A.
Our parasha relates that G-d, having planted the first human being (adam) in the Garden of ‘Éden, told him: מכל עץ הגן אכל תאכל: ומעץ הדעת טוב ורע לא תאכל ממנו כי ביום אכלך ממנו מות תמות: (“From every tree of the garden, eating shall you eat. And from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, you shall not eat of it, for on the day you eat of it dying shall you die”; II, 16-17).
If we examine the language of this passage, we note that it contains two verbal doublets, in which the first form is what grammarians call the maqor, “source,” a verbal noun often used as the infinitive, and the second is an imperfective: achol tochél, translated here by the awkward circumlocution “eating shall you eat,” and moth tamuth, “dying shall you die.”
The Talmud contains considerable discussion of this peculiar but common grammatical form, and debates whether it is to be considered as a sort of intensive (often translated, e.g. “you shall surely eat”), or if the “extra” word is in fact available for interpretation or expansion of the meaning (עיי' למשל ברכות ל"א:, יבמות ע"א., כתובות ס"ז:, נדרים ג., גיטין מ"א: בין השאר).
Basing himself on these discussions, the third Ozherover Rebbe, Rabbi Aryeh Yëhuda Leibush ha-Lévi Epstein זי"ע in his séfer Birkath Tov, suggests that exactly this ambiguity is at play here: Does achol tochél imply a commandment (mitzva) to eat of all the trees of the garden, or is it granting permission (rëshuth) to eat of them? The question, he notes, has implications for the next verse: If the first verse implies a mitzva, then lo’ thochal, the next verb, means that there is no mitzva to eat of the tree in the middle of the garden, the ‘étz ha-da‘ath; if, on the other hand, it constitutes rëshuth, then the next phrase withdraws permission to eat of that middle tree.
So which is it? And what are the implications of either interpretation for the subsequent dialogue between that remarkable creature called the nachash, “snake”, and the first woman?
B.
To understand the next part, we turn to the Talmud. The mishna tells us: חטאת העוף כיצד הי' נעשית כו' מולק את ראשה ממול ערפה ואינו מבדיל וגו' (“How was a sin-offering of a bird [chattath ha-‘of] performed?...[The kohén] wrings its head at the nape of its neck, but does not separate [it from the body]....”; זבחים ס"ד: במשנה, רש"י שם).
The basis for the mishna is Leviticus V, 8, which reads, in part: ומלק את ראשה ממול ערפה ולא יבדיל (“,,,and [the kohén] will nip its head at the nape of its neck and will not separate [it]”).
A bit later on, the gëmara records: אומר הי' ר"א בר' שמעון, שמעתי בחטאת העוף שמבדילין, ומאי "לא יבדיל"? אין צריך להבדיל (“Said Rabbi El‘azar ben Rabbi Shim‘on, 'I heard concerning chattath ha-‘of that one separates [the head from the body], and why [does the verse read] ‘he will not separate’? He need not separate”; שם ס"ה:). By this, Rabbi El’azar means that word mëliqa, “nipping” or “wringing,” implies that the head is twisted off. Hence, the last clause, vë-lo’ yavdil, does not mean that the head must not be removed, i.e., that it is an invalid sacrifice if the head is removed, but merely that if it happens not to come completely off, it does not matter.
This in turn prompted further discussion among the Amora’im: א"ל רב אחא ברי' דרבא לרב אשי, אלא מעתה גם בור, דכתיב "ולא יכסנו" , הכא נמי דאין צריך לכסותו! הכא השתא, התם כיון דכתיב "בעל הבור ישלם" עלוי' הוא דרמי לי' לכסויי, אבל הכא מכדי כתיב "והקריבו" חלק הכתוב בין חטאת העוף לעולת העוף, לא יבדיל ל"ל? ש"מ אין צריך להבדיל (“Said Rav Acha son of Rava to Rav Ashi, 'But from now, [this should apply] even [in the case of] a pit, for it is written ‘and he will not cover it’[Exodus XXI,33], here, too, [one might say that] he need not cover it! The cases are different; in that one, since it is written ‘the owner of the pit will pay’[ibid., 34], for that reason we mention his covering it; but here [i.e., in a case of ‘olath ha-‘of; cf. Leviticus I, 14], since it is written ‘and he will sacrifice it’, Scripture distinguishes between a chattath ha-‘of and an ‘olath ha-‘of ; why should it read ‘he will not separate’? To tell us that he need not separate”; שם ס"ו.).
Rav Acha is making a reductio ad absurdum, in an effort to establish the limits of when such a phrase as lo’ yavdil or lo’ yëchassennu indicates an actual prohibition, or indicates that an action is not necessary. In the case of the pit, since the Torah informs us that the owner of the pit will be fined to cover the damages of anyone whose animal strays into it, it plainly implies that the pit should be covered. In the case of the bird, since the point of mëliqa is to kill the bird swiftly and extract its blood, it does not matter if the head is actually severed or not.
