A.
ויהי ביום השלישי בהית בקר ויהי קלת וברקים וענן כבד על ההר וקל שפר חזק מאד ויחרד כל העם אשר במחנה (“And it was on the third day as it became morning, and there were sounds and thunderbolts and a heavy cloud on the mountain, and the very strong sound of a shofar; and all of the people who were in the camp trembled;” XIX, 16). So dawned the day on which Moshe began to receive the constitution of the nation of Israel, the Torah before all of Israel assembled, the day which has been celebrated ever since as the holiday of Shavu’oth.
The Talmud tells us of the great Amora, Rav Yosef: ביומא דעצרתא אמר עבדי לי עגלא תלתא, אמר אי לא האי יומא דקא גרים כמה יוסף איכא בשוקא (“On the day of Shavu’oth he would say, 'Prepare for me a choice calf;' he would say, 'Were it not for what this day brought about, how many Yosefs are there in the marketplace?'” פסחים ס"ח:).
Rashi offers an explanation of Rav Yosef’s sentiment: אי לא האי יומא שלמדתי תורה והתרוממתי הרי אנשים הרבה בשוק ששמן יוסף ומה ביני לבינם (“Were it not for this, because I have learnt Torah and been raised up, there are many men in the marketplace named Yosef; what difference would there be between me and them?”).
At first blush it seems that Rav Yosef’s gratitude for Mattan Torah lay in that it gave him the opportunity to learn, and thereby be exalted over the common “Joe.” A little reflection, though, will reveal that that cannot be his intent: after all, every one of those other Yosefs had the same opportunity as he did; as the Torah itself tells: תורה צוה לנו משה מורשה קהלת יעקב (“Moshe commanded us Torah, an inheritance, community of Ya’aqov;” Deuteronomy XXXIII, 4). Rav Yosef’s superior intellectual and spiritual gifts may have made him better able to take advantage of the opportunity, but the opportunity itself is common to all Israel.
So what did Rav Yosef really mean?
B.
We begin by discussing the parameters of the principle גדול המצווה ועושה יותר ממי שאינו מצווה ועושה (“Greater is one who is commanded and does [mitzvoth] than is one who is not commanded and [yet still] does [mitzvoth]”). This principle is asserted and discussed in several places in the Talmud.
In one of those places (בבא קמא ל"ח:), we learn: מנין שאפילו נכרי ועוסק בתורה שהוא ככהן גדול? ת"ל "אשר יעשה אותם האדם וחי בהם" -- כהנים, לויים, וישראלים לא נאמר אלא האדם, הא למדת שאפילו נכרי ועוסק בתורה הרי הוא ככהן גדול (“Whence [do we learn] that even a non-Jew who involves himself with Torah is like a kohén gadol? The teaching is to say, ‘and a person will do them and live by them’ [Leviticus XI,]. ‘Kohanim, Leviyyim, Yisr’élim but ‘person;’ hence you have learnt that even a non-Jew who is involved with Torah is like a kohén gadol”). Even a non-Jew who is engaged in Torah is worthy of respect and honor, no less than a person occupying the office of kohén gadol.
However: אמרי, אין מקבלים עליהם שכר כמצווה ועושה אלא כמי שאינו מצווה ועושה דא"ר חנינא גדול המצווה ועושה ממי שאינו מצווה ועושה (“[The Rabbis] say, 'They do not receive a reward like one who is commanded and does, but rather like one who is not commanded and does, as Rabbi Chanina said, "Greater is one who is commanded and does than one who is not commanded and does"'”). Despite the respect and honor due him, his reward is not the same as that of Israel.
At first glance, this principle, as I have observed before, seems counterintuitive. After all, if a child offers to help set the table, for instance, how much more praiseworthy does it seem than if the child waits to be asked by his or her parents? A little consideration, though, raises the question: How does the child know to offer? It can only be because he or she understands the parents’ expectations, and wishes to please them.
