine choice of words to express His wrath (חמה, rather than one of the possible synonyms, אף, כעס, or רוגז) an allusion to a wider meaning.

B.

If we turn to the Talmud, we find: ת"ר בזמן שהחמה לוקה סימן רע לכל העולם כולו כו' (“The Rabbis taught: In a time when the sun (chamma) is afflicted, it is a sign of bad things for the entire world....” סוכה כ"ט.). The gmara goes on to quote a second baraitha which details four things which could bring about such a solar “affliction,” amongst them: נערה מאורסה שצעקה בעיר ואין מושיע לה (“A betrothed girl who cried out [at an assailant] in a city and had no rescuer”). The Maharsha explains that the reason this should lead to the sun’s “affliction” and trouble for everybody is that it indicates a fundamental societal ill; the poor girl’s cry for help, he says, was ברור לכל כשמש, “clear to everyone as the sun”, and yet no-one acted on it.

If we now return to the sad story in our parasha, the gentle reader will be forgiven for considering the comparison, at first glance, inapt: Kozbi bath Tzur was not exctly a blushing maiden defending her virtue from Zimri’s lecherous advances. To the contrary, she had volunteered for this mission, even begged her father to be allowed to go along, and had brazenly aroused and encouraged those advances. If there was a “victim” in the story at all, it was Zimri ben Salu, not Kozbi.

Which brings to mind another Talmudic passage.

C.

ואלו הן שמצילין אותן בנפשן, הרודף אחר חבירו להורגו, ואחר הזכר, ואחר נערה מאורסה וגו' (“And these are the ones whom one may rescue [from sin - Rashi] at the cost of their lives: One who chases after his fellow to kill him, or after a male [for an unnatural purpose], or after a betrothed girl....” סנהדרין ע"ג. במשנה). The subsequent discussion in the gmara makes clear that each of the cases in the above mishna is derivable from that of the na‘ara ha-m’urasa, the “betrothed maiden” (cf. Deuteronomy XXII, 22).

This casts matters in a different light. The mishna’s wording is very precise: The person who is being “rescued” at the cost of his life is the rodéf, the “pursuer,” who has so lost control of himself that he is about to commit a supernally, supremely heinous act, one which will so stain his neshama that he is actually better off dead; hence, one is allowed to save him from himself, at the cost of his life (ועיי' גם פי' הרע"ב וקול הרמ"ז על המשנה).

D.

Now, consider our case. What Zimri ben Salu was about to do, he was advertising in public. His intentions were as clear as a maiden’s cry for help in the city...

And it was Pinchas who responded, and thereby השיב את חמתי מעל בני ישראל. How was G-d’s wrath about to be made manifest? Aside from the plague which had already claimed the lives of 24,000 people who had succumbed to the blandishments of the Mo’avi and Midyani women and participated in their foul rites, the actions of Zimri, a nasi shévet, head of the tribe of Shim‘on, in public before all of Israel, were about to bring about a siman ra‘, an evil sign for the entire world, as G-d’s cheima led to the positioning of His chamma for affliction.

This, I believe, is the point of the allusion in our verse. This is what Pinchas prevented by his immediate action. Were it to be revealed that the societal character of the ממלכת כהנים וגוי קדוש, the holy nation whose very purpose was, and is, to be the standard bearers of Torah in the world, the living embodiment of its values, the very picture of what the Divine intention was in creating humanity, was so depraved as to permit and, tacitly, approve of Zimri’s conduct, there would be no hope for the rest of the world, either.

Such is the potential of a single individual in Israel to influence the course of the world, whether for bad (Zimri), or for good (Pinchas).

Parshath Balaq (Numbers XXII,2-XXV,9) 7/11/08

A.

Eagerly rushing off to carry out the request of Balaq ben Tzippor, King of Mo’av, that he curse the Israelite hordes then massing on Mo’av’s border, Bil‘am ben Be‘or is confronted by an apparition: ויעמד מלאך ד' במשעול הכרמים גדר מזה וגדר מזה: ותרא האתון את מלאך ד' ותלחץ אל הקיר ותלחץ את רגל בלעם אל הקיר ויסף להכתה: ויוסף מלאך ד' עבור ויעמד במקום צר אשר אין דרך לנטות ימין ושמאול: ותרא האתון את מלאך ד' ותרבץ כו' ותאמר לבלעם מה עשיתי לך כי הכיתני זה שלש רגלים (“And Ha-Shem’s angel stood in the corridor of the vineyards, a fence on either side. And the athon [‘she-donkey’] saw Ha-Shem’s angel and shied toward the wall, and she pressed Bil‘am’s leg against the wall, and he proceeded to beat her. And Ha-Shem’s angel continued to move and stood at a narrow place where there was no way to turn right or left. And the athon saw Ha-Shem’s angel and lay down... And she said to Bil‘am, 'What did I do to you that you have beaten me three times [regalim];'” XXII, 24-28).

Drawn by the unusual usage of regalim (where we would ordinarily have expected pe‘a-mim), Rashi quotes the Midrash Tanchuma to tell us that the athon was sending a message to Bil‘am: אתה מבקש לעקור אומה החוגגת שלש רגלים בשנה (“You are seeking to uproot a nation which celebrates three regalim in the year”), i.e. Israel, which celebrates the three pilgrimmage holidays of Pesach, Shavu‘oth, and Sukkoth.

It seems reasonable to ask how the allusion to these holidays at this juncture could possibly convey some sort of admonition to Bil‘am.

B.

The séfer Toldoth Adam brings an anonymous midrash to tell us how it was that Bil-‘am, confidence man and supreme realist, could imagine, in the face of the firm Divine “no” which he had received earlier, to imagine that he would be able to accomplish his goal of cursing Israel. It seems that he offered G-d a deal: If He would consent to Israel’s destruction, the he, Bil‘am, would undertake to observe the Torah in their stead.

If we consider for a moment what Israel’s conduct had been like in the desert over the last 40 years, from the Golden Calf to the incident of Mei M’riva, we can imagine that the offer may have seemed tempting. In any event, it had to be evaluated and explored. What sort of test might G-d have devised for Bil‘am?

The Talmud offers us a template, as it were, for such an examination: There will come a judgment day, we are assured, in which each of the nations will pass before the Divine throne and have to account for its treatment of Israel, and have its conduct compared to that of Israel, at least a remnant of whom will have been faithful to the Torah throughout the long and painful exile. The nations will protest that they had not been offered the Torah under the same conditions as Israel, and for that reason had not taken it seriously: תנה לנו מראש ונעשנה (“Give it to us from the start, and we shall carry it out!”).

