Parashath Va-Ethhannan (Deuteronomy III,23-VII,11) 8/13/11

A.

In this week’s parasha we encounter a verse well-known to every synagogue-goer: וזאת התורה אשר שם משה לפני בני ישראל (“And this is the Torah [vë-zoth ha-Torah] which Moshe placed before the bënei Yisra’él”; IV, 44). The verse is recited by the congregation after a Torah reading has been completed, during hagbahath ha-Torah, when the scroll is lifted preparatory to being closed and covered for return to the aron ha-qodesh.

The actual context in which the verse occurs is very interesting. The preceding three verses (vv. 41-43) concern Moshe’s naming the three ‘arei miqlat, the “cities of refuge,” which were located east of the Jordan River: אז יבדיל משה שלש ערים בעבר הירדן מזרחה שמש: לנס שמה רוצח אשר ירצח את רעהו בבלי דעת והוא לא שנא לו מתמול שלשם ונס אל אחת מן הערים האל וחי: את בצר במדבר בארץ במישר לראובני ואת ראמות בגלעד לגדי ואת גולן בבשן למנשי: (“Then Moshe distinguished three cities on the Jordan bank eastward. To flee thither, a murderer who unwittingly murders his fellow, whom he was not hating yesterday or the day before, and he flees to one of these cities and lives: Betzer, in the wilderness on the plain of the Rë’uvéni, and Ramoth in the Gil‘ad of the Gadi, and Golan, in the Bashan of the Mënashi”). Then, immediately, vë-zoth ha-Torah, with the conjunctive prefix which usually marks continuity with what has gone before.

Why?

B.

Our question is asked by the Ma’asei la-Melech (a commentary published together with the séfer Hafétz Hayyim ‘al ha-Torah). He begins his answer by citing Rashi’s words on v. 41: ואע"פ שאינן קולטות עד שיבדלו אותן שבארץ כנען אמר משה מצוה שאפשר לקיימה אקיימנה (“...and even though they were not effective until those which were in Eretz Këna‘an were designated, Moshe said, [Any] mitzva which it is possible to fulfill, I shall fulfill it”). From this, the Ma‘asei la-Melech concludes: שמוכח מזה שאם אי אפשר לאדם לקיים את כל המצות בשלמות מ"מ כל מה שיש ביכלתו לעשות יראה לקיים, אף אם לא יוכל עכשיו לגמור הדבר כולו. וזהו מה שאמר הכתוב אחרי אשר הבדיל משה שלש הערים שבעבר הירדן, "וזאת התורה" כו' שלכאורה אין כל קשר וחבור לפסוק זה לענין של הבדלת הערים, אבל לפי הנ"ל ניחא, היינו שהורה הוראה זו, להבדיל שלש הערים בעבר הירדן, אעפ"י שאינן קולטות עדיין, וללמד לבני ישראל, שגם המה יתנהגו באופן כזה, שכמה שיוכלו לקיים רצון השי"ת, יראו לקיים אף שלא יוכלו לגמור הדבר, וזאת התורה אשר שם משה לפני בני ישראל. (“...that it is demonstrable from this that if it is impossible for a person to keep all of the mitzvoth in perfection, nonetheless everything which is within his ability to do he should be careful to keep, even if he is not able the finish the matter entirely now. And this is what Scripture is telling us, after Moshe distinguished the three cities across the Jordan, vë-zoth ha-Torah...., for there is apparently no connexion or link between this verse and the distinguishing of the cities, but according to the above it is resolved, i.e. that Moshe issued this ruling, to distinguish the three cities on the bank of the Jordan even though they were not yet functional, and to teach the bënei Yisra’él that they, too, should conduct themselves in this way, that to the extent that they can fulfill the ill of Ha-Shem, they should be scrupulous to do so, even if they cannot complete the matter, and this is the Torah which Moshe placed before the bënei Yisra’él”).

Rashi’s rationale for Moshe’s action is based upon the statement in the Talmud (מכות י.) that Moshe was entirely aware that his distinguishing of the three cities was entirely without effect until the cities west of the Jordan would be designated, and Moshe knew that he would not live to see that. Nonetheless, his intense desire to perform mitzvoth was such that he could not resist the chance at least to begin naming the six ‘arei miqlat, and it was this lust for mitzvoth, for fulfilling G-d’s will in this world, which he sought to impart to Israel, whence our fascinating juxtaposition.

With this in mind, we can appreciate some of the things which Hazal say about Moshe; for instance, "אוהב כסף" – אוהב מצוה "לא ישבע כסף" לא ישבע מן המצות כו' שהרי משה כמה מצות וצדקות עשה כו' דכתוב "אז יבדיל וגו'" (“‘One who loves silver [kesef]’ – one who loves mitzvoth – ‘will never be sated with kesef’ [Ecclesiastes V, 13], will never be sated with mitzvoth...For how many mitzvoth and acts of justice did Moshe perform... as it is written, ‘Then Moshe distinguished....”; קהלת רבה פ"ה סי' י' יע"ע ויקרא רבס פכ"ב סי' א'). As many mitzvoth as Moshe performed, his only ambition was to perform more. In this connection, it is perhaps worth pointing out that the meaning of the root kaf-samech-pé which under-lies kesef is “yearning, longing”; the object of Moshe’s deepest longings, then, analogous to a miser’s lust for money, was doing mitzvoth.

Similarly, the Talmud asks: מפני מה נתאוה משה ליכנס לא"י וכי לאכול מפרי' הוא צריך אלא כך אמר משה הרבה מצות נצטוו ישראל ואין מתקיימין אלא בא"י אכנס אני בארץ כדי שיתקיימו כולן על ידי וגו' (“Why did Moshe lust [nith’avve] to enter Eretz Yisra’él? Did he need to eat of its fruit? Rather, Moshe said, Israel have been commanded many mitzvoth which are only fulfilled in Eretz Yisra’él; let me enter the Land so that they will all be fulfilled by me!”; סוטה י"ד.), whence we see again that Moshe’s motivation was the opportunity to perform yet more mitzvoth.

