A.
ויהי העם כמתאוננים רע באזני ד' כו' וזכרנו כו' את הקשואים ואת האבטיכים וגו' ועתה נפשנו יבשה אין כל בלתי אל המן עינינו: (“And the people were like murmuring evil in the ears of Ha-Shem.... And we remembered... the cucumbers and the melons.... And now, our souls are dry, there is nothing before our eyes except the man;” XI, 1-6).
Rabbi Shim’on was moved to comment מפני מה המן משתנה לכל דבר חוץ מאלו? מפני שהן קשים למניקות. (“Why did the man change into anything [they wanted to eat] save for these? Because they are hard on nursing women....ספרי פיסקא כ"ט בגירסת רש"י, עיי' עמק הנצי"ב שם בספרי).
There does not appear to be a nutritional consideration as to why these specific items are not recommended for nursing mothers, so we look elsewhere for an explanation.
B.
We begin by noting a proverbial statenent, recorded in at least three different places in the Talmud: טבא חדא פלפלתא חריפתא ממלי צנא דקרי (“Better is one sharp pepper than a basketful of cucumbers”; חגיגה י., יומא פ"ה:, מגילה ז., בעצם "קר" נראה שפירושו כל מין ירק המתגדל ע"י גפן). In order to establish the reason behind the peper’s superiority, we note the following:
Rashi is bothered by an apparent inconsistency between Genesis I, 11 and the next verse. In the first, G-d commands: תדשא הארץ דשא עשב מזריע זרע עץ פרי עשה פרי למינו (“Let the earth bring forth greenery, seed-bearing grass and fruit trees bearing fruit of their kind”). The very next verse records the earth’s execution of that command, and we read: ותוצא הארץ כו' ועץ עשה פרי (“And the earth brought forth... trees bearing fruit”). In other words, no longer is it a “fruit tree bearing fruit” but simply a “tree bearing fruit."
So, Rashi observes: "עץ פרי" שיהי' טעם העץ כטעם הפרי והיא לא עשתה כן, אלא "ותוצא הארץ וגו' ועץ עושה פרי" ולא עץ פרי. לפיכך כשנתקלל האדם על עוונו נפקדה גם היא ונתקללה (“'Fruit tree,' that the flavor of the tree should be like the flavor of the fruit, and [the earth] did not do so, but ‘and the earth brought forth... a tree bearing fruit’ and not a fruit tree. Therefore, when the [first] man was cursed because of his transgression, [the earth] was also taken into account and cursed”).
Thus, Rashi explains the fact that when mankind was kicked out of the garden, the earth was also cursed: ארורה האדמה בעבורך וגו' וקוץ ודרדר תצמיח לך וגו'... (“Cursed is the ground because of you.... And thorn and thistle will it sprout for you....” III, 17-18).
The Talmud establishes elsewhere that there is an עץ שטעם עצו וטעם פריו שייה, הוי אומר זה פלפלין (“tree such that the flavor of the tree and the flavor of the fruit is the same; I would say this is the pepper”; סוכה ל"ה:, ע"ע ברכות ל"ו:). If so, the Divine commandment was carried out concerning the pepper tree to the letter; as such, it arguably has a certain status over the others, in that it had no share in the transgression which had rendered the earth vulnerable to the curse when mankind had been cursed (cf. my remarks on Parshath Acharei Moth/Qedoshim a few weeks ago, in which I discussed this matter at some length in a different connection).
This theme of vulnerability at some crucial juncture, such as a time of danger, is shot through Torah literature (עיי' למשל משניות שנת פ"ב מ"ו, ר' עובדי' מברטנורא שם, ועוד הרבה). It is simply prudent at such a time not to invite extra scrutiny by calling attention to old sins.
Now consider: At the time of that primordial curse, the first woman had been told: הרבה ארבה עצבונך והרנך בעצב תלדי בנים (“Greatly will I increase your pain and [the length of] your pregnancy, in pain you will bear children;" ibid., v. 16). Rashi, ad loc., tells us that the references to pain and pregnancy refer to צער העבור, צער הלידה, וצער גידול בנים (“the pain of pregnancy, the pain of birth, and the pain of raising children”).
In other words, as a result of her part in the “forbidden fruit” incident, Chava would have additional suffering in the bearing and rearing of children (note that G-d did not say that it would have been painless had they not eaten the fruit; rather, הרבה ארבה עצבונך, “I will increase your pain" (cf. Sforno ad loc. in this connection).
The items in our verse share the same curse, but so do others; why these in particular?
In the case of trees (as was established in Acharei Moth/Qedoshim) fulfilling the mitzva of ôrla, in which Israel abstains from the fruit for the tree’s first three fruit-bearing years, and then dedicates the produce of the fourth year to the kohanim, removes the sting of the original curse, and renders the fruit fit for human consumption. However, in the case of the cucumber and melon, in particular, which grow on a vine, it is arguably in doubt whether or not ôrla ought to have applied (as it does, e.g., in the case of grapes, since the bracha recited on grapes is boré pri ha-êtz). Hence (I believe), Rabbi Shim’on argues, it is best for a woman at such a time of vulnerability (her suffering having already been augmented due to the curse above) not to increase her exposure, as it were, and avoid these items.
Which leads us to consider the contexts in which our proverb occurs in the Talmud.
C.
