A.
Our parasha deals with the challenge to Moshe’s authority which was mounted by Qorach and his sect: כל העדה כלם קדושים ובתוכם ד' ומדוע תתנשאו על קהל ד' (“...the whole congregation are all of them holy, and why should you exalt yourselves over Ha-Shem’s community?” XVI, 3).
Rashi quotes the midrash telling us how Qorach and his cohorts confronted Moshe: באו ועמדו לפני משה, אמרו לו, טלית שכולה של תכלת חייבת ציצית או פטורה? אמר להם חייבת. התחילו לצחק עליו, אפשר טלית של מין אחר חוט אחד של תכלת פוטרתה, זו שכולה תכלת לא תפטור את עצמה? (“They came and stood before Moshe; they said to him, 'Does a tallith which is entirely of t’chéleth require tzitzith?' He told them, 'It does.' They began to laugh at him, 'Is it possible that a tallith of another sort is redeemed by a single thread of t’chéleth; [and] this [tallith], which is entirely t’chéleth should not redeem itself?'”).
If we consider the matter in light of what we learnt in last week’s parasha concerning tzitzith, it becomes apparent that there is something odd about Qorach’s claim: The mitzva, after all, consists of hanging a knotted group of eight strands on each corener of a four-cornered garment, such that the sum of the eight strands, the five knots, and the gimatriya (“numerical value”) of the word tzitzith add up to remind us of the 613 mitzvoth in the Torah (cf. XV, 39, Rashi ad loc.). The single sky-blue (t’chéleth) thread is one detail of the mitzva. At present, when we have forgotten the identity of the sea creature (chilazon) which was the source of the dye, the common practice is to wear knotted strands which are entirely white; the lack of t’chéleth does not nullify the mitzva.
So what lies behind Qorach’s evident allegation that the whole point of the mitzva of tzitzith was the t’chéleth?
B.
We begin to unravel the matter by turning to a Tosafoth, where we learn דאמר במדרש כו' שהיו אומרים ישראל כיון שנגזר עליהן שלא ליכנס לארץ ממעשה המרגלים שוב אין מחוייבין במצות (“that it says in the midrash... that Israel were saying, since it had been decreed upon them not to enter the [holy] land because of the incident of the spies [in last week’s parasha], they were no longer obligated in mitzvoth”).
The Torah contains many mitzvoth whose observance is dependent upon residence in Eretz Yisra’él. Now that the débâcle of the spies had brought about the consequence that most of the yotz’ei Mitzrayim were going to perish in the desert, doubts began to arise in the hearts of many concerning the effectivity of the rest of the mitzvoth which they had been observing, until now, on their way to the Promised Land. The Chida writes that Qorach was amongst the doubters (ראש דוד המובא בספר תורת החיד"א על פרשתנו).
The mere existence of such a doubt, in and of itself, was not necessarily a fatal development.
There is a well known principle that ספק דאורייתא לחומרא, in case of a doubt concerning the written Torah we act stringently, as the Talmud illustrates with many examples (עיי' למשל ביצה נ: בען השאר וע"ע ספר ארעא דרבנן סי' קס"ו). The holy nation which had come into being a Sinai would surely have risen to the occasion.
Yet, there is one case in the Torah in which a doubtful observance cannot take place. That case is Shabbath.
The observance of Shabbath has two purposes: On the one hand, it proclaims, each week, that Ha-Shem created the world in seven days (Exodus XX, 8-11), and on the other, it commemorates Israel’s liberation from Egyptian bondage (Deuteronomy V, 12-15). Bnei Noach, who are not obligated to observe the Torah’s 613 mitzvoth, are not permitted to engage in Shabbath observance (Genesis VLLL, 22; ע"ע סנהדרין נ"ח:). The reason is that these demonstrations are the essence of Israel’s mission as the ממלעת כהנים וגוי קדוש (“kingdom of kohanim and holy nation;” Exodus XIX, 6) which necessitates all of the other mitzvoth. Clearly, if there is doubt concerning the obligation to observe them, there is doubt concerning Shabbath.
So, we can see, those who considered their status doubtful were in a quandary: How were they to behave? If they were still bnei Noach and not obligated in mitzvoth because they were not going to settle the Holy Land, they were forbidden to observe Shabbath; if, on the other hand, they had become fully obligated in the mitzvoth at Sinai despite the fact that they would never be able to observe many of them, they were obligated to observe Shabbath. What would be the right thing to do?
C.