However, the fact is that this appears to contradict a ma’amar Hazal: כל מי שמתחיל במצוה ואינו גומרה ובא אחר וגומרה נקראת על שמו שגמרה (“Anyone who begins a mitzva and does not finish it, and another comes and finishes it, it is called by the name of the one who finished it”; דברים רבה פ"ח סי' ה'), i.e. the first party to the transaction gets no credit for the final performance of the mitzva. So how do we reconcile the two?

The answer, it seems to me, is implicit in the phrase vë-zoth ha-Torah: Moshe wished to communicate to Israel his love for mitzvoth, a lust for mitzvoth, such that it did not matter to him whether or not he got credit for performing it; it was enough to do, as the Ma‘asei la-Melech says, whatever was possible to do.

C.

The phrase zoth ha-Torah occurs in other contexts as well. For instance, in Numbers XIX, 14, we find: זאת התורה אדם כי ימות באהל (“Zoth ha-Torah, a person for he dies in a tent”), which finds explanation in the Talmud: אין דברי תורה מתקיימין אלא במי שממית עצמו עליהם (“Words of Torah are only fulfilled by one who kills himself over them”; גיטין נ"ו:), and the Maharsha elucidates further that such a person is ממית גופו ומסלק ממנו מותר התאוה (“killing his body [in that] he eliminates from himself excess lust [ta’ava]”), i.e. he places himself firmly in control of his physical nature and its animating yétzer ha-ra‘.

Similarly, in Leviticus VII,37 we read: זאת התורה לעלה למנחה ולחטאת ולאשם וגו' (“Zoth ha-Torah for the ‘ola, the minha, and the hattath and the asham....”), prompting the Talmudic question: מאי דכתיב "זאת התורה לעלה וגו" כל העוסק בתורה אין צריך לא עולה ולא מנחה ולא חטאת ולא אשם (“Anyone who engages in Torah needs neither an ‘ola nor a minha nor a hattath nor an asham”; מנחות ק"י.), whence we learn yet again of the primal and overrid-ing importance of Torah.

And finally in ibid., XIV, 54 we read: זאת התורה לכל נגעי הצרעת ולנתק: (“Zoth ha-Torah for all afflictions of tzora‘ath and for the scall”), on which Hazal ask: מניין אתה אומר כהן שבקי בנגעים ולא בנתקים, בנתקים ולא בקרחת, בנגעי אדם ולא בנגעי בגדים, בנגעי בגדים ולא בנגעי בתים שלא יראה את הנגעים ת"ל "זאת התורה לכל נגעי הצרעת וגו'" (“Whence do you say, A kohén who is expert in afflictions and not in scalls, in scalls and not in a bald patch, in afflictions of human beings and not in afflictions of clothing, in afflictions of clothing and not in afflic-tions of houses, that he not see [i.e., rule upon] the afflictions? It is taught by zoth ha-Torah for all afflictions of tzora‘ath....”; תורת כהנים פר' מצורע שם), i.e. that one who would make halachic rulings must be expert in every aspect of the field in which he intends to function.

D.

From the foregoing we conclude that the phrase zoth ha-Torah has a unique function within the Torah’s text. Whilst much of the rest of Torah is devoted to precise descriptions of the mitzvoth in all their precise detail, zoth ha-Torah has the function of delineating the atmosphere and climate within which Torah-learning and –observance are to take place; rather than laying down the letter of the law, as it were, zoth ha-Torah serves to define the spirit of the law. Through it, Moshe sought to impart values such that Torah-learning would not be a dry intellectual exercise, however stimulating, nor a set of ever more restrictive and claustrophobic rules, but the vibrant heart inspiring the noblest aspirations toward ever deeper, more meaningful, more precise and careful observance of the Torah’s mandates.

Thus, Hazal derive from it that those who would rule for others less steeped in the Torah’s wisdom must be expert in all aspects of their field; that the only way to avoid sin and truly promote Israel’s welfare is through diligent occupation in Torah; that one’s Torah-learning must be internalised, and utilised to bring the physical world under the Torah’s control; and that long and assiduous effort in this regard will serve to convert the physical ta’avoth of the yétzer ha-ra‘ into metaphysical ta’avoth for mitzvoth, so strong that it will not matter whether or not one is actually credited with a given mitzva; the sheer joy of beginning to undertake some previously unexperienced aspect of Divine ser-vice will be its own reward.

This is what we are affirming every time the Torah is read, as we assert: Vë-zoth ha-Torah asher sam Moshe li-fnei Bënei Yisra’él.

Parshath Va-Ethhannan (Deuteronomy III,23-VII,11) 7/23/10

A.

This week’s parasha contains not only Moshe’s account of the founding of Israel, the Torah nation, at Ma‘amad Har Sinai when פנים בפנים דבר ד' עמכם בהר מתוך האש (“Face to face Ha-Shem spoke with you on the mountain from amidst the fire”; V, 4) and Israel heard the ‘Asereth ha-Dibbëroth, the Ten Utterances often mischaracterized as the “Ten Commandments” (the word for commandment being mitzva, of which the Torah contains 613), but also numerous other passages familiar to us from our daily prayers, or regular participation in synagogue services or holiday rituals.

For instance, there is ואתם הדבקים בד' אלקיכם חיים כלכם היום (“And you who are clinging to Ha-Shem your G-d are living all of you today”; IV, 4), recited as the séfer Torah is being unrolled for reading on shabbath; the first paragraph of the Shëma‘, the fundamental declaration of Jewish faith recited thrice daily (VI,4-9); and also כי ישאלך בנך מחר לאמר מה העדת והחקות והמשפטים אשר צוה ד' אלקינו אתכם: ואמרת לבנך עבדים היינו לפרעה במצרים ויצאנו ד' ממצרים ביד חזקה (“For your son will ask you tomorrow to say, 'What are the testimony and the laws and the judgments which Ha-Shem our G-d has commanded you?' And you will say to your son, 'We were slaves to Pharaoh in Egypt, and Ha-Shem brought us out of Egypt with a strong hand”; ibid., 20-21).

This last is recognisable as the question which the hacham, the “wise son” asks, and the answer which the Haggada shel Pesah prescribes for him. The Haggada famously includes three other sons, the rasha‘ (“evil-doer”), the tam (“simple son”), and she-éyno yodéa‘ li-sh’ol (“one who does not know how to ask”), prescribing in each case a unique response. This, as numerous commentators on the Haggada note, demonstrates that there is no single approach to Torah education; rather, each person’s unique circumstances must be borne in mind in imparting the Torah to him.