G-d will respond to them: מצוה קלה יש בידי וסוכה שמה לכו ועשו אותה כו' מיד כל אחד ואחד נוטל והולך ועושה סוכה בראש גגו והקדוש ברוך הוא מקדיר עליהם חמה בתקופת תמוז וכל אחד ואחד מבעט בסוכתו ויוצא (“I have a simple mitzva in My hand and its name is sukka; go and observe it.... Immediately each and every one takes and goes and makes a sukka atop his roof, and the Holy One, Blessed is He causes the heat of the height of summer to beat down upon them, and each one kicks his sukka down and leaves;” עבודה זרה ג.; cf. Zechariah XIV, 16-18, that the nations will indeed be obligated to observe Sukkoth).

The mitzva of sukka, of building and dwelling in an insubstantial, thatched hut, would seem to be the test template. The sfarim ha-qdoshim (עיי' מהר"ל מפראג חידושי אגדות שם, וע"ע בני יששכר מאמרי תשרי מאמר י' סי' ז') tell us that Israel possess an אור המקיף, an “enveloping light” or “aura”, in that they surround themselves with חומרות וסייגים, “stringencies and ‘fences’” around the Torah, i.e. protective decrees designed to prevent inadvertent violation of Torah principles (עיי' למשל ברכות ב.), symbolised by the walls and roof of the sukka.

C.

With this in mind, our attention is drawn to the beginning of our parasha, where we read: וירא בלק בן צפור את כל אשר עשה ישראל לאמורי (“And Balaq ben Tzippor saw everything that Israel had done to the Emori”). The midrash tells us concerning the conflict with Sichon, King of the Emori (concerning which we read in lasr week’s parasha) that Israel י"א מלחמות סיחון עשו באלול ועשו את הרגל בתשרי ואחר הרגל מלחמת עוג (“conducted 11 campaigns against Sichon during Elul, then celebrated the regel [i.e. Sukkoth] in Tishrei, and after the regel [engaged in] the war with ‘Og;” במדבר רבה פי"ט סי' י"ח).

The principle of אין מוקדם ומאוחר בתורה, that the events reported in the Torah are not necessarily strictly in chronological order (פסחים ו:, בין השאר), seems to apply here. Since Israel were moving from south to north along the eastern border of Eretz Yisra’él, it srands to reason that they first conquered Sichon, then approached Mo’av. They must have been congregating on the border of Mo’av, during the first two weeks of Tishrei. This would have been when Balaq sent his two desperate embassies to Bil‘am. Hence, Bil‘am would have been rushing to do Balaq’s bidding on or about the holiday of Sukkoth (the regel mentioned in the midrash), which begins on 15 Tishrei.

Now let us consider the nature of this משעול הכרמחם, this “corridor of vineyards.”

We begin by noting that Torah sources repeatedly mention the practice of training vines to grow over the top of a lattice-work structure (עיי' למשל כלאים פ"ו מ"ג, פיהרע"ב ותוספות חכמים שם). This, inevitably, serves to form a shaded corridor as the vinces mature, and undoubtedly is the reality lying behind the Biblical phrase איש תחת גפנו, “[each] man under his vine” (cf., e.g., I Kings V, 5; Micha IV, 4).

Now, from our passage, it is apparent that when the athon first perceived the angel, the corridor was wide enough to permit passage; the athon shied away from the frightening apparition over against one wall of the corridor, and tried to slink past it. The angel responded by moving to a narrow spot in the corridor, blocking the athon’s way. One envisions an “L” in one of the walls of the corridor, blocking one of the lanes, and narrowing it.

The corridor at this point meets the minimum halachic requirement of a sukka, two walls and a partial (סוכה ו: ולהלכה עיי' רמב"ם הל' סוכה פ"ד ה"ב ושו"ע או"ח סי' תר"ל סע' ב'). As for the schach, the “thatch” of the roof, the Talmud discusses just such a case of someone who has trained vines to grow over a lattice, and concludes that if he cuts the vines off from the ground and handles or shakes them a bit, they are kosher schach (סוכה י"א:).

D.

Now, we have seen that Bil‘am intended to offer himself in Israel’s stead as the upholder of Torah in this world, much as the Talmud suggests the nations will offer, on the judgment day. So, the season being Sukkoth, G-d offered Bil‘am the sukka test; the angel blocked the narrowest part of the corridor, and the athon lay down before it, as if to make Bil‘am pause and notice that he was in a potential sukka. All that was necessary was for him to cut the vines and handle them, and it would have become kosher.

Bil‘am ignored the opportunity offered him; as it were, he “kicked down” his sukka, impatiently beating the athon to get up and depart (remember that he did not yet perceive the angel before him). This is what prompted the donkey’s allusion: You want to uproot a people who seek out opportunities to observe these occasions? You find youself in the “enveloping light” of the sukka, and you are impatient to get out of it? You are not a fit replacement for Israel!

Which, of course, means that we have to live up to our reputation.

Parshath Chuqqath (Numbers XIX,1-XXII,1) 7/4/08

A.

Our parasha deals with the deaths of Miriam and Aharon.

Miriam was the first of Moshe’s siblings to die: ויבאו בני ישראל מדבר צן בחדש הראשון וישב העם בקדש ותמת מרים שם ותקבר שם (“And the bnei Yisra’él came [to] the desert of Tzin in the first month, and the people settled in Qadesh; and Miriam died there and was buried there;” XX, 1).

Rashi quotes the Talmud (מועד קטן כ"ח.): למה נסמכה מיתת מרים לפרשת פרה אדומה? לומר לך כמו שקרבנות מכפרין אף מיתת צדיקים מכפרת (“Why is Miriam’s death juxtaposed to the passage of the para adumma [‘red heifer’, which begins our parasha]? To tell you that just as sacrifices atone, so does the death of tzaddiqim atone”).

The Maharal mi-Prag (גור ארי' לרש"י הנ"ל וע"ע שפתי חכמים) notes that the comparison seems, at first, inapt; after all, the para adumma is not, precisely, a sacrifice, since no part of it is offered on the altar. He goes on to observe, however, that our parasha nonetheless refers to the para by the term chattath (XIX, 9), the same term used of a sin offering (cf., e.g., Leviticus VI, 17-23), despite the fact that it is not really a qorban. He concludes that the atoning quality of this pseudo-sacrifice derives from the fact that it is burnt up completely, reduced to its fundamental matter; in like wise, death is an atonement, he says, since the soul is divested of the form of the body, the source of sin. It is in this that they are similar.

If so, why is it the death of Miriam, specifically (as opposed to another tzaddiq) which is juxtaposed with the para adumma? Our eye comes to rest on a midrash: משל לבן שפחה שטינף פלטין של מלך, אמרו תבא אמו ותקנח את הצואה, כך תבא פרה ותכפר על העגל (“A parable of a son of a maidservant who soils the king’s throne; they said, Let his mother come and clean up the mess; thus, let the cow come and atone for the calf;” מובא ברש"י בשם ר' משה הדרשן).