So we see that such a phrase as lo’ yavdil is not necessarily a prohibition, and can instead mean that an action is not necessary. As Tosafoth (שם ד"ה אלא מעתה) clarify, whether or not we need to ask what such a clause means is a matter of sëvara, of the internal logic of the verse and the purpose it serves. Applying sëvara to G-d’s statement supra, we can determine that if achol tochél means that there was a mitzva to eat from the garden’s trees, the subsequent lo’ thochal means simply that there was no mitzva to eat from the ‘étz ha-da‘ath; if, on the other hand, achol tochél granted permission to eat of them, lo’ thochal revoked that permission for the ‘étz ha-da‘ath.
C.
Now let us consider the dialogue between the woman and the nachash.
The nachash begins the exchange with an odd remark: אף כי אמר אלקים לא תאכלו מכל עץ הגן (“Perhaps G-d said, You will not eat from any tree of the garden”; III, 1). Rashi points out that only a little observation should have been necessary for the snake to ascertain that they were eat-ing of the trees in the garden; so why say this? The Rebbe suggests that he intended to draw out of the woman what she thought achol tochél meant: Did she and her husband have a mitzva to eat from the garden’s trees, or rëshuth? Her answer would determine what he would say next.
The woman answers: מפרי עץ הגן נאכל: ומפרי העץ אשר בתוך הגן אמר אלקים לא תאכלו ממנו ולא תגעו בו פן תמתון (“Of the fruit of the garden’s trees we shall eat. And of the fruit of the tree within the garden, G-d said, You will not eat of it and you will not touch it, lest you may die;” ibid., 2-3). Her straightforward declaration, “we shall eat,” shows that she considered it a mitzva to eat of the garden’s trees; hence, it was not a mitzva to eat of the ‘étz ha-da‘ath (but not necessarily prohibited). The final nun of the last verb, tëmuthun, imparts a potential or conditional sense to the word, as the Ha‘améq Davar notes in several places.
The nachash builds on this: לא מות תמתון, “You may not surely die”, כי ידע אלקים כי ביום אכלכם ממנו ונפקחו עיניכם והייתם כאלקים ידעי טוב ורע (“For G-d knows that on the day you eat of it your eyes will be opened and you will be like G-d, knowing good and evil”; 4-5). It was this joint knowledge of good and evil which bore the potential, but not the certainty, of death.
The nachash, says the Rebbe, was recommending: שטוב יותר לאכול כדי שתדע מידיעת הרע ואף על פי כן תכבוש את היצר הרע אזי יגיע להם יותר שכר, כי כעת שאין מבחינים אין מגיעים להם שכר גדול, ואך כאשר ידעו טוב ורע אזי כאשר יכבשו היצר הרע יהי' יותר שכר וזהו "ותרא האשה וגו' ונחמד העץ להשכיל" וגו' (“that it would be better to eat in order to know something of the knowledge of evil, and even so she would conquer the yétzer ha-ra‘ and so they would deserve more reward, for their time innocence they did not deserve so great a reward, but when they would know good and evil, then when they would conquer the yétzer ha-ra‘ there would be more reward, and this is [what Scripture means] ‘and the woman saw... and the tree was nice for enlightenment....’’).
And she went for the greater reward.
D.
Why would G-d express Himself in such an ambiguous fashion to His creatures, using simple, declarative terms, rather than these potentially deceptive doublets, such that they might err?
The Rebbe explains: שאם הי' אומר לו בפירוש בלי שום עיון וסברא בזה, אז קודם התפשטות היצר בו לא הי' כלל שום הוה אמינא שיעבור על דברי השי"ת ולא הי' שייך בזה שום מצוה וגו' (“that if [G-d] had spoken to [the adam] clearly, without scope for study or sëvara, then before the yétzer [ha-ra‘] had been internalized [for the snake was the yétzer ha-ra‘], there would have been no grounds on which the adam might have violated Ha-Shem’s words, and there would be no point to such a mitzva....”).
The Alter of Novaradok, in his séfer Madreigath ha-Adam (first essay), explains that the adam in his pristine state was a wholly spiritual being wrapped in, but not connected, a fleshy envelope. In that state, there was virtually no difference between the adam and a mal’ach; carrying out a mitzva would have been mëmeila, automatic, a foregone conclusion. There would have been no scope for free choice, and hence nothing to reward. It was for this reason that G-d endowed the adam with reason, and gave him scope to exercise it.
So how should the first couple have reasoned? מספק הי' לו להחמיר כו' פן באכילת שאר הפירות הוא מצוה ובעץ הדעת פן הכונה שהוא איסור וגו' (“out of doubt he should have been stringent, lest concerning eating the other fruits it be a mitzva, and concerning the ‘étz ha-da‘ath it be a prohibition...”). Precisely because the statement was ambiguous, he should have been stringent in both cases, until or unless the matter was clarified further by G-d.
אין מיתה בלא חטא, Chazal tell us (שבת נ"ח.); there is no death without sin. The advice is still good.
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