With this in mind, let us consider an insight which I have heard in the name of Rabbi Moshe Tukatshinsky זצ"ל, late mashgiah ruhani of the Slobodka yëshiva in Bënei Bëraq.

B.

Much more than the four specific examples offered by the Haggada shel Pesah, Hazal advise us שבעים פנים בתורה, there are “seventy facets in the Torah” (במדבר רבה י"ג סי' ט"ו וע"ע זוה"ק ח"א מ"ז: ונ"ד., ח"ג רט"ז. ועוד ); each passage, each word, is subject to seventy possible interpretations.
Rabbi Tukatshinsky suggests that this number is not coincidental, citing in evidence a verse recorded in a prayer of Moshe: ימי שנותינו בהם שבעים שנה ואם בגברות שמונים שנה וגו' (“The days of our years are seventy years, and if through strength, eighty years....”; Psalms XC, 10), i.e. the normal lifespan of a human being can be expected to last about seventy years, in exceptional cases, eighty some years. Therefore, he suggests, Ha-Shem loaded seventy levels of profundity into the Torah, so that uncovering them, year by year, should be the prime occupation of our lives.

But, continues Rabbi Tukatshinsky, it is hardly fair to expect a newborn infant to engage in even the simplest Torah study; first, it is necessary for him to learn to speak, to read, and begin to acquire some mental maturity. Hence, Rabbi Tukatshinky holds that childhood is entirely a time of preparation, and that the actual obligation to being uncovering the seventy levels does not begin until the age of 13, when a boy becomes bar mitzva and is obligated to observe the Torah.

‘Ad kan Rabbi Tukatshinsky. It should be noted in passing, then, that it is here that the additional years of gëvura, of “strength” or “heroism” come into play, and also that, lë-shittatho, Rabbi Tukatshinsky passed away at the age of 83, presumably on completion of the task he had been set.

C.

The implications of Rabbi Tukatshinsky’s insight will also serve to illuminate another passage in this week’s parasha. A bit later on, we read: ולא תתחתן בם בתך לא תתן לבנו ובתו לא תקח לבנך: כי יסיר את בנך מאחרי ועבדו אלהים אחרים וחרה אף ד' בכם והשמידך מהר: (“And you will not marry into [the other nation]; your daughter shall you not give to his son, and his daughter shall you not take for your son. For he will turn your son away from Me and they will serve other gods, and Ha-Shem’s anger will flare up against you and He will destroy you swiftly”; VII, 3-4).

As Rambam points out, אחד שבעים עממין ואחד כל אומות באיסור זה (“it is the same regarding the seven [Canaanite] nations, and all [other] nations concerning this prohibition”; הל' איסורי ביאה פי"ב ה"א).
This prohibition is one of a relatively small number in the written Torah for which the Torah also provides the rationale. Israel is not a nation like the other nations. As Bil‘am said of Israel, in the first of his aborted attempts to curse them for Balaq, הן עם לבדד ישכן ובגוים לא יתחשב (“Behold a people dwells alone, and is not counted amongst the nations”; Numbers XXIII, 9). Just before Ma‘amad Har Sinai, G-d told Moshe that the purpose for which Israel was to come into being was to become His ממלכת כהנים וגוי קדוש (“kingdom of kohanim and holy nation”; Exodus XIX, 6). Israel, and therefore each individual member of Israel, was to be completely dedicated to G-d’s service, primarily elucidating His Torah, observing its tenets, and applying its principles to all of the problems of life so as to sanctify even the most mundane activities, making them all aspects of Divine service.

The reason, then, that we are not to intermarry with the nations of the world is not because they are ethnically inferior to us or less refined. Rather, it is because a native of another nation cannot be expected to possess the dedication to Ha-Shem’s service which a native of Israel should have. The inevitable result, as the Torah warns us, is that the foreigner’s family will turn your son (or your grandson, as Hazal have it [קידושין ס"ח:]) away from the dedication to Divine service, to elucidating the seventy facets of Torah, every Jew’s life’s work. (Perhaps the number of original nations, also seventy, constitutes another allusion to this concept, as a friend suggests).

Rashi famously notes the unique unity with which Israel undertook that holy purpose. Exodus XIX, 2 reports their arrival at Sinai: ויסעו מרפידים ויבאו מדבר סיני ויחנו במדבר ויחן שם ישראל נגד ההר (“And they traveled from Rëfidim, and came to the Sinai desert, and they camped in the desert; and Israel camped [va-yihan] there opposite the mountain”). Every verb in the sentence save the last is plural, prompting Rashi to comment that they uniquely camped before the mountain כאיש אחד בלב אחד (“like one man with one heart”).

D.

In the haftara read this shabbath, the navi’ sings of Israel’s redemption from the final exile: נחמו נחמו עמי יאמר אלקיכם: דברו על לב ירושלם וקראו אלי' כי מלאה צבאה כי נרצה עונה כי לקחה מיד ד' כפלים בכל חטותי': (“Be comforted, be comforted My people, your G-d will say. Speak to Jerusalem’s heart and call to her, for her populace has been filled, for her transgression is forgiven, for she has taken from Ha-Shem’s hand a double measure [kiflayim] for all her sins”; Isaiah XL, 1-2). The double measure, kiflayim, refers to the destruction of both the First and Second Temples.

Indeed, our parasha foreshadows what was to come when that perfect unity of purpose broke down, והפיץ ד' אתכם בעמים ונשארתם מתי מספר בגוים אשר ינהג אתכם שמה (“And Ha-Shem would scatter you amongst the peoples [ba-‘ammim] and you would remain few in number amongst the nations [ba-goyim] whither Ha-Shem would lead you [asher yënahég Ha-Shem ethchem shamma]”; IV, 21), in which the Ba‘al ha-Turim discerns the gimatriya of ba-‘ammim (162) equivalent to béyn ha-Bavliyyim (“amongst the Babylonians”); that of ba-goyim (61) to uv’Madai (“and in Media”, i.e. the Medio-Persian state); that of yënahég (68) to bë-Yavan (“in Greece,” i.e. the Hellenistic world); and that of shamma (365) to mé-Romiyyim, “from [the] Romans,” i.e. western civilization, the final stage of the exile from which we shall be extricated).