The cow in some fashion atones for the Golden Calf; so does Mother Miriam’s death in some sense atone for Israel (ועיי' תורה תמימה שם). But for what sin?

B.

Our question is somewhat sharpened by the reflection that Miriam’s death, in a certain sense, can be said to have brought about the deaths of her brothers.

As a direct consequence of Miriam’s death, Rashi tells us, "ולא הי' מים לעדה" -- מכאן שכל מ' שנה הי' להם הבאר בזכות מרים (“‘And the community had no water’ [XX, 2] -- from here [we learn] that the entire 40 years [that Israel were in the desert] they had a well in Miriam’s merit”). For virtually the entire time of their sojourn in the desert, water was supplied by this miraculous traveling well. When Miriam perished, though, the well vanished.

And the people panicked, and crowded about Moshe and Aharon, yammering, לו גועמו בגוע אחינו לפני ד': ולמה הבאתם את קהל ד' אל במדבר הזה למות שם אנחנו ובעירנו: ולמה העליתנו ממצרים להביא אתנו אל המקום הרע הזה וגו' (“If only we had perished as did our brothers before Ha-Shem! Why did you bring the congregation of Ha-Shem to this desert to die there, we and our cattle? And why did you bring us up from Egypt to this evil place...?” ibid., 3-5).

In response, G-d told Moshe and Aharon to take Moshe’s staff, approach a certain rock, and speak to it; water would miraculously gush forth. As Moshe and Aharon walked toward the rock, the maddening crowd gave them no respite. In a flash of anger, Moshe cried, המן הסלע הזה נוציא לכם מים (“Is it from this rock that we should bring forth water for you?”) and struck the rock, rather than speaking to it. The miracle happened anyway, and the water gushed forth; but the damage was done: ויאמר ד' אל משה ואל אהרן יען לא האמנתם בי להקדישני לעיני בני ישראל לא תביאו את הקהל הזה לארץ אשר נתתי להם (“And Ha-Shem said to Moshe and to Aharon, 'Since you did not foster faith in Me to sanctify Me in the eyes of the bnei Yisra’él, you will not bring this congregation to the land which I have given them;” ibid., 10-11).

So we see that this whole incident of Mei M’riva can be said to have resulted as consequence of Miriam’s death. When Israel left Qadesh and arrived at Hor ha-Har on the border of Edom, Aharon died (v. 27). But this begs the question: It was Moshe who momentarily allowed himself to become angry and hit the rock; what, exactly, was Aharon’s failure?

C.

This question bothered Ramban, who subjected the incident of Mei M’riva to a lengthy analysis, in the course of which he disposed of theories proposed by several other commentators.

First, he dismisses the notion that the core issue could have been Moshe’s striking the rock. He notes that G-d explicitly told Moshe to take his staff to the rock (v. 8), which implies that it would have some use there, and striking is a logical use. He cites various examples of other miracles in which Moshe was enjoined to speak, and used the staff in some fashion, and was not penalized for it. Then, too, there is the incontrovertible fact that it worked; striking the rock brought forth the necessary water.

Similarly, he dismisses the possibility that Moshe’s anger was the problem. Again, he cites other occasions on which Moshe became angry, without suffering dire consequences, and also notes that the Torah’s text here does not make an issue of Moshe’s anger (אמנם חז"ל מזכירין את כעסו, עיי' במדבר רבה פי"ט סי' ה'), and also the fact that Aharon was not a participant either in Moshe’s anger or in his striking the rock, and yet was included in the punishment.

Ramban then focuses on a comment by Rabbenu Chananel concerning the words Moshe spoke in anger: כי החטא הוא אמרם "המן הסלע הזה נוציא לכם מים" וראוי שיאמרו יוציא ד' לכם מים כו' וכן בכל הנסים יודיעום כי ד' יעשה עמהם להפליא, ואולי חשב העם כי משה ואברן בחכמתם הוציאו להם מים מן הסלע הזה, וזהו לא קדשתם אותי וגו' (“For the sin was their saying, ‘Is it from this rock that we should bring forth water for you?, when they should have said, that Ha-Shem should bring forth water for you.... And so with all of the miracles, they would inform them that Ha-Shem would act for them wondrously, and perhaps the people thought that Moshe and Aharon in their wisdom had brought forth water for them from this rock, and this is [what G-d meant by saying], You did not sanctify Me....”).

D.

It is in this observation cited by Ramban that I believe the key lies.

Rashi tells us that the expression כל העדה, ‘the whole community,” in XX, 1 is a clue שכבר מתו מתי מדבר ואלה פרשו לחיים (“that those who were to die in the desert had already died, and these remained alive;” ע"ע אבן עזרא שם). Despite their towering greatness in so many ways, the yotz’ei Mitzrayim demonstrated at the incident of the Golden Calf a marked tendency to magnify and exaggerate the importance of Moshe to their immediate existence, almost to the extent of deification. As Rashi tells us (Exodus XXXII, 1), they had miscalculated the day on which Moshe was scheduled to descend from Mt. Sinai with the Torah, and expected him a day early. When he did not come down, they quailed at the prospect of being marooned in the howling wilderness without their leader and mentor.

This regrettable tendency was doubtless a product of the exile in Egypt. Modern scholars have ascertained from ancient Egyptian sources that such prominent Egyptian deities as Osiris and Ptah were, in fact, deified human beings who had once walked the earth (ועיי' גם עבודה זרה מ"ג: שעשו המצרים ע"ז מיוסף הצדיק אחרי פטירתו ).

Moshe and Aharon, who had experienced that débâcle, should have been acutely aware of and sensitive to this possibility, even amongst the new, young generation. Moshe, in his momentary fit of anger, forgot it, and said what he said. And Aharon did not correct him....

Chazal tell us: הקב"ה מקדים הרפואה למכה (“The Holy One., Blessed is He, brings the cure before the affliction;” מגילה י"ג:). The atoning death of merciful Mother Miriam was already in place to offset the potential negative effect of Moshe’s remark, as we find so clearly hinted in its close proximity to the para adumma, itself atoning for the Golden Calf, which resulted from that first tendency to deify men.

Yet, this young generation, the first in two centuries to grow up independent of that pernicious Egyptian influence, required one last, sharp lesson: As Rashi tells us, the Torah is at pains to record that Hor ha-Har, the site of Aharon’s death, was on the border of Edom שמפני שנתחברו כאן להתקרב לעשו הרשע נפרצו מעשיהן וחסרו הצדיק הזה וגו' (“for because they had joined themselves here to draw near to the wicked Esav [ancestor of Edom] a breach was made in their works and they lost this tzaddiq....”).

