A.
Amongst the materials for construction of the Mishkan in this week’s parasha we find: וערת אילם מאדמים וערת תחשים ןעצי שטים (“and ram hides dyed red, and tachash hides and shittim wood;” XXV, 5).
Rashi explains the elusive tachash with an abbreviated statement from the Talmud, which it is worth quoting here in full: אומר הי' ר"מ, תחש שהי' בימי משה ברי' בפני עצמה הי' ולא הכריעו בו חכמים אם מין חי' הוא אם מין בהמה הוא, וקרן אחת היתה לו במצחו, ולפי שעה נזדמן לו למשה ועשה ממנו משכן ונגנז (“Rabbi Me’ir used to say, 'The tachash which existed in Moshe’s day was a unique creation, and the Chachamim never decided whether it was a sort of wild animal or a sort of domestic animal; and it had a single horn in its forehead, and was made available to Moshe for that moment, and he made a Mishkan from it, and [the tachash] was put away;'” שבת כ"ח:).
Though a rare beast, the tachash appears not to have been so rare as all that, since the prophet Yechezqel, who lived centuries after the Mishkan was bult, also makes mention of it (Ezekiel XVI, 10), which prompts the Sifthei Chachamim to explain why Rashi found it necessary to assert the animal’s uniqueness: ותחש דיחזקאל מין חי' טמאה היא (“and Yechezqel’s tachash was a sort of tamé wild animal”), and hence not suitable for a holy purpose, such as the contruction of the Mishkan. In order that there be a uniquely kosher variety of tachash for this purpose, it seems, such a creature was created.
B.
But was a special act of creation the only way in which a kosher tachash could have been brought into existence?
The question is prompted by the following extraordinary case, mentioned elsewhere in the Talmud: בהמה טהורה שילדה כמין בהמה טמאה מותר באכילה, וטמאה שילדה כמין בהמה טהורה אסור באכילה, שהיוצא מן הטמא טמא והיוצא מן הטהור טהור (“A clean animal which has given birth to [a young animal] resembling a sort of tamé animal, [the young] is permissible to eat, and a tamé animal which has given birth to a [young animal] resembling a clean animal, the young is forbidden to eat, for what comes out of a tamé animal is tamé, and what comes out of a clean animal is clean;” בכורות ה: במשנה). The gmara ad loc. explains that the mishna is a gzeirath ha-kathuv, a Biblically mandated finding, based on a careful reading of Numbers XVIII, 17.
The principle is brought down l’halacha (שו"ע יו"ד סי' ע"ט סעיף ב'), on which the Pithchei T’shuva comments: שנסתפק אם דינה כטמאה ממש או אמרינן הואיל ויש בה סימני טהרה הרי היא כטהרה אלא אסורה באכילה (“that it is doubtful whether [a clean animal born of a tamé mother] has a status completely like a tamé animal, or do we say [that] since it possess signs of cleanness [i.e., resembles a kosher animal], it is like a clean animal, but is forbidden to eat” because of the gzeirath ha-kathuv; שם ס"ק ב' בשם תשובת יד אלי').
The Pithchei T’shuva appears to be telling us that such an anomalous creature shares aspects of both its natures: Its kashruth is determined by the status of the mother, but, in the event that, e.g., a mare has somehow given birth to an anatomically correct cow, the thing happens to be a tamé cow, which cannot be eaten, not a misshapen horse.
If we now return to our original issue, it seems to me that a kosher tachash could have been obtained in this manner: If a pregnant cow or a ewe were Divinely directed to give birth to an anatomically correct tachash, then following the logic of the Pithchei T’shuva, the animal would be entirely kosher, since its mother was kosher, but it would also possess the simanim, the “signs” of a tachash, without necessitating the special creation of a unique creature, as the gmara cited supra and Rashi intimate.
So what was the hechrach, the necessity, for the special act of creation they seem to require?
C.
Though he does not say this explicitly, the Pithchei T’shuva’s halachic svara, his “legal logic,” seems to me to be based upon another mishna, where we learn: המפלת כמין בהמה חי' ועוף בין טמאין בין טהורין, אם זכר תשב לזכר ואם נקבה תשב לנקבה כו' דברי רבי מאיר, וחכמים אומרים, כל שאין בו מצורת אדם אינו ולד (“'[If a woman] miscarries [a fetus shaped] like a sort of domestic animal, or wild animal, or fowl, if it is male, she should sit [for the requisite period] for a male [cf. Leviticus XII, 4] and if it is female, she should sit [for the requisite period] for a female [ibid., 10]...' [those are] the words of Rabbi Me’ir; and the Chachamim say, 'Anything which does not partake of the form of a human being, is not a [human] fetus;” נדה כ"א. במשנה).
The Pithchei T’shuva clearly seems to be guided by the opinon of the Chachamim in his estimation that the shape or form of the young animal determines its identity (וכן הלכתא, עיי' שו"ע יו"ד סי' קצ"ד סעיף ג' ), but what is most interesting for our purpsoes is Rabbi Me’ir’s opinion. He appears to hold that the young creature’s identity is entirely defined by its mother; indeed, a bit later on in the gmara (שם, כ"ג.), Rabbi Yirmya takes Rabbi Me’ir’s position to its logical extreme: לר"מ דאמר בהמה במעי אשה ולד מעליא הוא, קבל בה אבי' קידושין מהו? (“According to Rabbi Meir, who says that a beast in a woman’s belly is a valid human fetus, what would be the case if [such a female fetus survived and] her father married her off?”).
In light of his opinion, then, it is not at all surprising that it is Rabbi Me’ir who requires that the kosher tachash be a completely unique creation, since he would not accept our case of a “tachash son of cow” as being a tachash at all, but simply a misshapen calf.
But it is noteworthy that when Rashi excerpts this passage, he follows his usual custom of not ciring the author of the statement. The implication is that he, and the Talmud, feel that this was the metzi’uth, what actually took place. Since it seems to be important that this is Rabbi Me’ir’s opinion being cited (because the halacha, as we see from the Pithchei T’shuva, does not appear to agree with him), why does Rashi not mention Rabbi Me’ir here?
D.
The answer, I believe, can be seen by returning to the words of the Pithchei T’shuva: He says that the status of the anomalous young animal is נסתפק, “doubtful”; he does not express certainty one way or the other, if the young creature is a calf (according to its form) or a colt (according to its mother).
The argument which I have made above, following the Pithchei T’shuva’s logic, may be true. It may be the case that a cow could give birth to young resembling a tachash in every respect save that they are kosher, but it also may not be so. If the creature originates from a special act of Divine creation, though, it obviates all doubts, and one avoids having to ask the sh’éla.
This, then, is the lesson to be learnt, I believe, from how Rashi deals with this matter. ברי ושמא ברי עדיף, the Talmud tells us (כתובות י"ב:); when confronted with a choice between a clear certainty and a case of “perhaps,” choose the clear certainty.
No comments:
Post a Comment