Hence, all of the stages of our eventual exile were known at Israel’s founding. Why has this last stage gone on so much longer than all the earlier ones?

An answer is found in comparing Rashi’s comment on Exodus XIX, 2, supra, with one he makes on XIV, 10, where we read that at Yam Suf וישאו בני ישראל את עיניהם והנה מצרים נסע אחריהם וגו' (“...the bënei Yisra’él raised their eyes and behold, Egypt was pursuing them....”). The singular participle noséa‘ modifying Mitzrayim, “Egypt,” is as exceptional as the singular verb va-yihan at Ma‘amad Har Sinai, and Rashi similarly writes that the Egyptians were בלב אחד כאיש אחד (“with one heart, like one man”).

But note the difference in word order between the above comment and this one. Rabbi Yitzhaq Hutner זצ"ל in his Pahad Yitzhaq, explains that Israel’s unity is organic, essential and necessary to Israel’s survival in the world, whilst the nations are fundamentally disunited, and come together only temporarily, when their interests coincide. Thus, Israel’s unity of purpose, the desire to serve Ha-Shem (the “single heart”), derives from that organic unity, the “single man,” whilst for the nations, the “single man” is derived from their temporarily shared desire, the “single heart.”

This aspect of the nations is discernible by the coalition of Muslim fanatics and Leftists who oppose us today, having nothing whatever in common save their hatred of Israel, the same emotion which drove the Egyptians. But Israel’s unity is through Torah, as Rabbi Sa‘adya Ga’on famously declared in his Emunoth vë-Dé‘oth: אין אומתנו אומה אלא בתורה, “Our nation is not a nation, save through the Torah.” Every attempt to reduce our nationhood to an ethnic distinction, as is true of the nations of the world, is doomed to failure.

It is incumbent on us to do all we can to restore Israel’s unity on the basis of Israel’s true Torah culture. If we do our part, and there is an אתערותא דלתתא, an “awakening here below,” there will surely be an answering אתערותא דלעילא, an “awakening Above,” as the navi predicts in the passage supra, כי א-ל רחום ד' אלקיך לא ירפל ולא ישחיתך ולא ישכח את ברית אבתיך וגו' (“For a merciful G-d is Ha-Shem your G-d; He will not leave you and will not destroy you, and will not forget your forefathers’ covenant....”; Deuteronomy IV, 31).

Parshath Va-Ethchannan (Deuteronomy III,23-VII,11) 7/31/09

A.

ואהכת את ד' אלקיך בכל לבבך וגו'(“And you will love Ha-Shem your G-d with all your heart....”; VI, 5.
As everyone possessed of a חוש חי לשפה העברית, a living sense of the Hebrew language, will attest, the word for “heart” has two variants, lév and lëvav. It is the second form which is used in our verse.

The Talmud informs us: "בכל לבבך" בשני יצריך ביצר טוב וביצר הרע (“With both your yëtzarim, with the yétzer tov and with the yétzer ha-ra‘”; ברכות נ"ד. במשנה). The Torah Tëmima points out the apparent basis of the Talmud’s insight, דכ"מ דהשם לב בא בשני ביתי"ן בא לדרוש כפילת השם (“that in every place that the word ‘heart’ appears with two béythin [as in our example] it comes to be interpreted in a double sense”,וע"ע תורה תמימה ס"פ שלח באותו הענין ). It is this “double” sense of the word that apparently motivates Chazal to see a reference to two I (the word is conventionally translated “inclinations”), one “good” (tov), the other “evil” (ra‘).

That said, whatever can it mean to “love” Ha-Shem with the yétzer ha-ra‘?

The Torah Tëmima himself asks the question, and proposes in answer: ואפשר לומר לעבדו בקיום מצות עשין ובמניעת עשיית הל"ת ומכנה את המ"ע בשם יצר טוב ע"ש הכתוב עשה טוב ואת המניעה מעשיית הל"ת בשם עבודה ביצה"ר ע"ש הכתוב סור מרע (“And it is possible to say, to serve Him by fulfilling the positive mitzvoth and by refraining from doing the negative mitzvoth, and calling the positive mitvoth by the name yétzer tov on the basis of the Scripture ‘do good,’ and refraining from doing the negative mitzvoth by the name ‘service with the yétzer ha-ra‘’ on the basis of the Scripture, ‘turn away from evil’ [Psalms XXXIV, 10]”).

This seems somehow incomplete. Surely “turning away from evil” can be as much a “good” action as actually doing something. It would seem, from the Torah Tëmima;’s description, that one does not serve G-d “through” the yétzer ha-ra‘ or “by means of” the yétzer ha-ra‘, as the instrumental prefix bë- in our mishna supra seems to imply, so much as by simply avoiding it.
And so our question returns, and we must dig a bit deeper.

B.

“Inclination” is not a very accurate translation of the word yétzer (the English word would appear much more accurately translated by Hebrew nëtiya). Yétzer is built on the root yud-tzadi-réysh, which underlies one of the three fundamental verbs denoting the Divine actions which brought the physical cosmos into being (bara’, yatzar, ‘asa). The root itself is formed from the more fundamental tzadi-vav-réysh which conveys a sense of delineation, shape, form (cf., e.g., such words as tzura, tziyyur). The radical prefix yud adds a sense of directionality to the fundamental meaning, and the verb comes to mean “to impart shape or form” to something. In other contexts than Creation, it refers to the work done by a potter in making a clay vessel. A yétzer, then, is the concrete result or object of such action.

וייצר ד' את האדם וגו' (“And Ha-Shem formed the human being....”; Genesis II, 7). Chazal note that the verb is deliberately written somewhat anomalously with two yudin to tell us that the adam’s formation resulted from the amalgamation of two yëtzarim, more fundamental forms, one physical, finite, and perishable, subject to the principle of entropy (the true root sense of the word ra‘, as is evident from other uses of the root; cf., e.g., Psalms II, 10), and the other metaphysical and counter-entropic, able to maintain and sustain the other in accordance with the Divine will, the real sense of tov (עיי' בראשות רבה פי"ד סי' ד' וע"ע רש"י עה"פ ע"פ מדרש אחר,).