The loss of Aharon at Hor ha-Har was their reminder that, to prosper, Israel must be an עם לבדד ישכן ובגיום לא יתחשב (“A people dwelling alone and not reckoned among the nations;” Numbers XXIII, 9), subject to the influences and tendencies of neither Egypt nor Edom.

Parshath Qorach (Numbers XVI,1-XXI,1) 6/27/08

A.

Our parasha deals with the challenge to Moshe’s authority which was mounted by Qorach and his sect: כל העדה כלם קדושים ובתוכם ד' ומדוע תתנשאו על קהל ד' (“...the whole congregation are all of them holy, and why should you exalt yourselves over Ha-Shem’s community?” XVI, 3).

Rashi quotes the midrash telling us how Qorach and his cohorts confronted Moshe: באו ועמדו לפני משה, אמרו לו, טלית שכולה של תכלת חייבת ציצית או פטורה? אמר להם חייבת. התחילו לצחק עליו, אפשר טלית של מין אחר חוט אחד של תכלת פוטרתה, זו שכולה תכלת לא תפטור את עצמה? (“They came and stood before Moshe; they said to him, 'Does a tallith which is entirely of t’chéleth require tzitzith?' He told them, 'It does.' They began to laugh at him, 'Is it possible that a tallith of another sort is redeemed by a single thread of t’chéleth; [and] this [tallith], which is entirely t’chéleth should not redeem itself?'”).

If we consider the matter in light of what we learnt in last week’s parasha concerning tzitzith, it becomes apparent that there is something odd about Qorach’s claim: The mitzva, after all, consists of hanging a knotted group of eight strands on each corener of a four-cornered garment, such that the sum of the eight strands, the five knots, and the gimatriya (“numerical value”) of the word tzitzith add up to remind us of the 613 mitzvoth in the Torah (cf. XV, 39, Rashi ad loc.). The single sky-blue (t’chéleth) thread is one detail of the mitzva. At present, when we have forgotten the identity of the sea creature (chilazon) which was the source of the dye, the common practice is to wear knotted strands which are entirely white; the lack of t’chéleth does not nullify the mitzva.

So what lies behind Qorach’s evident allegation that the whole point of the mitzva of tzitzith was the t’chéleth?

B.

We begin to unravel the matter by turning to a Tosafoth, where we learn דאמר במדרש כו' שהיו אומרים ישראל כיון שנגזר עליהן שלא ליכנס לארץ ממעשה המרגלים שוב אין מחוייבין במצות (“that it says in the midrash... that Israel were saying, since it had been decreed upon them not to enter the [holy] land because of the incident of the spies [in last week’s parasha], they were no longer obligated in mitzvoth”).

The Torah contains many mitzvoth whose observance is dependent upon residence in Eretz Yisra’él. Now that the débâcle of the spies had brought about the consequence that most of the yotz’ei Mitzrayim were going to perish in the desert, doubts began to arise in the hearts of many concerning the effectivity of the rest of the mitzvoth which they had been observing, until now, on their way to the Promised Land. The Chida writes that Qorach was amongst the doubters (ראש דוד המובא בספר תורת החיד"א על פרשתנו).

The mere existence of such a doubt, in and of itself, was not necessarily a fatal development.

There is a well known principle that ספק דאורייתא לחומרא, in case of a doubt concerning the written Torah we act stringently, as the Talmud illustrates with many examples (עיי' למשל ביצה נ: בען השאר וע"ע ספר ארעא דרבנן סי' קס"ו). The holy nation which had come into being a Sinai would surely have risen to the occasion.

Yet, there is one case in the Torah in which a doubtful observance cannot take place. That case is Shabbath.

The observance of Shabbath has two purposes: On the one hand, it proclaims, each week, that Ha-Shem created the world in seven days (Exodus XX, 8-11), and on the other, it commemorates Israel’s liberation from Egyptian bondage (Deuteronomy V, 12-15). Bnei Noach, who are not obligated to observe the Torah’s 613 mitzvoth, are not permitted to engage in Shabbath observance (Genesis VLLL, 22; ע"ע סנהדרין נ"ח:). The reason is that these demonstrations are the essence of Israel’s mission as the ממלעת כהנים וגוי קדוש (“kingdom of kohanim and holy nation;” Exodus XIX, 6) which necessitates all of the other mitzvoth. Clearly, if there is doubt concerning the obligation to observe them, there is doubt concerning Shabbath.

So, we can see, those who considered their status doubtful were in a quandary: How were they to behave? If they were still bnei Noach and not obligated in mitzvoth because they were not going to settle the Holy Land, they were forbidden to observe Shabbath; if, on the other hand, they had become fully obligated in the mitzvoth at Sinai despite the fact that they would never be able to observe many of them, they were obligated to observe Shabbath. What would be the right thing to do?

C.

In my comments on Parshath Va-Yéshev two years ago, I noted that the Chida establishes elsewhere that the dispute between Yosef and his brothers was really centered on their halachic status: The brothers believed believed that their voluntary observance of the Torah before it had been commanded rendered them בני ישראל גמורים, full bnei Yisra’él with a status equal to that which would be granted at Sinai, whilst Yosef believed that they were still bnei Noach (ספר פרשת דרכים, דרוש א' דה"מ הנראה אצלי).

If so, then Yosef had already had to deal with the question of how, as a ben Noach who voluntarily assumed the obligations of Torah, he was to handle the question of Shabbath.

A question very like this one once came before Rabbi Ya’aqov Ettlinger, the rabbi of Altona (Hamburg) in the mid-19th century and world-renowned poséq in his day. It seems that a certain man had presented himself for conversion to a béyth din in Jerusalem, where he had taken upon himself the mitzvoth, and undergone circumcision. Medical difficulties resulting from the circumcision precluded his going into a miqvah to complete the process for quite some time. The question arose: What was the fellow’s status concerning Sabbath observance? Was he to be considered Jewish already, or not quite yet?

The controversy divided the holy city, and someone thought to ask Rabbi Ettlinger. In his t’shuva, the rav responded שצווי שהיתת ישראל ואזהרת שביתת בני נח אינם מענין אחד שבזה תלוי בל"ט מלאכות ובזה תלוי במלאכת טורח ויגיעה מצאנו אפילו למי שלבו נוקפו לומר שגר שמל ולא טבל מותר לקיים שבת פשר דבר ע"י שיעשה מלאכת יגיעה שאינה מל"ט מלאכות כגון שישא משא ברה"י כן נראה לענ"ד (“that the commandment that Israel rest [on the Sabbath] and the admonition concerning resting for non-Jews do not concern the same subject, for the former relates to the 39 mlachoth [forbidden on the Sabbath] and the latter relates to troublesome or laborious work; we found that even for one whose heart inclines to say that a gér who was circumcised and not immersed is permitted to observe the Sabbath, the meaning of the thing is that he perform [some] mlecheth yegi’â which is not [one] of the 39 mlachoth, for instance, that he carry a load within a private domain; so does it seem, in my humble opinion;” שו"ת בנין ציון סי' צ"א).

