דבר אל בני ישראל ואמרת אליהם אדם כי יקריב מכם קרבן וגו' (“Speak to the bnei Yisra’él and you shall say to them, 'A person, for he will bring from you a sacrifice....'” I, 2).
The wording of this first commandment in the book of Leviticus is a bit unusual; the word ki more usually begins a clause, followed by the verb and nominal subject. The presence here of the subject of the sentence, adam, outside of the clause means that it is especially emphasized by its odd position.
Rashi ad loc. follows the midrash (ויקרא רבה פ"ב סי' ג') to explain why the passage should so anomalously begin with adam: מה אדם הראשון לא הקריב מן הגזל שהכל הי' שלו אף אתם לא תקריבו מן הגזל (“Just as adam ha-rishon [the first man] did not bring sacrifice from stolen goods, since everything was his, you, too, should not bring sacrifice from stolen goods”).
In the Talmud (סוכה ל.), we find Rabbi Yochanan saying in the name of Rabbi Shim’on bar Yochai that a stolen sacrifice is invalid, לא שנא לפני יאוש לא שנא לאחר יאוש. בשלמא לפני יאוש "אדם כי יקריב מכם" אמר רחמנא ולאו דידי' הוא (“it makes no difference before [the original owner has despaired of his loss – yi’ush] or after yi’ush. Before yi’ush is all right, ‘a person for he will bring from you a sacrifice’ said the Merciful One, and it is not his”).
It appears that Rabbi Shim’on bar Yochai wishes to derive the invalidity of a stolen sacrifice from the word mikkem (“from/of you”), which he reads as though it is mi-shella-chem (“of yours”). Why does he appear to ignore the unusually emphasized word adam which apparently struck Rav Berechya, the author of the midrash cited by Rashi supra?
B.
If we turn elsewhere in the Talmud (חולין ס.), we find a discussion of the first ox which was offered by adam ha-rishon in sacrifice, and a number of remarkable qualities which it had. Not the least remarkable, of course, is that this ox, offered so soon after the Creation, could not have been born in the normal fashion of oxen ever since; it must have been one of the animals created at the very beginning.
This has ramifications in halacha, as we discover in yet another Talmudic source (בכורות נ"ז.), where we find a dispute whether or not an animal not born in the normal fashion can be a kosher sacrifice: The debate centres on Leviticus XXII, 27: שור או כשב או עז כי יולד וכו' ירצה לקרבן אשה לה' (“An ox or sheep or goat which is born... will be desired as a burnt sacrifice to Ha-Shem”), where we find that the Rabbanan would forbid, e.g. a yotzé dofen (an animal born by Cæsarian section) for sacrificial purposes, whilst Rabbi El’azar ben Yehuda would consider such an animal acceptable.
The halacha follows the Rabbanan (עיי' רמב"ם הל' אסורי מזבח פ"ג ה"ד), who insist that the phrase ki yivvaléd (“that it be born”) means that the animal be born normally. So it seems plain that, according to the majority opinion, the ox offered by adam ha-rishon would not have been a proper sacrifice. (If so, why did he bring such a sacrifice? As has already been implied, he did the best he could, since there were no other animals; the alternative would have been not to offer any sacrifice at all until a proper calf had been born and lived at least eight days. However, the flawed sacrifice which he did offer could not be an object for emulation.)
C.
Now we can see why the Talmud prefers to derive the prohibition of a stolen sacrifice from mikkem, rather than from adam. Turning to yet another place in the Talmud (נדה מ.) we find, in so many words: אמר רבי יוחנן דרבי שמעון סבר דבקדשים יוצא דופן פסול (“Said Rabbi Yochanan that Rabbi Shim’on held that concerning sacrificial animals a yotzé dofen is invalid”). As Rashi informs us, when the Talmud mentions Rabbi Shim’on without the patrronymic, the intent is always Rabbi Shim’on bar Yochai (שבועות ב: דה"מ משמו).
In other words, Rabbi Shim’on bar Yochai concurred with the majority opinion, and not with Rabbi El’azar ben Yehuda on this issue. For that reason, he rejected the example of adam ha-rishon, and looked elsewhere for the source of the prohibition.
But then what led Rashi to reject the Talmud’s conclusion here in favour of the midrash?
D.
The Sifthei Chachamim tells us that Rashi expected to find the word ish (“man”) here instead of the word adam, in light of the Talmudic pronouncement that adam generally refers to a ben Yisra’él (יבמות ס"א:) and, as is well known, non-Jews are also able to bring sacrifices (cf. I Kings VII, 41-3, מנחות ע"ג:). Hence, explains the Sifthei Chachamim, Rashi felt compelled to cite the midrash, enabling him to understand adam as referring to adam ha-rishon, common ancestor of all mankind, so that the prohibition of a stolen sacrifice applies to Jew and non-Jew alike.
The Talmudic source of this interpretation, cited supra, tells us: תניא וכן הי' ר"ש בן יוחאי אומר קברי עובדי כוכבים אינן מטמאין באהל כו' רבינא אמר נהי דמעטינהו קרא מאטמויי באהל דכתיב "אדם כי ימות באהל" (“It is taught, 'And so Rabbi Shim’on ben Yochai used to say, "The graves of idolators do not render [anyone] tamé when within an enclosed space...."' Ravina said, 'It appears that a verse excludes [non-Jews] from causing tum’a in an enclosed space, for it is written, "An adam for he may die within an enclosed space"' [Numbers XIX, 14]”). Thus, Rabbi Shim’on bar Yochai specifically held that adam refers to bnei Yisra’él.
But if this is so, then הדרא קושיא אדוכתה, our question returns: It appears from the first Talmudic passage supra (from Sukka) that Rabbi Shim’on bar Yochai wants to derive the prohibition of a stolen sacrifice from the word mikkem. If he really held that adam ordinarily refers to bnei Yisra’él, why was he not open to the drasha based on adam ha-rishon’s practice which Rav Berechya in the midrash and later Rashi favored?
It is true enough that other Tanna’im diasagreed with Rabbi Shim’on bar Yochai on the interpretation of adam, e.g. Rabban Shim’on ben Gamli’el and Rabbi Yossi (עיי' אהלות פי"ח מ"ט וכלאים פ"ח מ"ה, ר"ש שם). But it is Rabbi Shim’on bar Yochai whose view appears to be cited, not theirs.
The only possible answer, it seems to me, is that the gmara in Sukka never intended to learn the reason for the prohibition of a stolen sacrifice from Rabbi Shim’on bar Yochai. Rather, his opinion is cited in explanation of the mishna’s earlier assertion that לולב הגזול פסול, one may not fulfill one’s obligations on Sukkoth with a stolen lulav, just as one may not fulfill one’s duty to bring a sacrifice with a stolen animal. The mishna itself is anonymous and, as is well known, סתם משנה רבי מאיר, an anonymous mishnaic statement is attributed to Rabbi Me’ir (עירובין צ"ו:). As it happens, the gmara makes quite clear elsewhere that Rabbi Me’ir held that adam can also refer to a non-Jew (סנהדרין נ"ט.).
Hence, as Rabbi Me’ir did not accept Rabbi Shim’on bar Yochai’s opinion, he therefore would not have accepted Rav Berechya’s and Rashi’s reasoning concerning the word adam, and consequently needed a different hook on which to hang the universal prohibition of a stolen sacrifice.
Which he found in the word mikkem, QED.
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