The three passages are remarkably similar. In each one, a fundamental question is posed, and several tanna’im (authorities of the mishna) present their approaches to dealing with the issue at hand. However, each of these approaches constitutes only a partial answer, and so is rejected. Enter the great Shmu’el who, together with his colleague Abba Aricha (Rav) founded the two famous Babylonian yeshivoth whose edited deliberations make up the gmara. Shmu’el says: אי הואי התם, אמרי להו דידי עדיפא מדידכו (“Had I been there [at the deliberations of the tanna’im] I would have said, my [explanation] is preferable to yours”), whereupon he provides the drasha which solves the gmara’s problem.
For instance, in Chagiga 10a the question is the source of rabbinical authority to nullify vows. As Rashi explains the issue: מעט רמז יש במקרא ואין על מה לסמוך אלא שכן מסור לחכמים בתורה שבעל פה (“There is only a little hint in Scripture and nothing to rely on, save that [this function] was delegated to the Rabbis by the Oral Torah”). The gmara then presents the attempts of several tanna’im to find the “hint” to which Rashi alludes. Shmu’el’s offering is: "לא יחל דברו", הוא אינו מוחל אבל אחרים מוחלין לו (“‘He will not profane his word’ [Numbers XXX, 3]; he [the one who made the vow] cannot forgive [his vow], but others can forgive it for him”).
אמר רבא לכולהו אית להו פירכא לבר מדשמואל דלית לי' פירכא (“Said Rava, 'All of them have a question, save Shmu’el’s [drasha] which has no question'”). In each of the other suggestions, the verse or verses cited could be understood in alternate ways; only Shmu’el’s is unambiguous. The passage ends by quoting our proverb of the pepper.
In M’gilla 7a, the issue is whether or not the book of Esther was written ברוח הקדש, with Divine input. An assortment of tanna’im offer in evidence verses which seem to record things which Mordechai (the author) could not otherwise have known. For instance, Rabbi Eli’ezer cites ויאמר המן בלבו (“And Haman said in his heart;" Esther VI, 6). Shmu’el says: "קיימו וקבלו" -- קיימו למעלה מה שקבלו למטה (“‘They sustained and they accepted’ [Esther IX, 27] -- they sustained Above [in the Béyth Din shel Ma’âla] what [the Anshei Knesseth ha-Gdola] had accepted Below”). Again, Rava points out that all of the other explanations were objectionable -- Haman’s thoughts, for example, could have been deduced from what was known of his ambition and what the king told him to do. Only Shmu’el’s suggestion concerning the proceedings of the Béyth Din shel Ma’âla could not have been known without supernatural access. The passage closes with our proverb.
Finally, in Yuma 85b, the issue is: מניין לפקוח נפש שדוחה את השבת (“Whence do we know that saving someone’s life overrides the sabbath”)? Yet again, the tanna’im say what they say, and Shmu’el proposes: "וחי בהם" ולא שימות בהם (“[It is written] ‘And live by them’ [Leviticus XVIII, 5] and not that one should die by them”). Rava considers this the best answer, and closes with our proverb.
In each case, then, the one “sharp pepper” of Shmu’el’s was held to be better than the basketful of other possible interpretations which had been proposed by the tanna’im.
D.
A careful and critical review of the three Talmudic passages cited supra reveals, it seems to me, a yet deeper connection between our proverb and Rabbi Shim’on’s explanation of our verse.
In the versions in Chagiga and M’gilla, our pepper proverb is introduced by דאמרי אינשי (“for people say”). In Yuma, however, it is introduced by אמר רבינא ואי תימא אמר רבי נחמן בר יצחק (“Said Ravina, and if you like, said Rabbi Nachman bar Yitzchaq”). In other words, the proverb is quoted בשם אומריו, in the name of those who actually said it. Why the difference?
In disqualifying all of the suggestions of sources in the written Torah for the principle that saving a life supersedes the Sabbath, Rava notes that each one is a clear justification in a case of ודאי פקוח נפש, in which one is certainly and unquestionably saving a life, but unclear in a case of ספק פקוח נפש, i.e. a case in which it is uncertain whether or not the Sabbath need be desecrated on someone’s behalf. Only Shmu’el’s application of וחי בהם clearly works in such a case; hence, it is the final, accepted explanation.
The chét’ êtz ha-da’âth (alluded to in the proverb, as we have seen) which brought about the curses on the first couple and the earth brought death into the world; the spiritual implications of the curse on the earth are alleviated, we have seen, by observance of ôrla. The mitzva of ôrla, I have suggested, might arguably be applied to other things which grow on vines (such as cucumbers and melons) as it is to grapes, at least עפ"י סברא, logically. For this reason, there may be said to be an element of saféq, of doubt, concerning the status (cursed or not) regarding things which grow on vines. Rabbi Shim’on’s drasha relieves the potential danger in this doubtful status for pregnant women, by noting the apparent heavenly ban on emulation of such things by the man.
Each of the suggestions concerning saving a life on shabbath rejected by the gmara could have led to someone dying, since it was unclear in a case in which there was a doubt as to whether overriding the Sabbath is necessary to save one’s life. Shmu’el’s explanation resolves the doubtful case, and “lifts” the matter up from death, just as Rabbi Shim’on’s explanation of the caution behind our verse similarly avoids and clarifies a doubtful case. Since the proverb has a direct bearing on the actual subject under discussion (unlike the other two passages, where it is simply a pun refering to the “sharpness” of Shmu'el’s observation vice the “blandness” of the others) it is important to know who said it, and so it is quoted בשם אומריו, with attribution.
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