Now, there is a general prohibition of carrting something from a private domain to a public domain on the Sabbath. Needless to say, this dows not apply to one’s attire, properly worn. Hence, bnei Yisra’él, who are obligated to wear tzitziyoth on the corners of a four-cornered garment, such tzitziyoth are an integral part of their attire, and may be worn from one domain to the other; for bnei Noach, who are not so obligated, wearing tzitziyoth from one domain to the other is arguably carrying. In this way, I suggested, the doubtful convert could deal with his doubt: If he was indeed a kosher convert, he was obligated in tzitzith, and going from one domain to the other wearing them was not problematic; if he was not yet a convert, then wearing tzitzith and moving from one domain to the other would be enough of a m’lacha to constitute a violation of Shabbath.

This, I suggested, is what Yosef was about when he returned to Potifar’s house לעשות מלאכתו (“to do his m’lacha;” Genesis XXXIX, 11); it was his way of coping with Shabbath.

D.

So the yotz’ei Mitzrayim who were in doubt concerning their status had an example from Yosef ha-tzaddiq telling them how to cope with the doubtful mitzvoth of Shabbath, and Qorach, as a member of the group, was aware of their considerations.

When he decided upon his rebellion against Moshe’s authority, and wished to decouple a sizable group of Israel from the Torah to constitute his sect, he could not deny that the Torah had been given; everyone, after all, had been at Sinai. What he could do, however, was to distort the mitzvoth, to dispute that Moshe was interpreting them correctly.

By seizing on the mitzva of tzitzith, and emphasizing the detail of t’chéleth over the strings themselves, he would be able to persuade his followers that a tallith made entirely of t’chéleth surely did fulfill the mitzva, and was therefore exampt from tzitzith. If so, in order to avoid illicit Sabbath observance, it would be necessary for them to do something else, some m’lacha clearly part of the thirty-nine forbidden categories. Once started down that path, he reasoned, עבירה גוררת עבירה, one violation leads to another (אבות פ"ד מ"ב), and they would be on the way to decoupling themselves from the Torah, and so from their teacher, Moshe, G-d forbid.

The alternate thesis, the same mishna tells us, is also true: מצוה גוררת מצוה, one mitzva leads to another. Where Qorach sought to apply the principle negatively, we can apply it positively, strengthen our observance, and come closer to the Torah and to G-d.

Parshath Shlach (Numbers XIII,1-XV,41) 6/20/08

A.

ויהיו בני ישראל במדבר וימצאו איש מקשש עצים ביום השבת: ויקריבט אתו המצאים אתו מקשש עצים אל משה ואל אהרן ואל כל העדה: ויניחו אתו במשמר כי לא פרש מה יעשה לו: ויאמר ד' אל משה מות יומת האיש רגום אתו באבנים כל העדה מחוץ למחנה: ויביאו אתו כל העדה אל מחוץ למחנה וירגמו אתו באבנים וימת כאשר צוה ד' את משה: (“And the bnei Yisra’él were in the desert and they found a man gathering wood on the Sabbath day. And those finding that gatherer of wood brought him close to Moshe and to Aharon and to the whole community. And they placed him under guard, for it had not been clarified what was to be done with him. And Ha-Shem said to Moshe, 'Dying, the man shall be put to death; pile him up with stones, the whole community outside the camp.' And the whole community brought him outside the camp, and piled him with stones, and he died, as Ha-Shem had commanded Moshe;” XIII, 32-36).

The Talmud tells us that this “gatherer of wood” (m’qoshésh ‘etzim) was in fact Tzlofchad ben Chefer of the tribe of M’nashe (cf. Numbers XXVII, 1-11): וכן הוא אומר "ויהיו בני ישראל במדבר וימצאו איש" וגו' ולהלן הוא אומר "אבינו מת במדבר", מה להלן צלפחד אף כאן צלפחד, דברי רבי עקיבא. אמר לו רבי יהודה בן בתירא, עקיבא, בין כך ובין כך אתה עתיד ליתן את הדין. אם כדבריך, התורה כסתו, אתה מגלה אותו?! ואם לאו, אתה מוציא לעז על אותו צדיק (“And so it says, ‘And the bnei Yisra’él were in the desert and found a man....’, and later on it says, ‘Our father died in the desert,’ just as later on [it refers to] Tzlofchad, so here [it refers to] Tzlofchad, [in] the words of Rabbi ‘Aqiva. Rabbi Yehuda ben Betheira said to him, ‘Aqiva, one way or the other you are going to be held accountable. If it is as you say, the Torah concealed it, and you are revealing it?! And if not, then you are heaping scorn on that tzaddiq;” שבת צ"ו:).

Rabbi ‘Aqiva deduces from the wording of both verses, through the second rule of Talmudic logic, the gzeira shava, that the “wood gatherer” and Tzlofchad are one and the same. Rabbi Yehuda ben Betheira protests that either way, Rabbi ‘Aqiva is in the wrong: He has either revealed what the Torah wished to keep hidden, or he has defamed an innocent man. In either case, Tzlofchad’s reputation is ruined for all time.

The gmara continues: ואלא הא גמר גזירה שוה! ג"ש לא גמר (“But [Rabbi ‘Aqiva] learnt a gzeira shava! [Rabbi Yehuda ben Betheira] did not learn that gzeira shava;” שם, צ"ז. ).

The exchange is really quite remarkable. If Rabbi ‘Aqiva had reason to believe that a gzeira shava existed concerning these two verses, Rashi tells us, א"כ לא כסתו התורה דהוה לי' כמפורש (“If so, the Torah did not conceal it; for [Rabbi ‘Aqiva], it was as though it was stated explicitly”).

So if Rabbi Yehuda ben Betheira disagreed with Rabbi ‘Aqiva, fair enough; what lies behind his rather sharp rebuke of Rabbi ‘Aqiva?

B.

Our question is sharpened when we note that there are numerous other instances in which Tanna’im and Amora’im differ sharply concerning one or another aspect of the character of a Biblical personage which becomes clear only when viewed through the Talmudic lens, and yet do not engage in such provocative rhetoric.For instance, we find a dispute in which a number of Chachamim take up sides as to whether or not the first man was basically a tzaddiq or a rasha‘, and yet none of those who hold the former view accuse those who hold the latter of defamation of character (סנהדרין ל"ח:, יד הרמ"ה שם, וע"ע עירובין י"ח: ).