The communication of those expectations to the child constitutes the tzivvuy, the commandment; the child’s offer is not based on the child’s own conception of what to do, but constitutes willing compliance with the parents’ expectations. Willing compliance is surely greater than unwilling or forced compliance, but in both cases it is compliance with expected norms.
So it is with Israel; G-d expects Torah learning and observance of us. Knowing that, we willing bend to the yoke. The nochri, the non-Jew, has no such expectations levied on him; accordingly, if he sees what Israel does, likes it, and tries to emulate it, for whatever personal reasons, the emulation is worthy of respect, but the reward is according to the expectation.
C.
A bit later in the same massechta (דף פ"ז.), we learn: אמר רב יוסך, מריש הוה אמינא, מאן דאמר הלהכה כר' יהודה, דאמר סומא פטור מן המצהת, קא עבדינא יומא טבא לרבנן. מ"ט? דלא מפקדינא וקא עבדינא מצות (“Said Rav Yosef, 'At first I used to say, "Whoever says that the halacha is like Rabbi Yehuda, who said, 'A blind man is exempt from the mitzvoth,' I would make a celebration for the Rabbis [on his account]." Why? For I am not commanded, [yet still] I do mitzvoth'”).
The Tanna Rabbi Yehuda holds that a blind man, whose impairment renders it impossible for him to perform many of the mitzvoth, is therefore exempt from their obligation. Rav Yosef, as Rashi ad loc. informs us, was blind, and it appears that he originally understood the relationship of obligation and performance according to the intuitive understanding which I detailed above, namely, that if he is exempt from the mitzvoth, but nonetheless learns Torah and acts accordingly, his reward must be greater than others.
However: והשתא דשמעית הא דר' חנינא, דאמר ר' חנינא, גדול המצווה ועושה יותר ממי שאינו מצווה ועושה, מאן דאמר לי אין הלכה כרבי יהודה עבדינא יומא טבא לרבנן. מ"ט? דכי מפקדינא אית לי אגרא טפי (“And now that I have heard Rabbi Chanina’s opinion, that Rabbi Chanina said, 'Greater is one who is commanded and does than one who is not commanded and does,' whoever says to me that the halacha is not like Rabbi Yehuda [will cause me to] make a celebration for the Rabbis. Why? For if I am commanded, I have a greater reward”).
D.
Unfortunately for Rav Yosef, though, the halacha is basically like Rabbi Yehuda: so many mitzvoth require sightedness that a blind person is pretty exempt from them (עיי' למשל רמב"ם הל' רוצח פ"ו הי"ד והגהות מיימוניות שם ).
So what did he mean when he said that, had it not been for Mattan Torah, there would be no difference between him and any other Yosef in the marketplace? The answer, I suspect, tells us much about the character of Rav Yosef, and the other chachamim.
If Rav Yosef was indeed exempt from the mitzvoth, the plain implication is that level of reward due him in the next world was relatively small, equivalent to that of the nochri who learns Torah, mentioned above, in that he was in the class of éyno m’tzuvveh v’ôseh.
The same, however, was not, and is not, true of the rest of Klal Yisra’él, most of whom, baruch Ha-Shem, are not impaired or handicapped, and hence fall into the category of m’tzuvveh v’ôseh.
But they only do so because of Mattan Torah. Had, G-d forbid, the Torah not been given to Israel, then there really would be no difference with regard to the level of the reward due any ordinary “Joe” in the marketplace, and Rav Yosef. They would all be nochrim; there would be no nation of Israel, no m’tzuvvim.
Far from suggesting that he had an exalted status (though one certainly suspects that the reward due Rav Yosef, based on the quantity of Torah learnt and mitzvoth performed, was quite considerable, regardless of the “reward per unit,” if we may put it in those terms), Rav Yosef was being m’lamméd zchuth, singing the praises of the ordinary Jew, who, as a m’tzuvveh v’ôseh, thanks to Mattan Torah, is thus distinguished from him.
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