With this in mind, we turn to the Maharal mi-Prag (נתיבות עולם ח"ב נתיב אהאבת ד' פ"א).

C.

The Maharal learns a bit farther into the mishna cited supra, and notes that חייב האדם לברך על הרעה כשם שמברך על הטובה (“A person is obligated to recite a blessing for an instance of ra‘ just as he does for an instance of tov”), and goes on; וזה כי כאשר הביא הש"י עליו צרה ועם כל זה מברך הש"י מורה זה על אהבה גמורה מאוד (“and this is because, when Ha-Shem brings woe upon a person, and nonetheless he blesses Ha-Shem, it is indicative of a very complete love”).

He goes on to explain that such a bëracha constitutes recognition that the woe, too, is of Divine origin: אף כי היא רעה מצד המקבל כו' גם הרע הוא מצד הטוב כו' אי אפשר בעולם שיהי' מדת היסורין באים על האדם ולא יהי' זה כפרה על חטאתו (“even though it appears to be ra‘ from the receiver’s standpoint... even the ra‘ stems from tov.... It is impossible in the world that a measure of sufferings [yissurin] come upon a person which does not serve as atonement [kappara] for his sin [chata’atho]”).

So, as we suspected above, the very concept of ra‘ is limited to this world; in origin it also stems from G-d, הטוב והמטיב, “the Good One Who brings about good,” as we say every shacharith. Ra‘ is a matter of perception.

The Maharal then cites a remarkable midrash: "וירא אלקים את כל אשר עשה והנה טוב מאד", כו' אמר רב הונא, "והנה טוב מאד" זו מדת יסורין. וכי מדת יסטרין טוב מאד אתמהא! אלא שעל ידי' הבריות באים לחיי העה"ב וכן שלמה אומר "ודרך חיים תוכחות מוסר", ואמרת צא וראה איזהו דרך מביאה את האדם לחיי העה"ב הוי אומר זו מדת יסורין (“‘And G-d saw all that He had made and behold, it was very good [tov më’od; Genesis I, 31]’... Said Rav Huna, tov më’od is a measure of sufferings [yissurin]. And is then a measure of sufferings very good?! I am surprised! Rather, that by means of it G-d’s creatures come to the life of the next world, and so does Shlomo say, ‘The way of life is [through] the rebukes of discipline [mussar, from the same root as yissurin; Proverbs VI, 23]’; and you say, Go forth and see which way leads a person to the life of the next world? I would say, the measure of yissurin”; בראשיץ רבה פ"ו סי' י').

D.

It is this physical cosmos and its built-in quality of ra‘, of decline and decay, which we naturally perceive as “bad,” which leads to the quality’s being distinguished from tov. The quality of ra‘ is inherent in the physical realm’s distance and alienation from its Divine, metaphysical Source. We carry out the mitzva of ahavath Ha-Shem by using the physical realm to perform all of the other mitzvoth, whether by utilizing physical objects or by avoiding those to be avoided in the mitzvoth lo’ tha‘aseh, the “negative” commandments. The fact that we pick ourselves up, and continue in the way of the Torah, despite exile, despite the loss of the Béyth ha-Miqdash, despite our long and gruesome history, is primâ facie evidence of our ahava gëmura më’od, our very complete love for Ha-Shem, as the Maharal writes.

Nor is that love unrequited. The holy Zohar proclaims: "ועתה מה לי פה נאם ד' כי לקח עמי חנם וגו'" תא חזי רחימוץא דקב"ה בישראל אע"ג דחובייהו גרמו לאסתלקא מבינייהו ואתבדרו ביני עממיא הוא תבע עלבונא דלהון כו' כיון דגרמו חובייהו ואתגלי ישראל מארעא קדישא קב"ה לא עאל בגנתי' ולא משתעשע בי' ולא עוד אלא שהוא צווח ואמר "ועתה מה לי פה" וגו' (“‘And now, what have I here. says Ha-Shem, for My people has been taken for nothing’ [Isaiah LII, 5]. Come and see the love of the holy One, Blessed is He for Israel, that even though their sins have caused that they disappear from amongst them and be exiled amongst the nations, He claims recompense for their injury... Since their sins have caused Israel to be exiled from the Holy Land, the Holy One, Blessed is He does not enter His garden and takes no delight in it; and not only that, but He cries out, ‘And now, what have I here....”; ח"ג רס"ז.).

it is not only Israel who are in exile, and Israel’s return from exile, when the exile ends and the “garden of Ha-Shem” restored, it is not only faithful Israel, lovers of Ha-Shem, who will rejoice.
נחמו נחמו עמי (“Be comforted, be comforted My people....”; Isaiah XL, 1).

Parshath Va-Ethchannan (Deuteronomy III,23-VII,11)

A.

ואתחנן אל ד' בעת ההיא לאמר כו' אעברה נא ואראה את הארץ הטובה וגו' (“And I beseeched Ha-Shem at that time, saying.... Please let me cross and see the good land....” III, 23-25.)

Moshe relates that he begged G-d to rescind the decree which He had issued in the wake of the failure at Mei M’riva (Numbers XXVII, 12-14), and allow him to enter the Holy Land. The great Chida (Rabbi Chayyim Yosef David Azulai) cites the Sifrei in his sefer Parshath Drachim (דרוש ח' דה"מ ודרך אגב) to the effect that Moshe was convinced that G-d had nullified His vow not to let Moshe enter the Holy Land, and on that basis made his petition. He goes on to quote the opinion of a contemporary of his, the Mahari Adarbi, that Moshe believed that Transjordan was, indeed, part of Eretz Yisrael, and that he reasoned that, since G-d had allowed him to enter the plains of Mo’av, He had at least partially nullified His vow, and there is a halachic principle that בטל מקצתו בטל כולו; once something has been partially nullified, it may be considered nullified in its entirety.