Another example may be found concerning Yosef. The Torah testifies that he returned to his master’s house on an Egyptian holiday לעשות מלאכתו, “to do his work” (Genesis XXXIX, 11), and Rav and Shmu’el differ as to whether the term means actual work, or hanky-panky with his master’s wife, who had complained that she was sick and stayed home from the festivities. Yet, Rav does not accuse Shmu’el of impugning Yosef’s character (סוטה ל"ו:).

In yet another example, the Torah attests נח איש צדיק תמים הי' בדרתיו (“Noach was a perfectly righteous man in his generations;” Genesis VI, 9), and Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Laqish square off as to whether “in his generations” means that he was all the more praiseworthy and righteous despite his debased generation, or that he was righteous only with respect to the depravity of his generation. Yet again, there is no accusation of character assassination (סנהדרין ק"ט.).

So, as we can see, Rabbi Yehuda ben Betheira’s characterization of Rabbi ‘Aqiva because of his opinion is quite exceptional.

C.

There is a famous passage in which Yechezqel is shown a valley strewn with dry, human bones. G-d commands the prophet to speak, and the bones are again clothed in flesh and resurrected (Ezekiel XXXVII, 1-14).

The Talmud says of these bones, אלו בני אפרים שמנו לקץ וטעו, שנאמר "ובני אפרים שותלח וברד בנו ותחת ובנו ואלעדה בנו ותחת בנו: וזבד בנו ושותלח בנו ועזר ואלעד והרגום אנשי גת הנולדים בארץ וגו' ויתאבל אפרים אביהם ויבאו אחיו לנחמו" (“These are the bnei Efrayim who calculated the end [of the Egyptian exile] and erred, as it is said, ‘And bnei Efrayim, Shuthelach and Bered his son, and Tachath and his son and El‘ada his son and Tachath his son. And Zavad his son and Shuthelach his son and ‘Ezer and El‘ad, and the men of Gath who were born in the land killed them.... And Efrayim their father mourned, and his brothers came to comfort him;” I Chronicles VII, 20-22).

It was the whitening bones of these bnei Efrayim, who had made an early and ill-fated dash for freedom from Egyptian bondage, which G-d feared would dismay the bnei Yisra’él during the Exodus, פן ינחם העם בראותם מלחמה ושבו מצרימה (“lest the people have regrets when they see warfare and return to Egypt;” Exodus XIII, 17).

And the Talmud tells us מתים שהחי' יחזקאל עלו לארץ ישראל ונשאו נשים ויולידו בנים ובנות. עמד ר"י בן בתירא על רגליו ואמר, אני מבני בניהם ואלו תפילין שהניח לי אבי אבא מהם (“The dead whom Yechezqel revived immigrated to Eretz Yisra’él and married women and sired sons and daughters. Rabbi Yehuda ben Betheira stood up on his feet and said, 'I am from their descendants, and these are the t’fillin which my father’s father left me from them;'” סנהדרין צ"ב:).

With a little thought, this clears the matter up.

A gzeira shava, which depends on the similarity of two words in disparate verses, requires a legitimate tradition that the relationship exists in order to be valid. This only stands to reason, since all manner of weird conclusions could result from the random comparison of like words in any two verses. Rabbi ‘Aqiva, then, and most of his contemporaries were quite convinced of the existence of such a tradition concerning Tzlofchad, one which dated all the way back to the actual incident described in our parasha.

But Rabbi Yehuda ben Betheira, whose ancestor had been whitening bones in the desert at the time of the incident of the m’qoshésh ‘etzim, had no such tradition; his ancestor had been revived only during the time of Yechezqel, during the Babylonian exile, long after the event. Hence, his vehement protests that there was no reason to defame Tzlofchad, whether by saying something untrue, or by revealing what was meant to be hidden. For him, there was no such gzeira shava, and he therefore questioned the propriety of Rabbi ‘Aqiva’s making explicit what, for him, the Oral Torah had not stated explicitly.

D.

Here is a striking illustration of how utterly accurate and reliable was the transmission of the Torah tradition to Chazal, and how that tradition clarifies and illuminates the Biblical texts and the incidents they report.

Parshath Naso (Numbers IV,21-VII,79) 6/6/08

A.

Our parasha describes the ordeal of the sota, a woman whose husband has reason to be suspicious that she has been disloyal, but is unable to press a claim in court. The woman, of course, has denied all wrongdoing, but her denials do not allay her husband’s suspicions. In such a case, the Torah tells us, והביא האיש את אשתו אל הכהן וגו' (“And the man will bring his wife to the kohén....” V, 15), whereupon an elaborate ritual ensues. The purpose of the ritual is in part psychodrama, designed, as Rashi explains in an insightful comment, כדי ליגעה ותטרוף דעתה ותודה (“to exhaust her and fray her nerves so that she might confess”) in the event that she really is guilty, and thereby be spared the rest of the ordeal.

As the process nears its climax, we read: והעמיד הכהן את האשה לפני ד' ופרע את ראש האשה וגו' (“And the kohén will make the woman stand before Ha-Shem, and he will uncover the woman’s head....” ibid., 18) whence we learn, Rashi writes following the Sifrei, מכאן לבנות ישראל שגלוי הראש גנאי להן (“from here [we learn] that uncovering the head is a disgrace for daughters of Israel”). Which brings to mind an odd incident recorded in the Talmud.

B.

כי הא דרב אדא בר אהבה חזיי' לההיא כותית דהות לבישא כרבלתא בשוקא, סבר דבת ישראל היא, קם קרעי' מנה. אגלאי מלתא דכותית היא, שיימוה בארבע מאות זוזי. א"ל מה שמך? אמרה לי' מתון. אמרה לה מתון, מתון ארבע מאות זוזי שויא! (“Rav Adda bar Ahava once saw a certain non-Jewish girl wearing a provocative headdress in the marketplace; he thought she was a daughter of Israel, and arose and tore it from her. When it was revealed that she was non-Jewish, [the court] evaluated her damage at 400 zuz. [Rav Adda bar Ahava] asked her, 'What is your name?' She told him, 'Mathun.' He said, 'Mathun, Mathun is worth 400 zuz!'”; ברכות כ. ).

With a little help from the commentators, we can make this story a bit less cryptic. The Massoreth ha-Shas quotes the ‘Aruch as explaining that the headdress which the girl was wearing was considered unacceptable for Jewish girls שהוא פריצות ומביא לדבר עבירה (because it was immodest and [intended to] lead one into sin”). Hence, Rav Adda bar Ahava’s outrage when he thought that he saw a Jewish girl wearing such an item of clothing.