In my comments on Parshath Va-Yéshev two years ago, I noted that the Chida establishes elsewhere that the dispute between Yosef and his brothers was really centered on their halachic status: The brothers believed believed that their voluntary observance of the Torah before it had been commanded rendered them בני ישראל גמורים, full bnei Yisra’él with a status equal to that which would be granted at Sinai, whilst Yosef believed that they were still bnei Noach (ספר פרשת דרכים, דרוש א' דה"מ הנראה אצלי).
If so, then Yosef had already had to deal with the question of how, as a ben Noach who voluntarily assumed the obligations of Torah, he was to handle the question of Shabbath.
A question very like this one once came before Rabbi Ya’aqov Ettlinger, the rabbi of Altona (Hamburg) in the mid-19th century and world-renowned poséq in his day. It seems that a certain man had presented himself for conversion to a béyth din in Jerusalem, where he had taken upon himself the mitzvoth, and undergone circumcision. Medical difficulties resulting from the circumcision precluded his going into a miqvah to complete the process for quite some time. The question arose: What was the fellow’s status concerning Sabbath observance? Was he to be considered Jewish already, or not quite yet?
The controversy divided the holy city, and someone thought to ask Rabbi Ettlinger. In his t’shuva, the rav responded שצווי שהיתת ישראל ואזהרת שביתת בני נח אינם מענין אחד שבזה תלוי בל"ט מלאכות ובזה תלוי במלאכת טורח ויגיעה מצאנו אפילו למי שלבו נוקפו לומר שגר שמל ולא טבל מותר לקיים שבת פשר דבר ע"י שיעשה מלאכת יגיעה שאינה מל"ט מלאכות כגון שישא משא ברה"י כן נראה לענ"ד (“that the commandment that Israel rest [on the Sabbath] and the admonition concerning resting for non-Jews do not concern the same subject, for the former relates to the 39 mlachoth [forbidden on the Sabbath] and the latter relates to troublesome or laborious work; we found that even for one whose heart inclines to say that a gér who was circumcised and not immersed is permitted to observe the Sabbath, the meaning of the thing is that he perform [some] mlecheth yegi’â which is not [one] of the 39 mlachoth, for instance, that he carry a load within a private domain; so does it seem, in my humble opinion;” שו"ת בנין ציון סי' צ"א).
Now, there is a general prohibition of carrting something from a private domain to a public domain on the Sabbath. Needless to say, this dows not apply to one’s attire, properly worn. Hence, bnei Yisra’él, who are obligated to wear tzitziyoth on the corners of a four-cornered garment, such tzitziyoth are an integral part of their attire, and may be worn from one domain to the other; for bnei Noach, who are not so obligated, wearing tzitziyoth from one domain to the other is arguably carrying. In this way, I suggested, the doubtful convert could deal with his doubt: If he was indeed a kosher convert, he was obligated in tzitzith, and going from one domain to the other wearing them was not problematic; if he was not yet a convert, then wearing tzitzith and moving from one domain to the other would be enough of a m’lacha to constitute a violation of Shabbath.
This, I suggested, is what Yosef was about when he returned to Potifar’s house לעשות מלאכתו (“to do his m’lacha;” Genesis XXXIX, 11); it was his way of coping with Shabbath.
D.
So the yotz’ei Mitzrayim who were in doubt concerning their status had an example from Yosef ha-tzaddiq telling them how to cope with the doubtful mitzvoth of Shabbath, and Qorach, as a member of the group, was aware of their considerations.
When he decided upon his rebellion against Moshe’s authority, and wished to decouple a sizable group of Israel from the Torah to constitute his sect, he could not deny that the Torah had been given; everyone, after all, had been at Sinai. What he could do, however, was to distort the mitzvoth, to dispute that Moshe was interpreting them correctly.
By seizing on the mitzva of tzitzith, and emphasizing the detail of t’chéleth over the strings themselves, he would be able to persuade his followers that a tallith made entirely of t’chéleth surely did fulfill the mitzva, and was therefore exampt from tzitzith. If so, in order to avoid illicit Sabbath observance, it would be necessary for them to do something else, some m’lacha clearly part of the thirty-nine forbidden categories. Once started down that path, he reasoned, עבירה גוררת עבירה, one violation leads to another (אבות פ"ד מ"ב), and they would be on the way to decoupling themselves from the Torah, and so from their teacher, Moshe, G-d forbid.
The alternate thesis, the same mishna tells us, is also true: מצוה גוררת מצוה, one mitzva leads to another. Where Qorach sought to apply the principle negatively, we can apply it positively, strengthen our observance, and come closer to the Torah and to G-d.
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