Later on, in his sefer Rosh David, the Chida returned to this question, and noted that the question is in fact dependent upon a dispute between Tanna’im, in this case, Rabbi Shim‘on bar Yochai and Rabbi Yehuda ben Betheira; Rabbi Shim‘on bar Yochai held that Transjordan is indeed part of Eretz Yisrael, whilst Rabbi Yehuda ben Betheira held that it was not. (עיי' בכורות נ"ה., וע"ע ספרי פר' מסעי, פסקא ג').

The Chida draws the obvious conclusion, namely that Moshe Rabbeinu must have held in accordance with Rabbi Shim‘on bar Yochai’s view that Transjordan is in fact an integral part of Eretz Yisrael, as well as the equally obvious conclusion that G-d begged to differ, that rather Transjordan is not part of Eretz Yisrael, as Rabbi Yehuda ben Betheira held, and that therefore the Divine vow had been in no way nullified.

The Szatmárer Rebbe, Rabbi Yo’el Teitelbaum זצ"ל, revisited this issue (דברי יואל, פרשתנו, דה"מ והחיד"א ) and asked how it could be that Moshe held like Rabbi Shim‘on bar Yochai in this instance and apparently got the halacha wrong. After all, had Moshe not received the entire Torah on Mt. Sinai, to include the opinions of the Tanna’im? If so, how had he managed to miss Rabbi Yehuda ben Betheira’s opinion?

B.

In order to propose an answer to the Rebbe’s question, we must first reexamine a principle which has been mentioned before in these divrei Torah (עיי' למשל א"ז ישיר לפר' לך לך, שנת תשס"ז). The principle may be summarised as follows:

The midrash (בראשית רבה פס"א סי' א') takes note of the fact that Avraham Avinu is said to have observed the entire Torah, to include the fine distinctions of the Oral Torah, and then asks: אב לא למדו ורב לא הי' לא ומהיכן למד את התורה? (“[His] father did not teach him, and he did not have a rabbi; from where did he learn the Torah?”). Avraham had to know what he was to do, after all, before he could be observant. Rabbi Shim‘on answers: זימן לו הקב"ה שתי כליותיו כמין שני רבנים והיו נובעות ומלמדות אותו תורה וחכמה (“The Holy One, Blessed is He, furnished him with his two kidneys as a sort of pair of rabbis, and they derived and taught him Torah and wisdom”).

In order fully to appreciate the implications of what Rabbi Shim‘on is suggesting, we note first the wording of Genesis XV, 4 concerning Yitzchaq, where G-d says אשר יצא ממעיך יירשך (“the one who comes out of your belly will inherit you”). Of course, Yitzchaq was born in the manner of all the rest of us, from his mother’s abdomen, but the Torah here quite clearly alludes to what was common knowledge to Chazal (עיי' למשל נדה ל:), and is confirmed by modern genetics, namely that both parents have input into the characteristics of their offspring. However, Chazal tell us that the matter goes much farther than the mere physical make-up of the children: אב ואם אית לנשמתא כמא כמא דאית אב ואם לגופא בארעא (“The soul has a father and mother, just as the body on earth has a father and mother;” זוה"ק ח"ב י"ב: וע"ע ח"ד קע"ד: ), which means that a person’s metaphysical nature is as much an inherent potential in his parents as is the physical nature.

As a prophet, Avraham had the ability to “see” not only in the physical sense, but also to “see” in a metaphysical fashion (hence, there are two verbs for “see” in the Holy Language, ראה, which is a general reference, and חזה, which appears to be a specific reference to this metaphysical phenomenon). As such, then, חזיון is a form of perception which transcends the four physical dimensions (including time) which bound and limit our world.

Nor was Avraham the only person of prophetic sensitivity who possessed such a faculty of metaphysical sight. The midrash, for instance, tells us that the conflict between Yosef and his brothers was fueled, in part, because they were aware that Yerov‘am ben Nevat, the first king of the northern kingdom of Israel who deliberately introduced an idolatrous cult into his country and thereby led to the estrangement of the Ten Tribes, would be a descendant of Efrayim ben Yosef (בראשית רבה פ"ד סי' ז' מתנת כהונה שם). Similarly, Qorach was motivated in his rebellion against Moshe, in part, because he knew that amongst his descendants would be the prophet Shmuel, about whom it would be said ששקול כנגד משה ואהרן שנאמר "משה ואהרן בכהניו ושמואל בקראי שמו" (“that he was comparable to Moshe and Aharon, as it is said, ‘Moshe and Aharon with his kohanim and Shmu’el with those who call His name’ [Psalms XCIX, 6];” במדבר רבה פ"ח סי' ז' ).

Now, Moshe was the greatest of prophets, as the Torah attests: ולא קם נביא עוד בישראל כמשה (“And there did not arise another prophet in Israel like Moshe....” Deuteronomy XXXIV, 10), and as such had this faculty to an unprecedented degree. Thus, for instance, before he killed the Egyptian overseer who was beating a helpless Israelite to death, the Torah tells us וירא כי אין איש (“And he saw that there was no man;” Exodus II, 12) and Rashi explains that he looked into the miscreant’s future progeny and determined that none would be worthy, before dispatching him.
With such a capability of prophetic vision, then, we can well stipulate that, in the midst of Israel, Moshe had access to all of them, and to everything which their progeny would learn. But even this wonderful faculty had an inherent limitation: Moshe could only “read” those who were, in fact. present with him at Sinai.

C.

Elsewhere (סנהדרין צ"ב:), the Talmud tells us that a faction of the bnei Efrayim erred in attempting to calculate the end of the Egyptian exile, and therefore attempted to leave Egypt prematurely; as a result, they were slaughtered by the Plishtim. These men were the “dry bones” which were subsequently revived, during the Babylonian exile, by the prophet Yechezqel (Ezekiel XXXVII, 1-14), so that they rejoined Israel, married, and sired children. The gmara goes on to explain that Rabbi Yehuda ben Betheira testified that he was descended from these men.

With this in mind, I would suggest that Moshe Rabbeinu, through his unequalled prophetic “sight,” did indeed have access to the work of all those Tanna’im and Amora’im whose ancestors were present at Mt. Sinai. For this reason, he was familiar with Rabbi Shim‘on bar Yochai’s opinion that Transjordan is a part of Eretz Yisra’él, and based his conclusions and actions on it.