Rashi explains his odd remark on hearing the girl’s name: שמה גרם לי , “Her name caused me” to make a pun: Mathan is two hundred in Aramaic; thus, her name, repeated twice, was equivalent to 400, the amount of his fine. Alternatively, the name itself means something like patient, from the same root as the Hebrew word himtin, “to wait patiently, hold off, go slow”; hence, writes Rashi, Rav Adda bar Ahava was shaking his head ruefully, saying אם המתנתי הייתי משתכר ד' מאות זוז (“If I had held off, I would have been spared 400 zuz”). The Maharsha notes that the fine is in line with the Talmud’s assessment against anyone who embarrasses a Jewish woman in public by uncovering her hair (עיי' בבא קמא צ.).

Fair enough, but the Vilna Ga’on (Gra)is still bothered by the remark (עיי' ליקוטים שבסוף ספר דבר אלי' על איוב). It would have made sense, he argues, if the fine had been 200 zuz, to look for a hint in the girl’s name. What sort of hint is to be found by doubling the name, he wonders. What extra meaning can be gleaned from saying her name twice?

צריך עיון; the Gra leaves his question unanswered. Perhaps we can find an answer for it.

C.

To begin looking for an answer to the Gra’s question, we turn elsewhere in the Talmud, where we learn: כל האומר רחב רחב מיד נקרי (“Anyone who says, ‘Rachav. Rachav, immediately suffers a nocturnal emission;” תענית ה:). Why? Rachav, of course, was the “professional” woman who plied her trade in Jericho, and who befriended the spies sent by Yehoshua bin Nun to that city before it was placed under siege (cf. Joshua II). As to the doubling of her name, our attention is drawn to the midrash on Genesis XXII, 11: "ויקרא אליו מלאך ד' מן השמים ויאמר אברהם אברהם" תני ר' חייא לשון חיבה, לשון זירוז (“‘And the angel of Ha-Shem called to him from the heavens and said, Avraham, Avraham!’; Rabbi Chiyya taught, '[This is] an expression of affection, an expression of encouragement;'” בראשית רבא פנ"ו סי' ט' ).

D.

“Affection” and “encouragement” are a two-edged weapon. One can feel affection for, and encourage, someone engaged in an action wholly noble and admirable, such as Avraham complete faith in Ha-Shem, such that he did not hesitate when asked to sacrifice his entire future and legacy; or it is possible to entice and encourage someone in rather less admirable actions, such as Rachav was wont to do.

Both senses, I think, are operative in Rab Adda bar Ahava’s pun. On the one hand, regardless of the girl’s ethnicity or religious affiliation, it was apparently obvious from her mode of dress that she was advertising in the marketplace, and her comportment and dress were such that, when he thought he saw a Jewish girl behaving in this way, “Mathun, Mathun,” Rav Adda bar Ahava felt driven to action.

On the other hand, mathun, mathun is a principle which deserves to be encouraged; one should try to avoid precipitous action, think and consider. Perhaps Rav Adda should have approached the young woman, asked her who she was (presumably from the name “Mathun” it would have been suffieciently obvious that she was not Jewish), and thereby spared her the embarrassment, and himself the fine.

Parshath B’Har (Leviticus XXV,2-XXVI,2) 5/16/08

A.

דבר אל בני ישראל ואמרת אליהם כי תבאו אל הארץ אשר אני נתן לכם ושבתה הארץ שבת לד': (“Speak to the bnei Yisra’él and you shall say to them, "For you will come to the land which I am giving you, and the land will rest, a shabbath la-Shem;” XXV, 2).

At first blush our verse seems repetitive and unnecessary, especially in light of the next two verses, in which we discover that we are to sow and reap crops for six years, and tend our vineyards for six years, ובשנה השביעית שבת שבתון יהי' לארץ שדך לא תזרע וכרמך לא תזמר (“And in the seventh year the land will have a sabbath of resting, your field you shall not sow and your vineyard you shall not tend”). Under the circumstances, how does our verse add to the content?

A second issue is opened a bit later in our parasha, where we find: ועשיתם את חקתי וגו' (“And you shall carry out My laws....” v. 18), on which Ramban comments: יזהיר בחוקים מפני השמטה והיובל הנזכרים וגו' (“[G-d] warns us about [His] laws because of the shmitta and yovél mentioned [beforehand]....”). In other words, shmitta and yovél are the chuqqim, the laws, concerning which He is here admonishing us.

This becomes very interesting in light of what Chazal tell us concerning the first verse in next week’s parasha: "אם בחקותי תלכו", בנוהג שבעולם מלך ב"ו גוזר גזירה, אם רצה לקיימה הרי הוא מקיימה ואם לאו סוף שמקיימה על ידי אחרים. אבל הקב"ה אינו כן, אלא גוזר גזירה הוא מקיימה תחלה וגו' (“’If you will go according to My laws;’ In the world’s practice, if a flesh-and-blood king issues a decree, if he wishes, he keeps it, and if not, it is kept by others. Not so the Holy One, Blessed is He; rather, the One who issues the decree keeps it first....” ויק"ר פל"ה סי' ג', ועיי"ש במתנות כהונה).

Torah sources abound with examples of G-d observing His own mitzvoth: For example, He lays t’fillin (ברכות ו.); He observes the sabbath (ב"ר פי"א סי' ה'); He comforts mourners (סוטה י"ד.); He visits the sick (ב"מ פ"ו.), and so on. If shmitta and yovél are amongst the mitzvoth which G-d Himself observes, it is worthwhile trying to discern the form that observance takes.

B.

The sfarim ha-qdoshim (עיי' למשל ספר נחלת בנינין מצוה פ"ה סי' ב', פרדס יוסף פרשתנו סי' י"ד, ודברי יהונתן לר' יהונתן אייבעשיץ, ריש פר' ויצא) assert that the year of Creation was a yovél, such that the heavens and the earth were created in Elul of the yovél, and man’s advent occurred on Rosh ha-Shana of the following year. Therein, they tell us, lies the root of the mitzva of yovél: The earth, when it came into existence, was ownerless (since man had not yet made his appearance); in commemoration of that fact, then, the Patriarchs counted the yovél, and every fifty years the land returned to its pristine, ownerless state.

The Talmud records a dispute concerning the counting of the yovél: ורבנן שנת חמשים אתה מונה ואי אתה מונה שנת חמשים ואחת לאפוקי מדרבי יהודה, דאמר שנת חמשים עולה לכאן ולכאן, קא משמע לן דלא (“And the Rabbis [hold], You count the fiftieth year and do not count the fifty-first year, to detract from the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said, "The fiftieth year counts for both [the yovél and the first year of the next cycle]," so it comes to tell us that it does not;” ראש השנה ט.).

In other words, for the Rabbanan, the yovél cycle constitutes a full fifty years and the next cycle begins with the fifty-first year, while for Rabbi Yehuda, the fiftieth year is both the yovél and the first year of the next cycle; in effect, for Rabbi Yehuda, each yovél cycle consists of forty-nine years (עיי' רש"י שם).