However, Rabbi Yehuda ben Betheira’s paternal ancestors were not present at Mt. Sinai; at that moment in history, their bones were whitening in the desert, and would only be revived by Yechezqel some nine centuries later. Hence. Moshe was unaware of his opinion, and so G-d Himself informed him of it, and that in light of it, the Divine vow had not been nullified at all.

D.

In my humble opinion, this explication of metaphysical reality goes far to explain how it was possible that Moshe Rabbeinu received the entire Torah on Mt. Sinai, to include its oral component, and yet that oral tradition, embodied for us in the Talmudim and the midrashei halacha, is in large part expressed in terms of the opinions of later scholars, many of whom lived in the Second Temple period and afterward, over a millennium after Mattan Torah.

Armed with the written Torah, the thirteen rules of Talmudic logic, the precise definitions of technical terms, and the precise values of the Torah’s weights and measures, Moshe was able to work out the rest, cross-checking and evaluating all of the input from Chazal which was available to him through the metaphysical germ plasm of their ancenstors who were present at Sinai, accessible to him through his unrivaled prophetic vision.

Parshath Va-Ethchannan (Deuteronomy III,21-VI,11) 7/27/07

A.

This week’s parasha contains Moshe’s repetition of the Âsereth ha-Dibroth, the “Ten Utterances” with which Mattan Torah began, often misnamed the “Ten Commandments” (V, 6-18).

The Mishna describes how the kohanim used to pray in the Temple: אמר להם הממונה ברכו ברכה אחת והם ברכו וקראו עשרת הדברות ושמע והי' אם שמוע וגו' (“The one appointed [to lead the service] said to [the kohanim] to recite one blessing, and they recited [it] and read the Âsereth ha-Dibroth, Shma [Deuteronomy VI, 4-9], [and] V’haya im shamoa [ibid., XI, 13-21]....” תמיד פ"ה מ"א:).

Elsewhere (ברכות י"ב.) we learn: אמר ר"י אמר שמואל אף בגבולין בקשו לקרות כן אלא שכבר בטלום מפני תרעומת המינים (“Said Rabbi Yehuda, said Shmu’el, 'Even in the countryside people sought to read thus, but [the rabbis] had already abolished them because of the insinuations of the heretics [minim]'”), who used the practice to advance the claim to the less well-educated, as Rashi explains ad loc., that אין שאר התורה אמת ותדעו שאין קורין אלא מה שאמר הק"בה ושמעו מפיו בסיני (“the rest of the Torah is not true, and [that] you should know that [we] do not read anything save what the Holy One Blessed is He said and they heard from His mouth at Sinai”). In other words, the minim wanted to promotee the idea that there were “ten commandments,” rather than 613, which had to be obeyed (ע"ע ירושלמי ברכות פ"א ה"ה דאמרינן התם "מפני טענת המינים שלא יאמרו אלו לבדן ניתנו למשה בסיני").

Basing himself on the above passages, an anonymous chacham asked Rambam whether the custom of standing during the reading of the Âsereth ha-Dibroth should also be discouraged, on the grounds that it is מדרכי המינים המאמינים שלעשרת הדברות מעלה על שאר התורה (“of the ways of the minim who believe that the Âssereth ha-Dibroth are more important than the rest of the Torah”). He offers two explanations which he had heard for the custom, that it commemorates the fact that Israel stood during the original utterances at the foot of Sinai, and that it is an age-old custom of the ancient communities of Babylon. He refutes both of these, saying that the reason Israel stood was out of respect, since they were being addressed directly by G-d, and, similarly, that people in the Babylonian communities rose out of respect for the august personages, roshei yeshiva or reishei galutha, whom it was customary to honour with the reading; other, more humble communities not addressed directly by G-d or graced by such august personages need not follow the Babylonian example.

Rambam responds by ruling in favour of the questioner: בכל מקום שמנהגם לעמוד צריך למנעם בגלל מה שמגיע בזה מן ההפסד באמונה ומה שמדמים שיש בתורה מדריגות וכו' וזה רע מאוד וגו' (“in every place in which their custom is to stand they should be prevented because of what comes of it in loss of faith and that they imagine that there are levels [of truth] in the Torah... and this is very bad....” שו"ת רבינו הרמב"ם מכ"י אוקספורד, סי' מ"ו).

If so, why do we still stand?

B.

Rabbi Chayyim Yosef David Azulai (Chida) was asked the same question independently. He responded that the ban on reading the Âssereth ha-Dibroth together with the Shma mentioned in the gmara supra and standing whilst hearing the Dibroth during a regular Torah reading, are two very different things: הכא שקורין בס"ת כל התורה מידי שבת בשבתו וגם ביום זה שהם קורין עשרת הדברות קורין איזה חלק מהתורה בס"ת לית לן בה דמוכח דהכל אמת אלא שהם עומדים בהם להיות שהם יסוד התורה ונכתבו בלוחות (“And here where we read the entire Torah from the séfer Torah, sabbath after sabbath, and also on this day when they read the Âsereth ha-Dibroth they read a certain portion of the Torah from the séfer Torah we have no part in [this heresy] for it is demonstrated that it is all truth, but they stand during [the Âssereth ha-Dibroth] because they are the foundation of the Torah and were written on the Tablets....” שו"ת טוב עין סי' י"א).

More recently, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein זצ"ל (אגרות משה או"ח ח"ד סי' כ"ב) ruled similarly to Chida, but on the basis of a different rationale:

First, he notes that Rambam wrote in his comments on the mishna supra that the Dibroth are עיקר הדת וראשיתו שלכן חזינן שלא בטלו מלומר במקדש (“the root and starting point of the [Jewish] religion, for which reason we see that they were not abolished from being said in the Temple”).