Elsewhere, the Talmud establishes concerning everything said by the Tanna’im, that אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים (“Both [sides of a dispute] are the living words of G-d”; גיטין ו: וערובין י"ג: וע"ע חידושי הריטב"א שם). In other words, G-d somehow reconciles both opinions. In this case, I think, this means that we must look for the very first yovél which would be able to coincide with both opinions, the year 2450, either forty-ninth yovél according to the Rabbanan, or the fiftieth according to Rabbi Yehuda to discern Divine observance.

Now, elsewhere the Talmud tells us that the Exodus occurred in the year 2448 after Creation (ע"ז ט.), and that the sin of the m’ragglim, the “spies” (cf. Numbers XIII) occurred on the night of 9 Av of the second year of the Exodus, i.e. 2449 (תענית כ"ט.). Had the m’ragglim not committed their fateful error, therefore, and brought about the panic in Israel which extended their sojourn in the desert, they presumably would have begun to cross into the Holy Land to take it over on the morning of 9 Av 2449.

Rabbi S. R. Hirsch, commenting on Numbers XIII, 2, tells us that the m’ragglim entered the Holy Land from the southeastern corner. This tells us both the position of Israel at the time, and that Israel would have had to proceed diagonally across the face of the country in order to reach its northwestern corner.

Rashi (ibid., v. 25) tells us that the area of the Holy Land is 400 x 400 parsa, and that to cross it from east to west on foot is an effort of 40 days, 10 parsa being the distance a normal man can travel on foot in a day. The Talmud tells us (סוכה ח.) that the diagonal of a square one ama on a side is approximately 1 and 2/5 ama. Therefore, to cross from corner to corner of Eretz Yisra’él would take 2/5 longer than the forty days necessary to cross from east to west, or 56 days.
However, as Tosafoth point out (שם ד"ה כמה), this figure is only approximate, and the true value is slightly larger, closer to 56 and 1/2 days. Then, too, we must note that the tribe destined to take possession of the northwestern corner of the country was Dan (cf. Deuteronomy XXXIII, 22, Rashi ad loc.) and Dan was Israel’s rearguard in the desert (Numbers X, 25). Therefore, Dan had to traverse the entire area occupied by the rest of Israel in order to complete the occupation of their part of the country. The Talmud tells us that the camp of Israel occupied an area of 3x3 parsa (עירובין נ"ה:), so add another half-day (roughly) for the very last member of Dan to arrive on site, bringing us to 57 days.

Next, from Joshua I, 11, we can discern that to prepare to move out, Israel required three more days. Therefore, the total number of days in our calculation rises to 60.

Now consider: Had they received the order to move on 9 Av, there would have been 22 more days in Av (שאב תמיד מלא, עיי' רמב"ם הל' קידוש החודש פ"ח הל' ד'-ה'), another 29 days in the month of Elul, and nine more days in Tishrei until Yom Kippur 2450, when the yovél would have been decreed. This, then, is what the verse with which we started is coming to tell us: That the Divine intent was for Israel to arrive in the Holy Land during the Great Yovél, the first year that would have been a yovél according to everybody, and take possession of the land quickly and painlessly, since the Canaanites’ “ownership” would have been negated. The next verses, then, refer to the interval until the next shmitta year following that initial yovél.

But, as we know, it did not happen that way. The m’ragglim faltered, Israel panicked, and they spent 40 years in the desert.

So what did happen?

C.

The Talmud tells us: ת"ר לפי שראה אדם הראשון יום שמתמעט והולך אמר אוי לי שמא בשביל שסרחתי עולם חשוך בעדי וחוזר לתוהו ובוהו כו' כיון שראה תקופת טבת וראה יום שמאריל והולך, אמר מנהגו של עולם הוא וגו' (“The Rabbis taught: When adam ha-rishon saw the days growing shorter [immediately after his creation, in the autumn]. he said: 'Woe is me, perhaps because I sinned the world is growing dark because of me and returning to chaos.' When he saw [the winter solstice] and the days began to grow longer, he said, 'It is the way of the world....'” ע"ז ח.), whence we learn that, because at first he did not understand what was going on, the first man did not begin his count of the years until the first Rosh ha-Shana after his creation, i.e., the beginning of his second year (עיי' רמב"ם הל' קידוש החודש פ"ו ה"ח, פירוש שם).

In other words, the first man did not begin to count to the first yovél until the second year of Creation; thus, the first yovél according to the human accounting occurred in year 51. It is from this point, then, that the dispute between the Rabbanan and Rabbi Yehuda takes effect, the Rabbanan counting fifty years to the next yovél (101), and Rabbi Yehuda counting forty-nine (100).

Now, 1656 years after the Creation, another cataclysmic, transcendent event occurred: the Mabbul. Chazal are at pains to tell us that the laws of nature were suspended during that event, and so the year of the Mabbul was also not included in the count by subsequent generations (ירושלמי פסחים פ"א ה"א, ב"ר פכ"ה סי' ב', ילקוט שמעוני נ"ז, וע"ע ביאור הגר"א לחושן משפט בהשמטות לסי' ס"ז).

With this in mind, we note, then, that the first yovél to meet the criteria of both the Rabbanan and Rabbi Yehuda according to the count of mortal man is 2502, forty-nine cycles of fifty years from the first yovél for the Rabbanan, or fifty cycles of forty-nine years each for Rabbi Yehuda. This is the date Torah sources assign to the final allocation of Eretz Yisra’él amongst the tribes of Israel (Joshua XVIII, XXI, סדר עולם רבה).

D.

This affords us a rare glimpse of how Divine Providence functions behind the scenes of history.

Had the m’ragglim not presented the report that they did, and/or had Israel not received it and panicked as they did, had they instead faithfully proceeded, trusting in Ha-Shem’s promise that He was giving them the Holy Land (as He had repeatedly said), it seems, that they would have taken possession of it with the minimum amount of fuss, at the beginning of 2450, the Great Yovél according to the Divine count.

As it was, they spent forty years in the desert, until nearly all of the yotz’ei Mitzrayim, had perished in the desert. Then, in 2488, under Yehoshua bin Nun, they finally entered Eretz Yisra’él. But condemned by their failure to use primarily human resources, it took fourteen years of difficult warfare to accomplish what could have been done in minimal time on the Divine cheshbon.

This year is a shmitta year, and also the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the modern state of Israel. It is, in light of the above, a fitting occasion to reflect on the extremely difficult history which led up to the founding of that state, as well as subsequent events, in light of the Zionist pioneers’ wholsesale abandonment of their patrimony, the Torah, in contrast to what, perhaps, might have been.

By all accounts, this is also the most widely observed shmitta in the history of the state, thank G-d. In its merit, may we be zocheh to see and understand, very soon, the resolution of this Divine cheshbon, too.