He then cites the opinion of the Tif’ereth Yisra’él on the same mishna: דכך היתה התקנה אף בגבולין לקרות בכל יום עשרת הדברות קודם ק"ש. אולי מקורו הוא מלשון שכבר בטלום דלא שייך לשון ביטול על מה שלא הי' כלל כו' שהי' זה אחר זמן גדול משבטלום שרצו עוד הפעם להנהיג כו' ואמר ר"י אמר שמואל שכיון שכבר בטלום מחמת שבגבולין יש מקומות שלא נמצאו ת"ח והטעו המינים את ע"ה אין להנהיג בהא כו' (“that thus had been the ruling, that even in the countryside [it had been the norm] to read every day the Âsereth ha-Dibroth before reading Shma; perhaps [the Tif’ereth Yisra’él’s] source is the phrase ‘they already abolished them’ since the term ‘abolished’ does not apply to something which had never been at all... For this was some time after they had abolished them that people wanted to institute the custom once again... and Rabbi Yehuda said that Shmu’el said that since [their predecessors] had already abolished [the custom], since there were places in the countryside where there were no Torah scholars [unlike in the Temple, where the Sanhedrin was immediately available to answer questions], and the minim could mislead the peasantry, one should not reinstitute it....”).

Rabbi Feinstein concludes that standing in the synagogue is unrelated to this, but shows the importance of every individual member of Israel, who merited to hear these words directly from G-d’s mouth, דזהו ענין אחר אינו בכלל מה שבטלו דלפי זה אין לדמות מילתא למילתא (‘for this is a different matter entirely, amd is not sat all what they abolished, and accordingly one should not compare the one to the other”). The custom of standing during the Âsereth ha-Dibroth, he rules, is valid.

Rabbi Ovadya Yosef שליט"א, for his part, was asked a variant of this question: If one finds oneself in a synagogue in which the custom is to stand for the Dibroth, what should one do?

Rabbi Yosef begins by reviewing Rambam’s ruling, and declares אין לזוז מפסק דינו של הרמב"ם הנ"ל (“one may not budge from the above ruling of the Rambam”). He then proceeds to note Chida’s opinion, concluding that Chida was unaware of Rambam’s opinion, and would have changed his mind had he known of it. In support of this thesis, he adduces two other unrelated cases in which Chida ruled differently from Rambam and later reversed himself on learning Rambam’s view.

Turning to the immediate question, he notes that Chazal say: לא יהי' אדם יושב בין העומדים ועומד בין היושבין (“A person should not be sitting amongst the standing or standing amongst the sitting”; מסכת דרך ארץ רבה פ"ז וזוטא פ"ה), explaining that this only applies in the absence of a compelling halachic reason to behave differently than the rest. Nonetheless, to sit whilst the others were standing in this case would appear to show disrespect. Therefore, he suggests that if one knows in advance the custom of the synagogue, one should stand for the entire reading, or at least for the entire âliya in which the Âsereth ha-Dibroth occur, so as not to violate Rambam’s ruling not to stand specifically for the Dibroth whilst still maintaining peace and decorum (יחוה דעת ח"ו סי' ח').

Rabbi Yosef does nor mention Rabbi Feinstein’s opinion. Can they be reconciled?

C.

If we turn to the Shulchan Âruch, we find that, whilst he did not rule on this specific issue, he does say concerning Torah readings in general: א"צ לעמוד מעומד בעת שקורין בתורה (“One need not stand erect whilst the Torah is being read;” או"ח קמ"ו סע' ד'). His source in this is the practice of Rav Sar Shalom, one of the Ba’âlei Tosafoth, cited in the Tur (שם). Rema adds the gloss: ויש מחמירין ועומדין וכן עשה מהר"ם (“And there are those who are stringent and stand; thus did the Maharam mé-Rothenburg”).

On this, the Mishna Brura cites a comment of the Bach (או"ח קמ"א) דגם המהר"ם מודה דמדינא שרי אלא דס"ל דראוי להדר ולעמוד מפני שצריך האדם להעלות בדעתו כששומע הקריאה מפי הקורא כאילו קבלה אותה שעה מהר סיני ובהר סיני היו כל ישראל עומדין כו' (“that even the Maharam admits that it is permitted [to sit], but he holds that it is proper to stand because a person ought to consider as he hears the reading from the reader that it is as if he received [the Torah] that moment from Mt. Sinai, and at Mt. Sinai all Israel were standing....”).

Now, I once heard in the name of Rabbi Yosef Dov Soloceitchik זצ"ל an explanation that the difference between Rav Sar Shalom and the Maharam goes back to the question of what Ezra’s intention was in issuing the original ruling that one should read the Torah on Monday, Thursday, and Shabbath (בבא קמא פ"ב.): Did he intend it simply as a measure to encourage Torah learning, or did he have the deeper intent of emulating Mattan Torah three times a week, in keeping with the verse רק השמר לך ושמור נפשך מאד פן תשכח את הדברים אשר ראו עיניך כו' יום אשר עמדת לפני ד' אלקיך וגו' (“ Just guard yourself and guard your life lest your forget the things which your eyes have seen...[on] the day you stood before Ha-Shem your G-d;” Deuteronomy IV, 9-10, ועיי' יומא ה:).

If his intent was the former, the Talmud tells us that, from the death of Rabban Gamliel ha-Zaqen, due to advancing human weakness the old practice of studying Torah whilst standing was abolished (סוטה מ"ט. רש"י שם ע"פ מגילה כ"א.); this presumably underlies Rav Sar Shalom’s practice. On the other hand, if his intent was the latter, this explains the Maharam, who nonetheless agreed (the Bach goes on) ומי שהוא איש חלש וקשה לו לעמוד ועי"ז אין דעתו מיושבת עליו לכוין לקול הקורא יש לו לישב (“and whoever is weak and finds it hard to stand and for this reason cannot concentrate on the voice of the reader should sit”).

D.

Even if we agree with Rav Sar Shalom (as, apparently, both Rambam and the M’chabbér did) that the primary purpose of reading the Torah in the synagogue is study, it seems to me that there is nonetheless room to say that the two parashoth containing the Dibroth constitute a recapitulation of Mattan Torah, and therefore one should stand for them (as Chida and Rabbi Feinstein ruled). This is espoecially true in our day, when there are normally Torah scholars present in our congrgations (if only in the person of the congregational rabbi) who could deal with any minim and their issues.

But perhaps the best course is to follow Rabbi Yosef’s advice (who does not suggest making an issue of the custom, even though he disagrees with it), and stand for the entire reading, or at least the relevant âliya rather than only for the Dibroth, in deference to Rambam’s opinion, so as to comply with all the rulings, and avoid disputes.

For אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים (“These and these are the living words of G-d;” עירובין י"ג:).